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Introduction
In August 2017, Jacinda Ardern, then Labour candidate for prime minister of New
Zealand, faced this question on a radio show1:
If you are the employer of a company you need to know that type of thing
from the woman that you are employing because legally, you have to give
them maternity leave. So therefore the question is, is it OK for a PM to take
maternity leave while in office?
One year later, prime minister Ardern proved it OK returning to work six weeks after
giving birth to her first child2. Yet, to this day, parenthood puts women at a crossroads
between career and family in high-income countries and beyond. Once confined to ‘home-
making’, women have made strides in labour markets, taking up paid work at higher
rates across cohorts and more continuously along the lifecycle. Gender gaps in pay have
shrank and women and men distribute more evenly across jobs, albeit only up to a point.
And while family formation, on the other hand, remains a key life-course transition for
many, parenthood is increasingly postponed when not forgone altogether. More and more,
childbearing and child rearing are carried out independently from marriage ties, by two
parents engaged in both paid and unpaid work or in single-headed households where one
parent does it all.
Amid these secular trends in labour markets and family life, parenthood divides today
the careers of women and men. A family gap features contemporary labour markets, as
women pay economic and career prices for motherhood while men’s career progression
marches on come fatherhood. Gender inequality in paid work persists despite institu-
tional change aimed at mitigating it or curbing it altogether. Labour market and welfare
institutions have variously departed from the family wage model once supporting male
breadwinning through secure, well-paid employment, surrounded by social protections.
In particular, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands drifted away from
this family wage model in recent decades. Two main institutional changes have marked
this transition, namely the expansion of family leave rights and the flexibilisation of em-
ployment relationships. Beyond their common features, however, policy trajectories have
diverged in the three countries and so have their consequences for the family gap and
gender inequality more broadly.
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Hence, throughout this dissertation I ask how the family gap has shaped in the midst
of akin and yet distinct changes in the labour market and welfare institutions formerly
devoted to the family wage principle in the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands. By
highlighting progress and stall in the ways these three countries came to modify their
male breadwinner order, my main tenet is that policies aimed at women and families
are not, by default, women- or family-friendly. The family gap, I will argue, is often the
unintended or perverse by-product of gradual and selective institutional change.
In this Introduction I develop my argument in four steps. In a first section I define the
main contours of the family gap in the context of changing labour markets and changing
families. I then ask “What has parenthood got to do with your career?”, framing the
question in causal terms and bringing to the fore the main empirical challenges that arise
when answering such a question. In a third step I devote my attention to those institutions
that have departed from the family wage model in the three countries under consideration.
Fourth and last, I discuss the mechanisms producing the family gap with an emphasis on
their ties to the aforementioned institutional change. Throughout, I highlight the goals
and contributions of each chapter, re-affirming them together with directions for future
research in the concluding sections.
1. Gender, parenthood, and labour markets
1.1. Gender inequality in labour markets: progress and stall
In high-income countries women and men work for pay at rates more similar today than
ever before (Ahn and Mira, 2002; Charles, 2011). Figure 1 plots trends over the last 40
years (1977-2017). Even if at the tail end of a secular trend, the OECD average female
labour force participation (FLMP) rate is now 14 percentage points higher than it was in
1977. Of the three countries of interest here, the Netherlands features the most dramatic
rise in FLMP, from 32.5% in 1977 to 75.2% in 2017. Germany displays a steady growth
in FLMP3 as well, with a 24 percentage-point difference in the period considered. FLMP
in the UK has risen to similar levels despite a higher starting point back in the 1980s.
Notably, convergence between the three countries under study is evident since the late
2000s.
Beyond overall rates, female labour supply has become more continuous over the life-
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cycle across cohorts (Fouarge et al., 2010; Goldin and Mitchell, 2017). Compared to older
cohorts of women the typical life-cycle pattern comprises today later labour market entry
due to prolonged education, an evident yet smoother dip during childbearing years, and
sustained participation in later life. Both rising participation rates and continuity in paid
work have been aided by the availability of part-time work, especially in the countries
being considered (Gregg et al., 2007; Euwals et al., 2011; Trappe et al., 2015). Germany,
the UK, and the Netherlands indeed share a pattern of maternal part-time work, with
women working part-time disproportionately after the birth of a child (e.g. Anxo et al.,
2007). Gaps of around 20 percentage points exist between the part-time employment rate
of mothers of young children and the same rate for childless women in all three countries
(OECD, 2013a: 163).
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Figure 1: Female labour force participation rates in selected countries and in the OECD
area. Prior to 1989, data for Germany refers to West Germany. Source: OECD Statistics,
https://stats.oecd.org/.
Moving on from labour supply to earnings, progress has stalled in recent decades across
OECD countries. In the US, for example, rising FLMP coincided with a fast-pace shrink-
age in the pay gap in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by a slowdown in the 1990s and
2000s, with the gap halting at around 17% in 20144 (Blau and Kahn, 2000, 2006, 2017).
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For a comparison, Figure 2 plots available OECD data for gender gaps in gross earnings
at the median in the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands. In the UK, the gender gap
decreased by roughly 11 percentage points in the 1970s, from around 47% in 1970 to 36%
in 1980. By contrast, in the last decade or so, the gap reduced from around 21% in 2006
to 17% in 2016, a 4 percentage-point reduction. Similar gap levels and slow-pace change
feature both contemporary Germany and the Netherlands, albeit shorter time-series are
available especially for the latter country.
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Figure 2: Unadjusted gender wage gaps at the median in selected countries. Data refer
to full-time employees and to the self-employed. Prior to 1989, data for Germany refers
to West Germany. Source: OECD Statistics, https://stats.oecd.org/.
Notably, turning from variation over calendar time to variation over the lifecycle, studies
have reliably shown that the gender wage gap widens particularly through the early
career, and specifically around the time of first childbirth (cf. Loprest, 1992; Kunze,
2005; Manning and Swaffield, 2008; Napari, 2009; Bertrand et al., 2010; Del Bono and
Vuri, 2011; Goldin et al., 2017; Adda et al., 2017; Francesconi and Parey, 2018).
Underlying the raw gap and its evolution over both calendar time and the lifecycle are
multiple factors (for reviews, Blau and Kahn, 2017; Ponthieux and Meurs, 2015; Kunze,
2018). For one, as the gender gap in educational attainment reversed in recent decades
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(e.g. Goldin, 2006), gender differences in educational level between women and men now
contribute to the gap to the benefit of women. More continuous labour supply during
the lifecycle has also translated in a reduction of the portion of the gap explained by
gender differences in work experience (see also O’Neill and Polachek, 1993; Bar-Haim
et al., 2018).
What lies behind the gap in high-income countries today then? Labour market participa-
tion remains selective among women and, on average, those with better earnings potential
disproportionately fill the ranks of the workforce. Such positive selection leads to the un-
derestimation of gender wage gaps and in some high-income countries (take Italy, for one)
severely so (Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2008). Keeping this caveat in mind, an inevitably
partial list of causes includes: (i) segregation by field of study, and consequently, by occu-
pation (e.g. Murphy and Oesch, 2015; Adda et al., 2017; Francesconi and Parey, 2018); (ii)
differences in working-time arrangements (Triventi, 2013; Cha and Weeden, 2014) and in
how working time is rewarded across different occupations (Goldin, 2014); (iii) differential
sorting across firms and, thus, within-occupation differentials (e.g. Bayard et al., 2003;
Card et al., 2016); (iv) related, gender differences in job search, job mobility, and their
returns (e.g. Hirsch et al., 2010; Kunze and Troske, 2012); (v) gender (sex) differences
in psychological traits (for a review, Blau and Kahn, 2017); (vi) employer discrimination
(cf., for example, Hellerstein et al., 1999; Gayle and Golan, 2012; Lesner, 2018; Charles
et al., 2018).
Adjudicating the relative weight of each of these mechanisms is beyond the scope of this
dissertation. Rather, my aim is to highlight how some of these mechanisms are triggered
by one life event, the transition to parenthood.
1.2. Changing families, changing parenthood
The transition to parenthood remains a key life-course stage for many. Yet in the midst
of secular fertility decline and rising childlessness (e.g. Ahn and Mira, 2002; Kreyenfeld
and Konietzka, 2017), families are changing in high-income countries. I deem two of these
changes crucial for my purposes in this dissertation: the postponement of parenthood and
the increasingly complex entanglement of parenthood and couple formation.
When not forgone altogether, parenthood is more and more experienced later in life in
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OECD countries. With few exceptions, such as the US, the transition to parenthood has
been postponed by an average of 4 years between 1970 and the late 2000s (Gustafsson,
2001; Mills et al., 2011). Table 1 focuses on the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands.
Postponement is evident in all three countries, with mean age at first birth now surpassing
age 29 in former West Germany and the Netherlands, and age 27 in the UK5 and former
East Germany. Postponement is thus spreading and unequally so, as tertiary educated
women and men are by and large leading the way (Nicoletti and Tanturri, 2008).
Table 1: Mean age at first birth for women in selected countries and periods. Sources :
Gustafsson, 2001; Mills et al., 2011, OECD Family Database, and Human Fertility
Database.
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 ∆2010−1970
United Kingdom 23.5 24.5 25.5 27.1 27.8 4.3
Germany (West) 23.8 25.0 26.3 - 29.0 5.2
Germany (East) 22.5 22.2 22.7 - 27.2 4.7
Netherlands 24.7 25.7 27.4 28.6 29.2 4.5
Later life means later career stage. Parenthood, now more frequently than ever, may
thus come at a time when labour market careers are consolidating via human capital
accumulation (e.g. Lagakos et al., 2018) and voluntary mobility to better-paying jobs
(e.g. Schmelzer and Ramos, 2015). It follows, first, that career attainment might predate
parenthood as much as it may follow it. An average man, for example, might already
be climbing the wage ladder prior to the transition to fatherhood and, as such, it is an
empirical question whether fatherhood itself boosts a man’s wages or rather the other
way round. Second and related, individuals who postpone parenthood may gain a relative
advantage in the labour market as compared to to those who do not postpone or do not
as much. As mentioned, cohort and skill are key dimensions in stratifying parenthood
postponement. Highly-educated women and men, especially in younger cohorts, have
children later, while early parenthood is often a marker of social disadvantage (McMunn
et al., 2015; Struffolino et al., 2016). Heterogeneity in the career effects of parenthood,
consistent with these patterns, can be expected (see, for men, Chapter 1; for women,
e.g. Miller, 2011).
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Parenthood is not just happening later, but it is also more likely to intertwine with differ-
entiated union histories. Although marriage remains the modal port of entry into family
formation (Holland, 2017), non-marital transitions to parenthood have become increas-
ingly common in recent decades (Perelli-Harris et al., 2010, 2012). At the same time,
especially for couples in their 20s, marriages occurring right after conception but prior to
first birth have remained a substantial portion (from ≈10 to more than 20%) of all mar-
riages in the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands (Holland, 2017). Although less frequent,
marriages occurring right after first birth have also remained quite stable across cohorts,
being much more common in Germany and the UK rather than in the Netherlands (ibi-
dem). It is not far-fetched, therefore, to assume that the transition to parenthood still
leads to the transition to marriage, at least for a portion of the population.
Turning from union formation to its possible dissolution, life-time marriages have become
more infrequent, while divorce and re-partnering are commonplace (e.g. Elzinga and Lief-
broer, 2007). The share of single-headed, and overwhelmingly female-headed, households
with children has been rising in recent decades, up to around 20% in Germany and 15%
in the Netherlands, while stable at around 25% in the UK (Nieuwenhuis and Maldonado,
2018). What is more, the mere presence of children, as well as the couple dynamics chil-
dren can trigger (for instance, in terms of a couple’s division of labour), have been linked
to couple’s chances of divorce and to individual chances of re-partnering (for a review,
Lyngstad and Jalovaara, 2010; see also, e.g. Avdic and Karimi, 2018; Di Nallo, 2018).
This multifaceted “endogeneity of family status”, as Lundberg put it (2005), makes the
inquiry into the labour market effects of parenthood prone to bias. For example, consider
a scenario in which couples with children are more likely to split if women do not specialise
in unpaid work (e.g. Kalmijn et al., 2007). At any point in time, couples that “survive”
vice versa happen to be, disproportionately, those who have specialised along traditional
gendered lines (Becker, 1981). If my interest lies, say, in how fatherhood affects wages,
and I restrict my analyses to married men, these men may also be disproportionately
part of the surviving couples who have specialised. I would therefore risk to overstate the
impact of specialisation and, as a result, overestimate the effect fatherhood per se may
exert on wages (cf. Killewald and Gough, 2013).
All in all, from this brief consideration of demographic change, I derive two guidelines for
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the purposes of this dissertation. One is to pay as much attention to the (labour market)
processes that lead to the transition to parenthood as to what follows it. The second
guideline is not to condition the study of parenthood to couple-level dynamics (e.g. the
transition to marriage), for they are cyclically intertwined with parenthood itself.
1.3. Babies and careers: a (quick) review of the family gap
A wealth of research in fact points to parenthood as a key factor behind persisting gender
(wage) gaps in labour markets (Angelov et al., 2016; Wilner, 2016; Kleven et al., 2017;
Adda et al., 2017; Butikofer et al., 2018). In a series of seminal articles, economist Jane
Waldfogel (1995; 1997; 1998b; 1998a) first introduced the expression “family gap” to
indicate the observed wage losses attached to the transition to motherhood. Mothers
earn lower wages with respect to what they did prior to giving birth to their offspring (a
within component if you will, e.g. Gangl and Ziefle, 2009). Largely as a result, mothers
mature an earning disadvantage compared to women who delay or forgo motherhood
entirely, as well as with respect to men (a between component, e.g. Sigle-Rushton and
Waldfogel, 2007).
Focusing on the within component, motherhood wage penalties have been assessed all
around high-income countries and beyond (see e.g. for Germany: Ku¨hhirt and Ludwig,
2012; the UK: Harkness, 2016; the Netherlands: De Hoon et al., 2017; the US: Budig
and England, 2001; Canada: Fuller and Hirsh, 2018; Australia: Livermore et al., 2011;
Denmark: Kleven et al., 2017; Sweden: Angelov et al., 2016; Norway: Cools et al., 2017;
France: Lucifora et al., 2017; Switzerland: Oesch et al., 2017; Italy: Martino, 2017; Spain:
Ferna´ndez-Kranz et al., 2013; China: Yu and Xie, 2018). These economic losses vary in
size, ranging from modest dips of around 3% up to and exceeding 20%, in comparison
to women’s earnings preceding childbirth. The wide range of the wage penalty for an
average woman can be traced back to variation among countries. In the small group of
countries under consideration here, for instance, harsher motherhood wage penalties are
typically found in Germany vis-a`-vis the UK and the Netherlands (Davies and Pierre,
2005; Gangl and Ziefle, 2009; Ku¨hhirt and Ludwig, 2012; Harkness, 2016).
Yet differences in study design hinder credible rankings among countries. In particular,
early studies may have underestimated the magnitude of the penalty by neglecting non-
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linearities, i.e. that penalties could be harsher in the first years after the event and
be mitigated by some wage recovery, however partial, later on. Alternatively, penalties
could be long-lasting, with no rebounding as years go by since the event. Event-study
designs, in which wage changes are investigated in each year relative to the timing of the
transition to parenthood, have started to shed light on such dynamics (Angelov et al.,
2016; Cheng, 2016; Kleven et al., 2017; Chapter 1 and 2 in this dissertation). The case
of Denmark is illustrative: studies have found small or even negligible wage penalties for
Danish mothers in the short term (Simonsen and Skipper, 2006, 2012). Differently, the
event-study design of Kleven and colleagues (2017) provides evidence for a sizeable and
long-lasting motherhood penalty in Denmark, pulling down mothers’ wages by roughly
20 percent (see also Lundborg et al., 2017). Similar discrepancies can be found for other
countries and, as a result, policy implications starkly differ across studies. In a frequently
cited comparative paper, Davies and Pierre (2005: 485) trace their inability to detect a
wage penalty for French mothers back to the role of institutions such as “publicly funded
cre`ches, day care institutions and after school facilities developed to enable mothers to
work full-time”. In contrast, Lucifora and colleagues (2017) find a long-lasting wage drop
of around 10 percent for French mothers, a result they attribute to the impact of reduction
in working hours and absenteeism – thus calling out market dynamics incompatible with
the presence of small children in the household.
Despite the ongoing debate on its size and dynamics, the effect motherhood exerts on
the wages of women is nonetheless well established, especially as compared to other links
between parenthood and labour market outcomes. First, extending the scope of Waldfo-
gel’s original definition, studies have contended that the family gap may also comprise a
fatherhood wage premium. Opposite to the wage penalty for mothers, parenthood may
further divide the careers of women and men by boosting men’s wages. Fathers earn
more after the transition to parenthood than they did prior to it and fathers typically
out-earn childless men (e.g. Lundberg and Rose, 2000; Petersen et al., 2011; Killewald,
2013; Cooke and Fuller, 2018). Overall though, the size of such premiums rarely exceeds
1-2% and, similar to motherhood, the dynamics of the fatherhood effect (if any) have
not been scrutinized in the literature yet. Also, recent studies on a closely related sub-
ject, the wage premium seemingly attached to marriage (male marital premium), have
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cast doubts on whether family formation indeed causally affects men’s wages. Rather,
the observed premiums might be more of a statistical artifact (Killewald and Lundberg,
2017; Ludwig and Bru¨derl, 2018; see also Ioannidis et al., 2017). I will explore this issue
further, focusing on fatherhood, in Chapter 1.
Closely related to wages, the family gap has also been assessed in terms of the type of
jobs parents of both sexes end up doing. Motherhood penalties in particular have been
assessed with respect to access to supervisory and managerial jobs (Bygren and Ga¨hler,
2012; Kleven et al., 2017; Lucifora et al., 2017), promotion chances (Kunze, 2015), as
well as occupational status more broadly (Aisenbrey et al., 2009; Abendroth et al., 2014).
Becoming a father, differently, seems to spark little change in the chances men have of
climbing the job ladder, although results are more of a mixed bag here (cf. Bygren and
Ga¨hler, 2012; Kleven et al., 2017; Lucifora et al., 2017).
A third arena in which a family gap may manifest is hiring chances. A seminal study
combining a lab and a field experiment in the US found mothers to be the least-preferred
candidate for hire in marketing and business jobs (Correll et al., 2007). Field experi-
ments in the financial sector in France (Petit, 2007) and across a wide array of jobs in
Sweden (Bygren et al., 2017) have not replicated this finding, while a vignette study in
Switzerland found evidence of a motherhood penalty for women applying for a HR as-
sistant position (Oesch et al., 2017). As for men, field experiments could not detect any
employer preference for fathers over women or childless men (Correll et al., 2007; By-
gren et al., 2017). Far less established than wage responses, the literature on parenthood
and hiring is thus quite inconclusive and Chapter 4 in this dissertation will provide a
contribution to it.
As in Waldfogel’s original proposal, hence, motherhood wage penalties still constitute
the bulk of the family gap both in terms of size and reliability of the statistical finding.
Additionally, a recent wave of studies suggests that the effect motherhood has on wages
has strong dynamics, meaning that we are better off thinking about the motherhood
wage penalty as something distributed over a woman’s lifecycle rather than a simple
one-off change in a woman’s wage rate. Broadening the family gap literature to career
outcomes other than wages, as well as to men’s outcomes after parenthood, is a relatively
under-developed research endeavor and consensus in many areas is still lacking.
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2. What has parenthood got to do with your career? A causal question
One question predates that of why (how, where, when, or for whom) parenthood may
affect the careers of women and men: does parenthood affect the careers of women and
men? Investigating the causal effect of parenthood on job rewards – such as wages, access
to top jobs, and so forth – requires addressing two main processes of selection by virtue of
which parenthood and career opportunities may very well intertwine, yet not causally so.
These two processes are selection into parenthood (or the problem of endogenous fertility)
and selection into employment (or the problem of endogenous sample selection bias).
In Figure 1, I present a unified graphical representation of these theoretical hurdles by
means of a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG6, see e.g. Pearl, 1995; Greenland et al., 1999;
Herna´n et al., 2004; Elwert and Winship, 2014). In brief, nodes in the network represent
observed and unobserved random variables (the latter in between brackets or denoted by
the letter U), each identified by a letter. If a letter is surrounded by a box, that variable
is conditioned on in the analysis from the get-go – meaning that it is either adjusted for
or the analysis is carried out only among units with a particular value of that variable.
Pointed arrows express direct links from causes to effects. Dashed arrows originating in
U indicate that U comprises multiple variables whose interrelations are not shown in the
graph (e.g. Greenland et al., 1999: 39). Error terms are typically absent in a DAG, as
their inputs into each variable are assumed to be marginally independent7. Finally, the
example is formalized with respect to wages (WO) as the outcome variable, but could be
easily transposed to other career outcomes.
2.1. Selection into parenthood
Positing a causal effect of parenthood (P) on wages (WO) is first threatened by common
causes of both the transition to parenthood and wage determination. In the graph, I
include a vector U standing for such characteristics. A back-door path passing through
U leads from the outcome WO back to the treatment P, qualifying U as comprising
common causes or confounders. Focusing for now on the left-hand side of the graph, valid
causal inference thus depends on blocking this path by adjusting for U. Otherwise, causal
inference may be biased by antecedent factors that select individuals into parenthood
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while also influencing wages. For instance, if low-paid women are, by the same token, more
likely to have children, one risks overestimating the motherhood wage penalty. If, vice
versa, high-earning men are more likely to become fathers, fatherhood wage premiums
may be overestimated.
P (WR)
WO
E
U
Figure 3: DAG for the causal path between parenthood P and wage offers/observed
wages WO. WR stands for the (unobserved) reservation wage; E for employment; U for
confounders in the path between P and WO. Adopted and modified from Elwert and
Winship (2014).
By and large, research in the field has developed and is still grounded on the working
assumption that common causes of P and WO are time-constant and can thereby be
netted out by adjusting for individual fixed effects in panel data analysis (e.g. Budig
and England, 2001; Gangl and Ziefle, 2009; Killewald, 2013). The latter operation has
typically lead to the claim that negative selection operates for both women (e.g. Budig and
England, 2001; Davies and Pierre, 2005; Gangl and Ziefle, 2009) and men (e.g. Lundberg
and Rose, 2000; Hodges and Budig, 2010), meaning that unobserved and time-invariant
factors boost the chances of becoming a parent while also depressing wages. For example,
preferences morphed by socialization (e.g. Hakim, 2002; Polavieja and Platt, 2014) or
education choices accounting for future earnings (e.g. Polachek, 1981) are examples of
antecedents that may underlie women’s combination of family formation and low-paying
(but perhaps “family-friendly”) jobs in adulthood.
Time-varying common causes of parenthood and wages, also subsumed in U, may still rep-
resent a threat to identification. Focusing on women for illustrative purposes, accounting
for the time-invariant component of U takes care of the possibility that women who even-
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tually have kids may typically earn lower (higher) wages than women who will eventually
remaining childless. Yet, it could still be that women sort into motherhood depending
not just on time-constant factors subsumed in their wage levels, but also on time-varying
factors leading to their wage growth. Put differently, one should account both for a) the
fact that parents(-to-be) may have a different earning potential than non-parents and b)
the fact that parents(-to-be) may be on a different wage growth path than non-parents.
For motherhood, a wealth of research has dealt with the possibility of time-varying en-
dogenous fertility, either by accounting for selection on wage growth rather than on wage
levels only (Loughran and Zissimopoulos, 2009; Livermore et al., 2011) or by deploying a
variety of instrumental variables for the transition to motherhood8 (see e.g. Hotz et al.,
1997; Miller, 2011; Kleven et al., 2017; Lundborg et al., 2017; Farbmacher et al., 2018).
Unanimously, these studies support a causal story for the motherhood wage penalty. No
comparable evidence exists for men, although in two US-based studies fatherhood wage
premiums could not be detected when accounting for the differential wage growth of men
eventually becoming fathers (Loughran and Zissimopoulos, 2009; Ludwig and Bru¨derl,
2018). Chapter 1 applies this line of reasoning and adds new evidence on fatherhood
and wages.
2.2. Selection into employment
Selection bias may also come in the form of selection into employment. At any given time
point, wage offers WO are only observed for those individuals who have accepted a wage
and therefore participate in paid work (therefore WO → E). It is well established though
that the transition to motherhood negatively affects the chances of accepting paid work
in the market (e.g. Gutie´rrez-Dome`nech, 2005; Fouarge et al., 2010; Fitzenberger et al.,
2013; Kleven et al., 2017; Kuziemko et al., 2018). Being a common effect of WO and P,
employment is a collider in the path between P and WO. As a result, limiting the analysis
to a sample of employed individuals risks biasing estimates of the effect of P on WO, to
the point that one may retrieve a statistically reliable “effect” even in the absence of a
“real” causal path leading from P to WO (Elwert and Winship, 2014: 41).
What can be done? Motherhood is supposed here to adversely affect employment by
raising a woman’s reservation wage WR (e.g. Gronau, 1974), i.e. the minimum wage offer
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that would offset the utility9 she enjoys outside of the labour market. It follows that
conditioning on WR would eliminate the bias
10, by blocking the path P → E11.
A first strategy aims to adjust for some “unobserved propensity to work”, conceivable
as a proxy of the reservation wage WR (Heckman, 1979). In a nutshell, one should run
a statistical model with E as the dependent variable, estimating women’s probability of
being employed rather than non-employed. A non-selection hazard (the so called Inverse
Mills Ratio) is then derived and plugged in the outcome model, i.e. the one with WO as the
dependent variable (for panel data, see e.g. Wooldridge, 1995; Semykina and Wooldridge,
2010; see also extensions to polytomous selection in Ermisch and Wright, 1993; Matteazzi
et al., 2014). The outcome model is still ran on the subsample of employed women (thus
conditioning on E = 1), but adjusting for the non-selection hazard blocks the non-causal
path opened by the collider E.
Gangl and Ziefle (2009) and Livermore and colleagues (2011) have taken this route when
it comes to the motherhood wage penalty. They highlight that positive selection into
employment may bias upward the estimates of the motherhood wage penalty. At any time
point in time, women with better earnings potentials are disproportionately represented
in the sample. Failing to account for this, “conventional estimators will underestimate
the motherhood wage penalty” (Gangl and Ziefle, 2009: 364; Elwert and Winship, 2014).
This approach has two main pitfalls. First, it typically assumes a unique selection rule,
meaning that women are assumed to be, on average, either positively selected or nega-
tively selected into paid work. Yet, the selection of women into paid work may change
over time (Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2008; Ejrnæs and Kunze, 2013) and, on top of that,
multiple selection rules may co-exist at a given moment in the labour market, as shown
by Neal (2004) documenting negative selection for white women and positive selection
for black women in the US (see also Machado, 2017). Second, the strategy heavily relies
on the use of exclusion restrictions, i.e. a set of variables that directly influence E, but
not WO. Identification in the absence of such restrictions is questionable (Puhani, 2000)
and theoretical and/or statistical justifications for a given exclusion restriction are hard
to come by.
Moving then to a second class of approaches to this particular selection problem requires
a shift in focus. Rather than aiming at conditioning their analyses on WR or a proxy for
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it, researchers can extend their analyses to the non-employed (E = 0) by imputing values
for the missing WO. Sample selection bias can thus be framed as a missing data problem.
Three strategies can be briefly outlined here. One is to arbitrarily assign to non-employed
women a value of 0 for their missing WO. In doing so, statistical analyses can be performed
without stratifying on the sub-sample of employed women, thus purportedly solving the
collider problem of Figure 1. Despite its promise, statistical estimates of the effect of P
→ WO will then mix up the effects of parenthood on women’s wages and the effects of
parenthood on women’s labour supply (see, e.g. Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck, 2014; Baum
and Ruhm, 2016). Besides, assigning the lowest possible wage value (0) to non-employed
women clashes with the theoretical assumption, on the other hand, that women who do
not participate in paid work have higher reservation wages on average than those who do
participate.
A second imputation strategy is available when relying on panel data. Missing values of
WO at a given point time point t for a woman i can be substituted with valid values
of WO observed, for the same woman i, in the previous period(s) t − k (for a recent
application, Jee et al., 2018). Hot deck imputations of this kind have proven useful to
correct year-by-year estimates of the gender wage gap (Blau and Kahn, 2006; Olivetti
and Petrongolo, 2008). Yet, this strategy might only trade selection bias for another
kind of bias in the case of the motherhood penalty. Since motherhood negatively affects
employment, particularly in the years immediately following a child’s birth, researchers
would impute for women – especially for those less prone to return to the market – their
pre-pregnancy wages. As a result, for these women, there would be no within-individual
variation in wages come parenthood, by design. This would automatically give rise to
attenuation bias, moving (within-individual) estimates of the overall motherhood wage
penalty closer to 0.
The third approach to imputation I survey here is based on matching. The key idea is
that wages WO of non-employed women (recipients) can be imputed using the observed
wages WO of “observationally equivalent” employed women (donors). Two additional
assumptions need to be met: (1) assignment to the donor or recipient group should depend
on a set of observable characteristics (selection on observables); (2) enough women with
similar characteristics (collapsed in the propensity score) should exist in the two groups
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(common support). Resting on these assumptions, the strategy would then require to
“donate” the observed wages of employed women to non-employed women with similar
values of the propensity score. Neuberger and colleagues (2011) apply nearest-neighbour
matching to adjust estimates of the gender wage gap in Britain, finding evidence of
positive selection for British women coherently with previous studies (Blundell et al.,
2007; Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2008). While this imputation strategy arguably overcomes
the limits of the previous two and does not rely on exclusion restrictions a` la Heckman,
it has yet to find application in the literature on motherhood wage penalties.
In the absence of a well-established strategy to address selection into employment, one
can point out that, once again, netting out individual-level, time-invariant confounding
gets us at least half the way. Per the DAG of Figure 1, selection bias can be muted by
conditioning on WR or on so called parents of WR contained in U (e.g. Greenland et al.,
1999). It follows that, at least for its time-invariant component, selection into employment
is accounted for by conditioning our analysis on U (for example, by including individual
fixed effects in panel data analysis). This will be my working assumption in the relevant
chapters (2 and 3). I will return on this issue, particularly on the uncharted waters
of selection into employment on the basis of time-varying variables, in my concluding
remarks.
3. The family gap unpacked (1): institutions
The overarching question “What has parenthood got to do with your career?”, aptly
dressed up in causal clothing, can now be explored further. I ask under which institutional
conditions and through which mechanisms parenthood may affect the labour market
careers of women and men. I discuss, first, institutional change in the former family
wage models of the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands. Second, I present individual-
level mechanisms that may produce the family gap and highlight how they are linked to
institutional change.
Often overlooked in the family gap literature (cf. Gough and Noonan, 2013; Ponthieux
and Meurs, 2015), in fact, is how individual-level mechanisms depend on the welfare
and labour market institutions in which employed parents are embedded. This depen-
dence may manifest in a twofold manner (DiPrete, 2002). First, institutions may trigger
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life-course events such as the transition to parenthood and related mechanisms at the in-
dividual level. Second, institutions may mitigate, leave unchallenged, or rather exacerbate
the consequences of life-course events and related mechanisms, with distinct implications
for the family gap and for gender (social) inequality.
In the three countries under consideration12, labour market and welfare institutions have
long supported and enmeshed with the cultural and empirical norm of male breadwinning
(Lewis, 1992; Crompton, 1999; Hobson, 2002; Gornick and Meyers, 2003; Iversen and
Rosenbluth, 2010). Although never a monolith, male breadwinning had its cornerstone
in the family wage ideal, prescribing that “the male head of the household would be
paid a family wage, sufficient to support children and a wife and mother, who performed
domestic labor without pay” (Fraser, 1994: 591). Several institutions certified or actively
supported this gender order: (i) marriage bars, that is, laws and regulations prohibiting
the employment or forcing the dismissal of women upon marriage, in place in specific
sectors, occupations, or firms up to the second half of the 20th century (e.g. Smith,
1986; Kolinsky, 1989; see also, Goldin, 1990; Brinton et al., 1995); (ii) joint taxation
of a family’s income, typically discouraging women’s participation in paid work (Cooke,
2011); (iii) social programs, such as unemployment benefits or sickness absence, tailored
to “male” employment-related risks (Esping-Andersen, 1990); (iv) policies promoting, on
the opposite, “female” full-time homemaking such as leaves reserved de jure or de facto
to mothers (see Table 1A in the Appendix).
It is precisely this latter pillar of the family wage ideal, that of female full-time home-
making, that I will consider here for it has eroded in recent decades in what have become
the “modified” male breadwinner societies of the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands
(Gregg et al., 2007; Trappe et al., 2015; Begall and Grunow, 2015). Institutional trans-
formations, pertaining to leave rights and to employment relationships, have contributed
to this erosion, albeit not homogeneously across the three countries.
3.1. Leave rights
Leave rights grant individuals the opportunity to take time off from paid work and prepare
or recover from childbirth, take care of newborns and infants, or assist ill family members.
Leave programs vary widely in terms of eligibility criteria, duration, financing, and benefit
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levels and structure, as well as in the take-up behaviour of recipients. Statutory national
paid maternity leaves are now widespread all over the world, the US and Papua New
Guinea being the only exceptions. Paternity, parental, and family leave provisions are
common in a smaller yet growing number of countries, although overwhelmingly high-
income ones (Rossin-Slater, 2017).
Table 1A in the Appendix offers an overview of how maternity, paternity, and parental
leaves have changed in the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands. In all three countries,
paid maternity provisions date back to the 1960s and 1970s, replacing ‘work restrictions’
for childbearing women put in place already at the turn of the 20th century (CESifo
database, https://bit.ly/2zTwwwV). Following the example, however varied, of Nordic
countries (Eydal and Rostgaard, 2016) and the input of EU directives (e.g. Lewis, 2002),
leave rights have also been extended to fathers in the 1990s, and more decisively in the
2000s.
The UK and the Netherlands have taken a similar route in many respects. For one,
eligibility for maternity leave in the UK, and for parental leave in both countries, has
been tied to parents’ involvement in paid work, in terms of tenure and working hours
(Burgess et al., 2008; Begall and Grunow, 2015). With respect to generosity, benefits for
both programs rank in the lower tier among OECD countries (Ray et al., 2010). Parental
leave, in particular, is currently unpaid in the Netherlands and paid only in part in the UK
under the new Shared Parental Leave scheme (2015). Parental leave uptake is far from
universal among women and rather low for men in both countries, and higher among
high-income/highly educated parents anyway (Huerta et al., 2014; Blum et al., 2018). By
contrast, more than 80% of new fathers in both countries use paternity leaves nowadays
(ibidem). Introduced in the 2000s, paternity leave in the Netherlands has recently being
expanded to five days at full wage replacement (up from the two granted since 2001),
while in the UK it spans two weeks at a flat-rate payment. Notably, while paternity
leave was introduced in the UK, maternity leave was simultaneously extended, perhaps
signalling contradictory commitments to changing gendered work-family reconciliation
(Baird and O’Brien, 2015).
Both the UK and the Netherlands have thus taken the approach of a “cost-efficient
minimum standard of family policy” (Begall and Grunow, 2015: 698; Baird and O’Brien,
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2015) when it comes to leave rights, particularly those of fathers13. Germany, on the
other hand, has reinforced and then challenged the female home-making principle the
most via its reforms to leave provisions over time. German parental leave, first instituted
in 1984 in the former West, has long been among the longest and most generous in
comparative perspective (Ray et al., 2010). After a series of reforms culminated in 1992-
1993, parents could access up to 24 months of benefit, paid irrespective of employment
status, and 36 months of job guaranteed leave (e.g. Ziefle and Gangl, 2014). German
mothers, especially in the former West, were taking the longest career breaks among
the countries of interest here (Fouarge et al., 2010), largely as a result of the design of
parental leave itself (Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck, 2014; Ziefle and Gangl, 2014). Formally
entitled, men were instead exploiting leave provisions only in single-digit shares for much
of the 1990s and early 2000s (Bu¨nning, 2015).
Things changed in the 2000s. With the double aim of facilitating women’s quicker return
to paid work after childbirth and of contrasting Germany’s fertility decline, a new parental
leave benefit came into effect in 2007. Now earnings-related, and thus more advantageous
for employed parents, the new benefit spans only 12 months, or 14 if each parent takes
at least two months. Women’s leave interruptions shortened, falling in line with a new 12
months norm (e.g. Ziefle and Gangl, 2014; Chapter 2), and fathers started chipping in
at higher rates. Today, over 30% of German fathers go on parental leave, for an average
of two months (e.g. Bu¨nning, 2015). For a comparison, both figures resemble those of
parental leave uptake among Swedish fathers (Albrecht et al., 2015).
Overall, institutional change in the realm of leave rights has challenged the female full-
time home-making ideal in all three countries. Maternity and parental leave mandates,
when of moderate length, help women stay in paid work (e.g. Ruhm, 1998; Rønsen and
Sundstro¨m, 2002; Gregg et al., 2007; Baker and Milligan, 2008; Lalive and Zweimu¨ller,
2009; Kluve and Schmitz, 2018). The extension of leave rights to men has been heteroge-
neous across countries (see also Ray et al., 2010; OECD, 2017), but may have increased
fathers’ involvement in childcare and further freed up women to participate in paid work
(Tanaka and Waldfogel, 2007; Huerta et al., 2014; Tamm, 2018). How these changes can
in turn impact the family gap, starting from the motherhood wage penalty, is much more
ambiguous (Waldfogel, 1998a; Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck, 2014; Baum and Ruhm, 2016;
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Andersen, 2018). I contribute in this respect by highlighting, in this Introduction, which
relevant mechanisms parental leave regulations may trigger, to the benefit or detriment
of the earnings of mothers (fathers). In Chapter 2, I tackle the issue empirically and
exploit the ‘German experience’ as an example of how leave rights can shape the family
gap.
3.2. Flexible employment
Female full-time home-making has also eroded thanks to the flexibilization of employment
relationships. Temporal flexibility in particular has been on the rise in labour markets,
as flexible working-time arrangements have become common alternatives to the standard
full-time work schedule. Women’s lifetime labour market participation has been aided cru-
cially by the availability and regulation of part-time work in all three countries (Gregg
et al., 2007; Euwals et al., 2011; Trappe et al., 2015). Other flexible working-time sched-
ules, such as flexitime or working from home, are also in high demand among employed
parents (e.g. Felfe, 2012b; Bryan and Sevilla, 2017; OECD, 2017).
Nevertheless, working-time flexibility has been subject to different regulations in the
UK, Germany, and the Netherlands, and the career consequences attached to holding
flexible jobs have diverged. The Netherlands set up the most extensive legal entitlements
surrounding working-time flexibility through the 1980s and 1990s, largely via agreements
between the state, trade unions, and employer organisations (not to mention impulse from
the EU, Visser, 2002). Over time, part-time work has become not just the prerogative
of married women with children, but also increasingly common among women without
children (Bosch et al., 2010) and more widespread among men than in all other OECD
countries (OECD, 2013b). What is more, in the Netherlands, women in part-time jobs
have similar chances to receive firm-sponsored training (Picchio and van Ours, 2016) and
experience comparatively small wage penalties (Fouarge and Muffels, 2009) vis-a`-vis their
full-time counterparts, while also reporting high levels of job satisfaction (Booth and van
Ours, 2013).
In Germany, part-time work has long been the modal port of re-entry into the labour
market for women after childbirth, especially in the former West (Trappe et al., 2015;
Dieckhoff et al., 2016). Parental leave reforms over the years have fostered moves to
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part-time jobs, but importantly did so by encouraging mobility within rather than across
employers (Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck, 2014; Kluve and Schmitz, 2018). Since 2001, for
example, mothers (parents) have been granted the right to work up to 30 hours a week
while on the aforementioned job-protected parental leave. At the same time though,
labour market reforms (‘Hartz’ reforms, 2003-2005) promoted work arrangements com-
bining temporal flexibility and lax employment and social protections, with the aim of
integrating women and other outsiders into the labour market (Palier and Thelen, 2010;
Biegert, 2014). Part-time and marginal employment are more and more synonym of low-
wage employment, contributing to rising in-work poverty and wage inequality in Germany
(e.g. Bru¨lle et al., 2018).
For women in particular, the career costs of part-time work are more ambiguous in Ger-
many than in the Netherlands. Working part-time generates lower returns to experience
and, thereby, lower wage growth (Paul, 2016). German women working part-time suffer
a wage penalty when compared to their full-time counterparts, but this gap is relatively
modest in international comparison (Bardasi and Gornick, 2008). Previous research has
also suggested that switches to part-time jobs after childbirth are not responsible for
the motherhood wage penalty experienced by German women (Gangl and Ziefle, 2009;
Ku¨hhirt and Ludwig, 2012; cf. Chapter 2).
Women work disproportionately part-time after childbirth in the UK as well (e.g. Paull,
2008). For the most part, a laissez-faire principle has driven Britain’s approach to the
regulation of part-time work (e.g. Rubery, 2011), and the economic and career costs of
part-time are more clear-cut in the UK than elsewhere. Part-timers receive less training
and lower pay than comparable full-timers (Arulampalam and Booth, 1998; Manning
and Petrongolo, 2008), and are both horizontally and vertically segregated (Connolly and
Gregory, 2008; Matteazzi et al., 2014). Transitions to part-time jobs during the career-
cycle have also been found to explain rising downward class mobility among British
women (Bukodi et al., 2017). And yet, British women employed part-time are usually
more satisfied with their jobs than do full-timers, and relatively more satisfied than their
counterparts in European countries (Booth and Van Ours, 2008; Gallie et al., 2016).
Divergent paths aside, one common piece of institutional change in all countries has been
the introduction of “righ-to-request” legislation in the early 2000s. These laws pertain the
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right for employees to ask changes to their current working schedule and formalise how
employers should manage, accept, or refuse such requests (Hegewisch, 2005; Lewis and
Campbell, 2007). While Germany and the Netherlands granted such right to all employees
in firms above a certain size threshold, the UK first limited the right only to parents of
small children. Such selectivity may have deepened further the negative toll working-time
flexibility has on British mothers, an issue I will explore further in Chapter 3.
In all three countries, in sum, mothers’ work is part-time work and part-time work is
mothers’ work. Drifting away from pure female full-time homemaking, these three coun-
tries have molded in a “one-and-a-half” arrangement where women are part-time earners
and part-time carers (e.g. Crompton, 1999, 2006). The Netherlands stands out, however,
in terms of regulation and equal treatment of part-time work, the UK being the polar
opposite in both respects, and Germany falling somewhere in between.
3.3. ‘Women-friendly’ changes? Putting it all together
Having discussed relevant institutional change, I situate here my contributions with re-
spect to the few examples in previous research that have also sought to ‘unpack’ how the
family gap differs across institutional settings.
Comparative research has highlighted the importance of institutions by showing how the
magnitude, drivers, or consequences of the family gap differ across countries belonging to
different welfare regimes, gender orders, or work-family packages (e.g. Davies and Pierre,
2005; Gangl and Ziefle, 2009; Dotti Sani, 2015). Regardless of the label, a merit of this
research agenda is to elaborate on and provide empirical evidence for how individual
life courses are shaped in contexts featuring distinct institutional complementarities (e.g.
Chapter 1). I move three critiques to such approach nonetheless. First, the importance
of institutional arrangements is gauged only indirectly, without explicit measurement and
modelling of macro-level variables. Even when measured and part of the empirical models
(Abendroth et al., 2014; Budig et al., 2016), second, institutions are rarely considered as
they change over time due to policy reform. Third, while work-family policies undoubtedly
come in bundles and interact with each other to influence individual outcomes, the effects
of single policies – as they change over time – are difficult to disentangle following this
comparative approach (cfr. Aisenbrey and Fasang, 2017; Kluve and Schmitz, 2018).
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In line with this critical appraisal, I pursue a complementary design aimed at assessing
how a given policy in a given country evolved over time and with what consequences
for the family gap (esp. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3). In doing so, my goal is also to
contribute to the debate on the ‘perverse effects’ of work-family policies. Well-established
in both sociology and economics is the finding that work-family policies help women
maintain their footing in paid work at the expense of persistent gender gaps in pay and
labour market career (e.g. Ruhm, 1998; Arulampalam et al., 2007; Mandel, 2012; Blau
and Kahn, 2013; Aisenbrey and Fasang, 2017). This has been variously called a ‘trade-off’
(Pettit and Hook, 2009), a ‘boomerang effect’ (Gupta et al., 2008), a ‘welfare paradox’
(Mandel and Semyonov, 2006). Similar to research on the institutional contours of the
family gap, the bulk of this broader literature has focused on Nordic countries or cross-
national comparisons, often resorting to cross-sectional data. My aim, by contrast, is
to assess whether and how changes to policies commonly deemed women- and family-
friendly have affected the family gap, within countries other than Nordic ones and over
time. Examining how leave rights and the promotion of flexible employment have changed,
and with what consequences, in the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands, one question
leads the investigation: are all-encompassing narratives about the ‘perverse’ effects of
family-friendly policies satisfactory in all contexts or, looking at the nuts and bolts of
each single policy, are we bound to conclude that, in fact, “it depends” (e.g. Mun and
Jung, 2018)?
4. The family gap unpacked (2): mechanisms
Keeping this question in mind, here I survey individual-level mechanisms that may un-
derlie the family gap in labour markets. Mechanisms are here lined up on a continuum,
from those whose explanatory power mainly rests on labour supply factors to the ones
who insist, conversely, on the role of labour demand. Arguments based on human capital
and effort considerations, presented first, mainly point to the labour supply behaviours of
employed parents. Relevant behaviours, such as taking time off or adjusting one’s work-
ing hours, are expected to affect individual productivity, to which wage setting in the
labour market is assumed to be fine-tuned. Signalling mechanisms, on the other hand,
posit that what matters is how the labour supply behaviours of parents are read (re-
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warded or sanctioned) by employers. Similarly integrating labour demand into the mix,
the theory of compensating differentials shifts the focus to how family gaps may arise as a
consequences of what preferences parents have in terms of job features and of employers’
leverage over those job features. Finally, employer discrimination theories grant labour
demand the most prominent influence, as employers are hypothesized to treat differently
otherwise equal workers depending on their sex category and parental status.
Whenever pertinent, I emphasise how each of these mechanisms relate to the aforemen-
tioned institutional change.
4.1. Human capital: loss, depreciation, and returns
As per human capital theory (Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Becker, 1981), motherhood
penalties in labour markets may stem from career interruptions around the time of a
child’s birth. Human capital loss may harm women’s career as taking time off halts
the accumulation of experience and job tenure, possibly resulting in the loss of training
and promotion opportunities. Secondly, women’s current stock of human capital may
depreciate, meaning that the longer they stay off work the higher the chances their skills
may become obsolete and thus less remunerative when reprising their former or a new
job14. Third, if returning to work on a part-time basis, women may face the economic costs
associated with the lower (returns to) human capital accumulation granted by working
short hours (Ferna´ndez-Kranz et al., 2015; Paul, 2016).
A number of studies on the motherhood wage penalty highlights how losses and de-
preciations of, as well as lower returns to, human capital account for at least part of
women’s wage losses (Gupta and Smith, 2002; Anderson et al., 2002; Gangl and Ziefle,
2009; Adda et al., 2017). Also consistent with the implications of human capital theory,
mothers staying with their pre-pregnancy employer – and thus retaining firm-specific
skills – experience smaller wage penalties than those who switch employers (Waldfogel,
1997; Zhang, 2010; Felfe, 2012a; Fuller, 2017; see also Looze, 2014).
Career interruptions and their costs do not come about in a vacuum though. Particularly,
work interruptions are influenced by family-leave policies and reforms to those policies
over time (Ruhm, 1998; Rønsen and Sundstro¨m, 2002; Gregg et al., 2007; Scho¨nberg and
Ludsteck, 2014; Lalive et al., 2013; Baum and Ruhm, 2016; Kluve and Schmitz, 2018).
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Yet, the link between leave policies, career interruptions, and motherhood wage penalties
has been seldom teased out. Leave mandates mechanically trigger work interruptions. The
length, replacement rates, and rights (to work part-time during leave, to return to one’s
pre-pregnancy employer) regulated by leave policies shape the consequences that career
interruptions may have for motherhood penalties. The analyses of such macro-micro link
are carried out in Chapter 2, focusing on German parental leave reforms.
4.2. Effort
A different strand of human capital theory (Becker, 1965, 1985) points to mothers’ allo-
cation of time and effort. Childless women can allocate more of their non-market time
to leisure activities as compared to mothers. Heightened housework hours and childcare
duties add up instead to mothers’ involvement in the household (Ku¨hhirt and Ludwig,
2012; Schober, 2013; Cooke and Baxter, 2010), consuming their energies and depress-
ing their work effort much more than leisure would do. Wage losses in the aftermath of
parenthood may thus reflect a reduction in work effort.
One key issue here is that of measurement. Scholars have commonly referred to effort
as proxied by the age of the youngest child in the household (Anderson et al., 2003), by
the amount of hours spent doing housework (Ku¨hhirt and Ludwig, 2012), or measured
in terms of work-life primacy, that is, the relative importance a person assigns to work
over family (Evertsson, 2013; Gangl and Ziefle, 2015; Bielby and Bielby, 1984). Evidence
is mixed on whether mothers’ labour market outcomes rebound as children grow older
(cf. Anderson et al., 2003; Kahn et al., 2014; Abendroth et al., 2014; Kunze, 2015) and
household effort, consequentially, declines (e.g. Vargha et al., 2017). Housework hours
have been relatively overlooked, yet seem to mediate part of the motherhood wage penalty
particularly for mothers of young children, consistent with theory (Ku¨hhirt and Ludwig,
2012).
Differently, subjective evaluations of work-life primacy have not been explicitly linked
to the motherhood penalty. It is this latter measure of work effort, however, that has
been shown to vary in response to institutional constraints, namely to the design of
parental leave policies. Long parental leaves indeed seem to depress mothers’ work effort
(Evertsson, 2013; Gangl and Ziefle, 2015), leading to a re-orientation of preferences from
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market to household production. Whether this macro-to-micro link has spillover effects
into mothers’ wages is an open question. In Chapter 2, I build on previous studies (Gangl
and Ziefle, 2015) to ask whether German parental leave reforms in the early 1990s, by
depressing work commitment, have hurt mothers’ wage attainment.
What about men? Fatherhood may act as a motivating force and push men to increase
their effort on the job (Townsend, 2002; Percheski and Wildeman, 2008; Petersen et al.,
2011), either by working longer hours or being more productive. For the US, Killewald
(2013) provides indirect support for this hypothesis when she finds that men get a father-
hood wage premium only when married and co-residing with their biological children.
Stronger ties to their children and partner, she argues, may motivate men to commit
more fully to breadwinning, yet the study lacks direct measures of work effort to further
support this conclusion.
Turning to working hours as a proxy for effort, however, findings in the extant literature
rarely corroborate the fatherhood-effort nexus. Indeed, average working hours actually
decline after the transition to fatherhood in most European countries (Bu¨nning and
Pollmann-Schult, 2016). Studies for Germany, for example, have shown that becoming a
father prompted an increase in working hours for men born prior to 1960, but a decrease
in working hours for men belonging to younger cohorts, and both changes are modest
in size (1 h of paid work at most, Pollmann-Schult and Reynolds, 2017). For Britain,
previous studies provide little evidence that the presence of children affects men’s working
hours at all (Bryan, 2007; Paull, 2008; Schober, 2013). Further and differently from the US
(Lundberg and Rose, 2000), men’s allocation of time seems hardly affected by fatherhood
in European countries, even in couples where the female partner reduces her working
hours and devotes more time to housework and childcare (Schober, 2013; Ku¨hhirt, 2012;
Grunow et al., 2012). In Chapter 1, therefore, I will further evaluate this stance asking
if fatherhood, absent any increase in work effort, indeed leads to wage premiums for men
in Germany and Britain.
4.3. Signalling
In labour markets with imperfect information, employers may use employees’ behaviours
to better infer individual productivity (Spence, 1973). For instance, workers may signal
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their ability or motivation by participating in training or higher education. In contrast,
taking time off may result in adverse signaling, suggesting low commitment to the current
job or to paid work in general.
Evidence in support of the signalling value of family-related career interruptions, vis-a`-vis
an interpretation resting on human capital, comes in three flavours. First, studies focused
on human capital depreciation neglect whether or not depreciation follows a linear trend
(Go¨rlich and De Grip, 2009). Picking up on this, research has shown that the career costs
of women’s work interruptions rather develop in non-monotonic fashion over interruption
time (Aisenbrey et al., 2009; Buligescu et al., 2009; Evertsson and Duvander, 2011).
Notably such patterns can be traced back to the design of family leave mandates, that
is, taking leaves longer than the maximum duration granted by the law – or longer than
the ‘norm’ (e.g. Bergemann and Riphahn, 2017) – may acquire negative signalling value
and thus trigger economic costs.
A second critique moved to human capital arguments is that, in principle, depreciation
should result out of a work interruption regardless of the reason behind it. Career breaks
of the same length due to family reasons or unemployment should therefore give rise to
comparable career costs, yet studies have found otherwise (Albrecht et al., 1999; Evertsson
et al., 2016). Third and last, signalling has emerged as a powerful explanation for the
wage costs of taking time out among fathers. Across Europe, paternity and parental leaves
allow men to leave work for relatively short periods of time (Karu and Tremblay, 2018).
Even in countries where men’s uptake is the highest like Sweden or present-day Germany,
fathers’ time out stops at around two months on average (Bu¨nning, 2015; Albrecht et al.,
2015). With such short breaks human capital depreciation is hardly triggered, but wage
losses for men after parental leave are well documented nonetheless (Albrecht et al., 1999,
2015; Evertsson, 2016). The consensus, hence, is that women who choose to stay out more
than some threshold and men who choose to stay out per se experience career penalties
as a result of adverse signalling15.
Taken all together, explanations resting on human capital accumulation, effort, and sig-
nalling are pitted against each other in Chapter 2 as possible accounts of the wage
responses to parental leave reform in Germany over the last two decades.
32
4.4. Compensating differentials
Focusing on the type of jobs mothers hold, the family career gap may arise because of
compensating differentials. In this framework, jobs are bundles of monetary and non-
monetary features such that losses in one domain are compensated by gains in another.
In the parlance of the theory, jobs combine amenities (what makes a job a “good” job)
and disamenities (what makes a job a “bad” job).
Originally conceived to suggest that jobs involving disamenities (e.g. physical hazards)
should pay a wage premium to attract enough workers to fill them (Smith, 1776; Rosen,
1986), compensating differentials theory also highlights how workers may have a “will-
ingness to pay”, vice versa, for job amenities. While some have argued for the “perva-
sive absence of compensating differentials” in labour markets when considering men and
women together (Bonhomme and Jolivet, 2009), a growing body of literature highlights
gender differences. Women, and not (or much more than) men, value job features like
schedule flexibility and regard some working-time arrangements such as long hours as
disamenities instead (Flabbi and Moro, 2012; Mas and Pallais, 2017; Wiswall and Zafar,
2017). Mothers in particular may opt16 for amenities such as flexible schedules at the cost
of disamenities such as lower wages or scant chances of promotion (e.g. Filer, 1985; Felfe,
2012b). Motherhood penalties are thus manifestations of a trade-off between job features
coveted by mothers themselves, like working short hours, and the career costs that may
combine with such features in labour markets, such as the lower pay often associated
with working short hours.
Most commonly, compensating differentials are invoked to explain women’s career hurdles
in Scandinavian countries. Whether it is the glass ceiling in pay (Albrecht et al., 2003),
the wage penalty upon motherhood (Simonsen and Skipper, 2006; Kleven et al., 2017), or
the chances of climbing to top jobs (Kunze, 2015; Hardoy et al., 2017), scholars associate
women’s career setbacks with Scandinavia’s family-friendly jobs and workplaces, yielding
indirect support for the compensating differentials story.
Explicit tests of the argument only provide mixed evidence though. Notably, Felfe has
shown how, within the mandates of German parental leave granting mothers continuity
with their pre-pregnancy employer, German mothers may trade off pay cuts for some flex-
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ible schedules (e.g. rotating shifts and working during the evenings) and not others (Felfe,
2012b). And yet, motherhood penalties, especially for mothers who switch employers, are
not fully accounted by changes in work schedules (Felfe, 2012a). For Sweden, Hotz and
colleagues (2017) first develop a composite index of workplace-level family-friendliness
and then find the transition to motherhood to increase the chances of switching to
family-friendly jobs at the expense of skill and career progression. Differently, for the
US and Canada, studies have found that family-friendly job features (mainly pertaining
to working-time arrangements) do not “explain away” motherhood wage penalties (Budig
and England, 2001; Glauber, 2012; Fuller, 2017) suggesting limited scope for the trade-off
between monetary and non-monetary job features17.
In line with the key tenets of my argument, I consider the job amenity value of flexible
schedules to be context-dependent. As a litmus test of this proposition, in Chapter
3 I ask if compensating differentials arise for mothers (and women more broadly) in a
context such as that of the UK, where working-time flexibility and particularly part-
time work is associated with dismal career prospects (Manning and Petrongolo, 2008;
Connolly and Gregory, 2008; Matteazzi et al., 2014). More specifically, I ask if policies
aimed at easing access to flexible schedules have helped install compensating differentials
for British mothers, deepening both family- and gender- wage gaps while simultaneously
increasing transitions to part-time jobs and satisfaction with these arrangements.
4.5. Employer discrimination
Two theories of employer discrimination are often mentioned and seldom tested in the
literature on the family gap: statistical discrimination theories and status-characteristic
theory (Correll et al., 2007; Gangl and Ziefle, 2009; Bygren et al., 2017). In reviewing
them, I develop two arguments. First, statistical discrimination theories do not account
specifically for mothers’ disadvantage, but rather apply to all women of childbearing
age, while status-characteristic theory predicts motherhood penalties more specifically.
Second, the incentives to discriminate statistically depend on labor market institutions
and welfare institutions, as well as on occupational features. The latter are also relevant
for status-characteristic theory and predictions from the two models are, by and large,
complementary. As such, they will be put to test in a survey experiment on employer
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discrimination in Chapter 4.
4.5. Statistical discrimination
Statistical discrimination theories (Phelps, 1972; Aigner and Cain, 1977) hold that risk-
averse employers might pay women less than (equally productive) men, believing that
women will eventually take time out from work, have their working hours reduced or
leave their job altogether. Under statistical discrimination, employers are rational ac-
tors aiming at maximizing expected profits in labour markets characterized by imperfect
information (for a review, Fang and Moro, 2011). Specifically, employers may find it dif-
ficult or too expensive to access precise information on the individual productivity of job
applicants. Group markers such as a candidate’s sex are instead easily accessible – on
CVs, at job interviews, etc. – and employers may thereby determine individual produc-
tivity by combining the expected productivity of a given female (male) candidate with
the group-level productivity they estimate for women (men). Even if employers believe
women and men to be equally productive on average, the productivity signals of a female
applicant might be deemed more noisy (Aigner and Cain, 1977). Employers’ underlying
assumption is that, despite equal educational credentials or accumulated work experi-
ence, female employees might be more likely than men to take career breaks, reduce their
working hours, or leave their job altogether for family-related reasons.
To compensate for this “risk”, employers become more reluctant to hire women and offer
them lower wages than those of men, all else equal. Economic discrimination arises then
as a result of overshooting, as female employees deciding against motherhood or whose
productivity is not affected by the presence of children will be discriminated against. In
this framework, employers are thus forward-looking and their concern lies with women
potentially becoming parents and altering their labour supply in ways harmful to pro-
ductivity. Women of childbearing age, irrespective of current parental status, could be
discriminated against with respect to men (Gupta and Smith, 2002; Petit, 2007; Yip and
Wong, 2014; Biewen and Seifert, 2016).
In a nutshell, employers insure themselves against the risk they attach to female employees
of childbearing age. The estimation of such risk though might be moderated by institu-
tional factors, such as employment protection legislation (e.g. Dieckhoff et al., 2015).
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Particularly, when open-ended contracts are surrounded by stringent protections against
dismissal, temporary contracts may serve as extended probationary periods to solve asym-
metric information with respect to job candidates’ productivity (e.g. Wang and Weiss,
1998). This may become especially valuable when deciding upon the hiring of women
of childbearing age. Statistically discriminating employers can offer temporary contracts
to insure themselves against the costs they expect to bear come motherhood. Addition-
ally, waiting for a temporary contract to expire helps circumvent anti-discriminatory laws
that may prohibit the dismissal of employees because of pregnancy. The key prediction
is, therefore, that employers have more incentives to discriminate statistically if the job
post being offered is permanent rather than temporary, as previously found for France
by Petit (2007).
In Chapter 4, I investigate this hypothesis looking at the Dutch context. Recent labour
market reforms have relaxed the level of employment protection attached to temporary
contracts but left largely untouched that of permanent contracts (Mooi-Reci and Dekker,
2015), which remains above the European average in the Netherlands (OECD, 2014).
I thereby expect Dutch employers to be reluctant to hire women or offer them equal
starting salaries, vis-a`-vis men with identical CVs, for permanent job posts.
4.5. Status-characteristic theory
According to status-characteristic theory, no matter information asymmetries and risk
aversion, status beliefs may bias employers’ evaluations against women and, particularly,
mothers (Correll et al., 2007; Ridgeway, 2011). Status beliefs are conceived as a particular
class of stereotypes (e.g. Fiske et al., 2002) by virtue of which individuals categorize mem-
bers of social groups on the basis of perceived competence. Any nominal characteristic
that groups together individuals in a social setting – sex, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and
so forth – may become a status characteristic if actors share beliefs regarding that group’s
competence, further conceptualized as the sum of ability and commitment (Berger et al.,
1977; Ridgeway and Correll, 2006; Mark et al., 2009). Seeking coordination with one
another, individuals may activate performance expectations regarding how capable and
committed others will be with respect to the task at hand, depending on the salient social
memberships. Performance expectations may then drive the distribution of rewards such
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that, in the hiring setting, low-status actors end up penalized in terms of hiring chances
or salary offers (Correll et al., 2007; Pedulla, 2016).
Motherhood is such a status characteristic insofar as it amplifies status beliefs morphed
along gender lines (Ridgeway and Correll, 2004; Correll et al., 2007). Specifically, women,
especially if mothers, are perceived to be less capable than men in workplace settings
(Cuddy et al., 2004; Correll et al., 2007; The´baud, 2015). Superior ability may be granted
to mothers only for tasks that involve nurturance and care (Ridgeway and Correll, 2004),
in line with stereotypes broadly associating women with communion, i.e. being selfless
and concerned with others, rather than with agency, i.e. being assertive and motivated
to master a task (for a review, Ellemers, 2018). As for commitment, women and mothers
in particular are not expected to prioritize work over family obligations nor to make
sacrifices to build a career as much as men would (Correll et al., 2007).
While all of this points to motherhood penalties, in female-typical jobs where nurturing
and caring skills are needed (teaching, nursing, social work etc.), proponents of status-
characteristic theory suggest women and mothers might actually be highly regarded in
terms of competence (Ridgeway and Correll, 2004). This proposition may help explain the
large body of evidence on gender discrimination in favour of women in female-typical lines
of work. In reviewing such findings, Neumark notes that they pose “a bit of a puzzle for
labor economists, since our models of discrimination do not naturally predict this pattern.
That said, perspectives on discrimination from other fields, such as those emphasizing
norms regarding who does which job, might fit these facts better” (Neumark, 2016: 77). I
test whether status-characteristic theory can account for differential treatment of mothers
(women) across occupations in Chapter 4.
5. Content of the dissertation
In this dissertation I put together four essays on the family gap in the UK, Germany,
and the Netherlands. Each chapter descends from the general framework traced in the
previous sections and attempts to provide a little piece of the puzzle. Starting from
Chapter 1, I address whether fatherhood causally affects the wages of men in the UK
and Germany, relying on long-running household panel data and on new advances in linear
fixed effects modelling. Relatively little evidence exists on whether fatherhood grants men
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a wage premium or superior wages spur the transition to fatherhood instead. Also, most
longitudinal studies have been US-based and neglected a comparative perspective that
may unravel the contextual underpinnings of fatherhood wage premiums, if any. I carry
out here a comparative and longitudinal analysis of how fatherhood may affect men’s
wages. Micro-level mechanisms supporting the idea of a wage premium - changes in
work effort, couple specialization, and employer discrimination - are discussed in light of
stability and changes in the institutional settings of the two modified male-breadwinner
societies. Empirical evidence in this first chapter, however, cannot support the idea of a
causal premium for men, even in such contexts. Rather, I highlight the role of previously
neglected sources of selection into fatherhood, particularly on the basis of prior wage
growth.
The main findings of this first chapter indirectly call out on the family gap literature to
renew its focus on motherhood penalties, for they might be the prime and only manifes-
tation of how parenthood deepens the labour market divide between women and men.
Exploiting a quasi-experimental design and panel data, Chapter 2 explores the causal ef-
fect of family-friendly policies on the motherhood wage penalty. Together with co-author
Giorgio Cutuli, we assess if and how two decades of reforms of parental leave schemes in
Germany have shaped changes in the motherhood wage penalty over time. We compare
two sweeps of reforms inspired by opposite principles, one allowing for longer periods
out of paid work, the other prompting quicker re-entry in the labour market. Mother-
hood wage penalties were found to be harsher than previously assessed in the 1990s. As
parental leave reform triggered longer time spent on leave coupled with better tenure
accumulation, wage losses for mothers remained stable in this first period. Conversely, we
can no longer detect motherhood wage penalties for women affected by the later reform.
Shorter career breaks and increased work hours may have benefited new mothers in the
late 2000s, leading to a substantial improvement in their wage prospects.
Chapter 3 also zooms in on the effects of specific policy reforms, this time turning
from leave rights to the flexibilisation of the employment relationship. A commonly held
account of the family gap in labour markets is that mothers favour flexible working-time
arrangements over career attainment, yet little is known on whether this compensating
differential is shaped directly by public policy. Relying on panel data and a difference-
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in-difference design, I examine the introduction of a ‘right to request’ flexible schedules
for parents of small children in Britain. Fitting the theory of compensating differentials,
mothers experience wage cuts combined with a reduction in working hours and accrued
satisfaction with working-time arrangements. This is especially the case for mothers of
children aged 0-2 at the time of the reform. Evidence also suggests that the negative
economic impact of the reform might have deepened gender gaps in the British labour
market. For mothers of older children though, I can only detect wage losses and not
reductions in working hours or increases in satisfaction with working time.
Finally, in Chapter 4 I turn to the causal effects parenthood may have on hiring de-
cisions, “bringing employers back in”. Together with co-author Ruud Luijkx, we ran
two survey experiments with Dutch employers to investigate hiring discrimination in
sex-typical jobs. We ask if women are especially discriminated against when they have
children, whether discrimination applies similarly in different occupations, and whether
statistical discrimination or status-characteristic theories best account for discriminatory
practices. Informed by these theories, we set up our experimental study having employ-
ers rate fictitious candidates for either a female-typical job (primary school teacher) or
a male-typical job (software engineer). Employers display a slight preference for female
candidates all else equal when filling a teacher post, although such bias is less strong for
female applicants with children. No such ranking is found for a software engineer vacancy,
nor we find different salary offers across candidates and across vacancies. Employers do
not appear to favour men over women for positions likely to be on the career track,
as predicted by statistical discrimination theories, nor expect women to be less capable
than men, as status-characteristic theory suggests. If mothers, however, female candi-
dates are expected to be less committed to their job and work fewer hours, especially in
the teacher experiment. Differently from US-based research, such expectations seem to
have small consequences for the hiring decisions and salary offers Dutch employers make
in our study.
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6. Concluding remarks
6.1. Mind the gap: contributions
Parenthood is key to the persistence of gender inequality in labour markets. Decades
of societal and policy changes have eroded the family wage principle once underpinning
the male breadwinner order across European countries. Yet it appears a new equilibrium
has been achieved, one in which parenthood deepens (economic) inequalities between
men and the women newly participating in labour markets. Hopeful to inform a future
research programme, the contributions of this dissertation are mainly two.
First, the family gap does not come about in a vacuum. The family wage has been
enforced at the intersection of state, market, and family: we meet the family gap at the
same crossroads. The allocation of jobs and job rewards such as wages and promotions
in labour markets is intertwined with family dynamics, and so should be their study as
masterfully argued by Lundberg (2005). What I have attempted to add here though is
that parents and employers are also embedded in contexts featuring distinct sets of labour
market and welfare institutions. Their impact on the family gap makes such phenomenon
“context-dependent” (e.g. Gangl and Ziefle, 2009).
In making this claim, however, I have proposed here an alternative and complementary
approach to two broad narratives. One narrative groups contexts in more or less coherent
clusters whose features and consequences for individuals along the life course are to be
contrasted with one another (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1999, 2009; Mandel and Semyonov,
2005, 2006; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Aisenbrey and Fasang, 2017). In choosing the UK,
Germany, and the Netherlands, I have considered countries that could all be grouped as
‘modified male breadwinner’ or ‘one-and-a-half’ arrangements. Yet, among them, my aim
has been to highlight difference despite similarity, and similarity despite difference. Take
part-time work, for one, commonly underlying the labour market integration of women
in the UK and the Netherlands. Evidence in Chapter 3 suggests a causal link between
policies promoting part-time work and the labour market disadvantage experienced by
British mothers. By contrast, Chapter 4 points out that employers in the Netherlands,
even if associating motherhood with part-time work and low commitment, do not im-
pose substantial penalties on mothers at the hiring stage. And as for similarity despite
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difference, while the UK and Germany pursued different policy strategies on fatherhood,
I cannot detect a fatherhood wage premium in both countries (Chapter 1) - not unlike
previous research for Nordic countries (e.g. Cools et al., 2017; Kleven et al., 2017).
A second broad narrative points to the unintended and often perverse effects of women-
and family-friendly policies (e.g. Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Gupta et al., 2008; Pettit
and Hook, 2009). Fostering women’s employment, these policies may end up creating
labour market ‘shelters’ made of low paid, part-time, female-typical jobs with little career
opportunities. Chapter 2 puts to test this claim, highlighting the radical overhaul of
parental leave legislation in Germany, and how family-friendly policy can at times mitigate
rather than exacerbate forms of gender inequality. In line with recent contributions in
sociology (Mun and Jung, 2018) and a much longer tradition in economics (e.g. Heckman
et al., 1999), I thus take issue with the evaluation of a single policy as it changes over
time and provide evidence for how, decomposed to its nuts and bolts, this policy variously
affected the motherhood penalty.
In short, I advocate for a piecemeal evaluation approach to the study of what is, not
infrequently, piecemeal reform. The trade-off is clear, the synthesis granted by a broad-
scope research agenda for the variation that “single-issue” studies may unveil. In favouring
the latter, my second contribution has been to bring to the fore a causal perspective
with a twofold target. One is that of policy evaluation. The other centres on the causal
effects parenthood may have on the labour market outcomes of women and men. My
point of departure is that, as Lundberg put it, “No single econometric technique or set
of techniques can ‘solve’ the family-work simultaneity problem” (2005: 592). Modern
causal inference may help though, being a tool to “draw assumptions” rather than a
set of techniques to arrive at a conclusion (e.g. Elwert and Winship, 2014). And so, for
example, Chapter 1 has wrestled with the assumption that men who eventually become
fathers are on earning trajectories parallel to those of men who will remain childless. In
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 valid inference rests on the assumption that time-varying
confounding is muted when one re-weights groups of women exposed and not exposed
to a given reform. Carrying out experimental manipulation in Chapter 4, finally, our
conclusions stem from the assumption that randomisation is effective in cancelling out
any confounding behind the effect that signalling parental status may have on hiring
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chances (cf. Deaton and Cartwright, 2018).
All of these assumptions, and the path to ‘solve’ them, have been comprised in the
causal model purported in this Introduction and, hopefully, future research can build on
it and on its previous iterations (Elwert and Winship, 2014). To be sure, transparent
assumptions do not automatically make for valid conclusions18, yet they make of causal
inference less of a “dirty deed” (Herna´n, 2018).
6.2. Mend the gap: limits and ways forward
In this respect, a first limit of this dissertation is that, coming to its end, two causal prob-
lems - namely “the endogeneity of family status” and selection into employment - remain
hard problems. Some of the chapters discuss at length these issues and provide some par-
tial solutions. As proposed in Chapter 1, the attention of further research could go to
still neglected processes of selection into parenthood, such as the demography of father-
hood (cf. Balbo et al., 2013). Techniques like inverse probability of treatment weighting
may then hold promise to mute what spurs the transition to fatherhood and identify, on
the other hand, the causal effect of fatherhood on labour market outcomes and beyond
(e.g. for marriage, Mincy et al., 2009). As for selection into employment, examined more
in depth in Chapter 2, it remains particularly elusive when it changes over life-course
time. As women’s participation in paid work becomes more continuous over the lifecy-
cle, bias deriving from non-random selection into employment may decline. Falling male
activity rates in some countries (like the US, Krueger, 2017) may motivate an analysis
of men’s changing selection into employment in turn. Measuring reservation wages more
comprehensively, covering all employed and non-employed people, and accounting for
this measure in our empirical models could solve the problem as portrayed in Figure 1.
Alternatively, techniques based on matching, briefly surveyed in this Introduction, have
yet to find application.
A second limit of my inquiry is that, for all the fuss made about the causal effect of
parenthood on labour market outcomes, I have not looked into its heterogeneity as much.
Research on how the family gap is not one but many is burgeoning. Heterogeneity has
been explored not just across national contexts, but also depending on race, class, skill,
marriage ties, job title, the timing of parenthood, and so forth. Here, particularly in
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Chapter 1, I have argued that questioning causal assumptions underlying the effect
of fatherhood (motherhood) on the labour market outcomes of men (women) necessarily
predates addressing whether such causal effect, if any, varies across social groupings. Small
sample sizes hindered, throughout, this latter line of research. I have focused nonetheless
on how the family gap changed over time, before and after policy reform (Chapters 2
and 3), as well as across birth cohorts and skill groups (Chapter 1). In Chapter 4, I
have examined whether signalling parental status affects hiring chances across male- and
female-typical occupations, but compared only one of each kind (cf. Bygren et al., 2017).
Tackling heterogeneity, studies on the family gap may in particular contribute to the
broader debate on gender-and-class divides in high-income countries. Some scholars have
argued that class and gender inequality add up to a seemingly zero-sum game, as some
institutional settings magnify one and not the other (Cooke, 2011; Aisenbrey and Fasang,
2017). Some others have suggested that institutional change of the kind examined in these
pages has benefited middle classes the most, for they are the ones who have demanded
and obtained work-family reconciliation (Moen, 2011; Warren, 2015). Others even have
posited, on the opposite, that family-friendly policies hurt the hardest the career attain-
ment of women in advantageous class positions (Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Mandel,
2012). For future contributions to this debate, the blueprint provided here is one that
focuses on single policies, prior and complementary to painting the big picture. Asking if
and how family gaps contribute to gender-and-class divides may fit smoothly within the
framework followed here (e.g. Kluve and Schmitz, 2018).
Finally, I have contended that institutional transformations pertaining to leave rights
and to employment relationships are factors not just in the transition out of the family
wage, but in the one “into” the family gap as well. Not only institutional change has
been heterogeneous among countries formerly devoted to the family wage, but it has
been contradictory too and further research could highlight the consequences of such
contradictions. For one, changes to parental leave legislation, as well as to the provision
of public childcare (Zoch and Hondralis, 2017), have put Germany in a better position
to sustain universal breadwinning. Perhaps surprisingly then, Germany also introduced
a cash-for-care program in 2013, subsidizing childcare for those parents (mothers) that
choose not to enroll children to childcare facilities. Such a policy, inspired by a “caregiver
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parity” principle (Fraser, 1994), follows the footsteps of Nordic countries too, inheriting
their dillemas in the process: while it appears to be in high demand among parents, it
may depress the labour supply of mothers especially in low-income households (Sipila
et al., 2010).
On a similar note, will the expansion of leave rights to fathers bring about fatherhood wage
penalties, Nordic-style too (Rege and Solli, 2013; Albrecht et al., 2015)? Will parental
leave combining job protection with generous benefits of moderate length help curb the
motherhood penalty (Chapter 2)? What about a new class of policies, austerity mea-
sures on the one hand and policies mandating gender equality on the other (board quotas,
pay equality, etc.), how will they impact the family gap? For these and more questions, I
hope this thesis has provided useful starting points for future research design. Evidence
amassed in this thesis and this body of literature dissects the contours of the family gap
as a market failure. As such, what to do about it is largely up to governments (Atkinson,
2015). Mind the gap, and mend it too.
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Notes
1The Guardian, 19 January 2018 (https://bit.ly/2Omglws).
2The Guardian, 2 August 2018 (https://bit.ly/2OX0x4n).
3Part of the increase displayed in Figure 1 is artificially due to German re-unification. A discontinuity
in the trend is in fact visible between 1989 and 1990 and likely due to the much higher FLMP in East
Germany now taking part in the estimates. More recently, the rise in FLMP is rather due to changing
patterns of female and, especially, maternal labour supply in West Germany (Trappe et al., 2015).
4This figure refers to the gap between the average weekly earnings of men and women working full-time
in 2014 (Blau and Kahn, 2017).
5Data from the latest available time-point (2016) suggests a further acceleration for the UK. Mean
age at first birth in the UK now reaches 28.9 years (OECD Family Database).
6DAGs are graphical models encompassing all the assumptions underlying the causal effect of a
treatment X on an outcome Y. Now a standard item in the toolkit of causal inference, DAGs do not just
help in formalizing a causal question but also provide theory and rules to address the “three horsemen”
of causal relationships, namely confounders, mediators, and colliders (see Pearl, 1995; Pearl et al., 2016;
Morgan and Winship, 2007; Hernan and Robins, forthcoming).
7In their DAG for the effect of motherhood on wages, Elwert and Winship (2014) suggest that
determinants of wages, exogenous to the transition to parenthood and subsumed in an error term , may
bias the estimation of the motherhood effect regardless of whether WR is measured and controlled for.
The authors, however, do not provide examples of what variables might be omitted here and that would
thus end up in the error term. For simplicity, I omit this element from the DAG in Figure 2.
8Usual disclaimers on the availability and credibility of instruments apply (see Wilde et al., 2010;
Farbmacher et al., 2018; Bhalotra and Clarke, 2018 for discussions of the case at hand).
9Such utility comprises the amenity value women may derive from children, leisure, or from other
sources of income, such as the partner’s income.
10It is useful here to clarify that, following DAG theory, conditioning on a confounder may close non-
causal paths between treatment and outcome, whereas conditioning on a collider may open non-causal
paths between treatment and outcome (see e.g. Elwert and Winship, 2014).
11This conclusion derived from the causal graph depicted in Figure 1 is exactly the same as Heckman’s
econometric framing of selection bias as a “specification error” (Heckman, 1979), i.e. sample selection
(collider) bias stems from omitted variable bias! Unfortunately, reservation wages often remain unob-
served. In two of the main data sources used in this dissertation (BHPS and G-SOEP), for instance,
respondents are only asked to estimate their (gross) reservation wage if also reporting to be ready to
accept paid work. This arguably leaves out individuals with the lowest propensity to participate in paid
work, that is, precisely those that might differ the most from currently employed individuals.
12This is not the case, of course, for former East Germany whose institutions have long encouraged
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women’s roles as workers and mothers (e.g. Trappe et al., 2015). Since my main concern is with institu-
tional change after German re-unification, I will not systematically delve into the East-West divide.
13Although not surveyed here, similarities can also be traced with respect to the provision of child-
care services in both countries (e.g. Yerkes and Javornik, 2018) and looking at tax policies directed to
parents, as both countries have implemented earned income tax credits with the goal of stimulating the
participation in paid work of (lone) mothers (with mixed results, Francesconi and Van der Klaauw, 2007;
Francesconi et al., 2009; Bettendorf et al., 2014).
14An implication of this is that women who anticipate family formation may choose occupations in
which human capital depreciates at slow(er) rates and career interruptions are thus less costly (Polachek,
1981; Go¨rlich and De Grip, 2009; Polavieja, 2012). From this lifecycle perspective, the ‘career costs of
children’ would then comprise the initial occupational sorting operated by women. In other words, the
fact that women typically sort into low-paid occupations (e.g. Murphy and Oesch, 2015) should be
considered as an indirect component of the family pay gap. Throughout this dissertation, however, I
focus on the costs attached to the transition to parenthood, i.e. how career attainment deviates as a
result of parenthood. Even Adda and colleagues (2017), who provided perhaps the most comprehensive
treatment and support for Polachek’s model, show that part of the income costs of motherhood arise
following the birth of a child, in addition to the costs (forgone earnings) attached to human capital
investments anticipating motherhood (see, by contrast, Kuziemko et al., 2018 for a competing model
and evidence supporting a scenario in which women make education choices under uncertainty, and not
perfect information, and the employment costs of motherhood are by and large unanticipated by young
women).
15In a sense, signalling also rests on the concept of work effort/commitment. What may trigger ad-
verse signalling though is employers’ expectation of lower commitment on the part of working parents,
regardless of whether such reductions in work commitment are factual or not. A similar argument is put
forward within the framework of status-characteristic theory (Ridgeway and Correll, 2004; Correll et al.,
2007).
16Importantly, compensating differentials arise come motherhood. In other words, differently from
Polacheck’s model (1981), women sort into family-friendly jobs after becoming a mother rather than
picking a family-friendly line of work for their future when making their initial human capital investment
(say, when choosing a field of study).
Compensating differentials are closer to Hakim’s concept of adaptiveness (Hakim, 2000, 2002), the
idea that some women may adapt their preferences during their lifecycle and end up combining work and
family rather than committing fully to either a career or to home-making. Differently from preference
theory though, compensating differentials explicitly deal with the career costs that come with opting
for family-friendly jobs. Also, the focus is on the measurement of job features (conceivable as “revealed
preferences”, e.g. Hotz et al., 2017) rather than that of women’s preferences. The former are easily
available across the waves of panel data used in this dissertation and my operationalization choices can
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build on an internally consistent body of research (e.g. Smith, 1979; Rosen, 1986; Bonhomme and Jolivet,
2009). Measures of women’s preferences, instead, are less readily constructed, especially considering that
concepts such as preferences, attitudes, commitment, expectations, or work orientations are sometimes
used interchangeably and sometimes analytically distinguished in the extant literature (e.g. Hakim, 2002;
Kan, 2007; Kahn et al., 2014; Garc´ıa-Manglano, 2015; Gangl and Ziefle, 2015). For its superior scope
and precision, the theory of compensating differentials is here preferred to Hakim’s framework.
17Two recent studies, one for the US (Yu and Kuo, 2017) and one for Canada (Fuller and Hirsh,
2018), pursue a different route to the assessment of compensating differentials. They look at whether
the extent of the motherhood wage penalty differs depending on mothers’ job characteristics. In both
studies, penalties are smaller or not detectable in jobs featuring family-friendly schedules, a piece of
evidence interpreted as inconsistent with compensating differentials and rather pointing to a “work-life
facilitation” function of flexible working-time arrangements.
There might be a number of inter-related conceptual and empirical problems with such a strategy.
Job features become a moderator rather than a mediator in the analysis of the penalty, i.e. a variable
conditioned on to examine the heterogeneity of motherhood effects rather than one that lies in the
causal path between motherhood and wages. Conceptually though, compensating differentials theory
frames working-time flexibility as a mediator of motherhood wage penalties. One expects mothers to pay
a price for switching to flexible yet less lucrative job posts. Further, if mothers indeed switch jobs to
achieve their preferred balance between monetary and non-monetary features, it becomes tricky to asses
when, relative to the transition to motherhood, one should measure those job features then deployed as
moderators. Related, the fact that women stay or switch across jobs with different attributes raises the
threat of selection bias, seldom addressed by the literature at large. For instance, women with higher
earnings potential may be better poised to “purchase” family-friendly working-time arrangements in
the firm or in the market, creating a positive, and yet spurious, association between earnings and job
amenities (see Heywood et al., 2007; Chapter 3 in this dissertation).
18No doubt, internal validity was favoured throughout this dissertation (for a more unified approach
to validity, Westreich et al., 2018). The reasons are threefold (Athey and Imbens, 2017). First, causal
inference that privileges internal validity already incorporates concerns over external validity when it
investigates treatment effect heterogeneity (e.g. Chapter 1) and if it aims at replication in different
settings (e.g. Nosek et al., 2015). Second, generalising findings that lack internal validity risks to resolve
into a ‘garbage-in-garbage-out’ model of evidence accumulation (King et al., 1994; Shadish et al., 2002).
Third and last, random samples from multiple contexts are no guarantee for external validity given how
common modelling techniques end up circumscribing estimates to smaller, often non-representative and
perniciously weighted, ‘effective samples’ (Aronow and Samii, 2016).
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Table 1A: Chronology of main changes to family-leave arrangements in the UK, Germany
(DE), and the Netherlands (NL), from the 1980s to the present day.
1980s 1990s 2000s - present day
UK
Maternity leave:
job guarantee up to 29 weeks
after delivery (40 in total);
only entitled if
a) ≥ 2 years of tenure,
≥ 16 h/week or
b) ≥ 5 years of tenure,
between 8 and 16 h/week;
mix of earnings-related
(first 6 weeks) and flat-rate
payments
(since 1975-1977)
Maternity leave
1994: 14 weeks of job guarantee
for all women (statutory);
additional period
(up to 28th week)
if ≥ 2 years of
tenure; improved flat-rate,
but payments only if
≥ 2 years of tenure
Parental leave
1999: up to 13 weeks, unpaid
Maternity leave:
2003: extended to 52 weeks,
unpaid in the second 26 weeks
2007: flat-rate payments up to
33 weeks (from 20)
Paternity leave
2003: two weeks, flat rate
2009: option to take unused
maternity leave for fathers
Parental leave:
2015: Shared Parental Leave
(SPL), 50 weeks (37 paid);
eligibility based on tenure
and h/week; no mandate for
fathers
DE
Maternity leave:
14 weeks, job guarantee,
full income
replacement (since 1968)
Parental leave
1984: 6 months job guarantee,
earnings-related benefit
1986-1989: duration
gradually up to 15 months,
mix of flat-rate and means-testing
benefit for 12 months; access
to the benefit granted
to non-employed mothers
Parental leave
1990: job guarantee up to
18 months
1992: job guarantee up
to 36 months
1993/1995: payments up
to the 24th month
Parental leave
2001: increased benefit if
leave of 12 months only; 12
months of leave can be taken
between a child’s 2nd and
8th birthday; parents
allowed to work 30h/week
(up from 19h limit)
2007: earnings-related benefit,
67% replacement rate
(capped at 1,800 EUR/month);
“daddy months”
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Table 1A continued from previous page
1980s 1990s 2000s - present day
NL
Maternity leave:
12 weeks, job guarantee,
full income replacement (since 1969)
Maternity leave
1990: duration up to 16 weeks
Parental leave
1991: 13 times weekly
working hours, eligible if
≥20h/week and
≥1 year of tenure;
unpaid in the private sector
1997: extension to workers
< 20h/week; flexibility
within a child’s 8th birthday;
option to reduce hours instead
of leave period
Maternity leave
2015: six weeks after delivery,
remaining weeks can be spread
over a maximum of 30 weeks
Parental leave
2009-2014: expansion up to 26
times the weekly working hours
and tax credit of 50 per cent of
minimum wage; extended if < 1
year of tenure; added flexibility
and job protection
2015: leave is now unpaid
Paternity leave
2001: two days (fully paid)
2019: extended to five days
(gov’t plans to expand it
to 5 weeks, 70% wage replacement,
from 2020)
Sources: Burgess et al. (2008); Ziefle and Gangl (2014); Begall and Grunow (2015); Blum et al. (2018); CESifo
database, https://bit.ly/2zTwwwV.
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Chapter 1
Is There a Fatherhood Wage Premium? A Re-Assessment in
Societies with Strong Male-Breadwinner Legacies
Is There a Fatherhood Wage Premium?
A Re-Assessment in Societies with Strong
Male-Breadwinner Legacies∗
Abstract
This study asks whether fatherhood sparks the wage attainment of men or rather
entry into fatherhood is simply more typical for high-earning men and at times of
wage growth during the career-cycle. Fatherhood premiums may contribute to gen-
der economic inequalities, particularly in countries with strong male breadwinner
legacies such as Germany and the UK. And yet, as male breadwinner norms have
waned and policies have started fostering men’s role as carers, wage premiums could
be a thing of the past.
I use long-running panel data for both countries. Pitfalls and benefits of three
regression-based approaches (pooled OLS, fixed effects estimation, and fixed effects
individual-slope estimation) are highlighted. Overall, fatherhood wage bonuses can-
not be detected, on average as well as across birth cohorts. At best, estimates are
compatible with premiums of a few percentage points among the older cohorts
examined. Positive selection on both prior wage levels and wage growth is largely
responsible for the apparent wage boost. The contribution of selection on prior wage
levels though is fading across cohorts, meaning that men select into fatherhood less
and less on the basis of time-invariant characteristics positively related to both
wages and the chance of becoming a father. Similar to what has been suggested for
marriage, the link between fatherhood and wages appears to be more of a selection
story than a causal one, even in contexts with strong male-breadwinner legacies.
∗Data from the BHPS and UKHLS were made available through the UK Data Archive (University
of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research, 2018), while data from the G-SOEP were made
available by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin, 2016. Neither the original
collectors of the data nor the archive bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented
here. I wish to thank Lynn Prince Cooke, Renske Keizer, Volker Ludwig, and Rossella Icardi for useful
comments on previous versions of this paper. This paper has previously been presented at the RC28
Spring Meeting 2019 (University of Frankfurt). A slightly different version of this paper currently under
review at an international peer-review journal.
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Wage penalties after motherhood are now key drivers of gender wage gaps in high-income
countries (for a review, Ponthieux and Meurs, 2015). Counterpart to wage losses for
mothers, fathers may receive a more modest wage premium (Lundberg and Rose, 2000;
Petersen et al., 2011; Killewald, 2013). Yet, while the question of whether motherhood
causally affects wages has come under intense scrutiny (e.g. Elwert and Winship, 2014),
few have asked the same about fatherhood (for an exception, Loughran and Zissimopou-
los, 2009).
I reconsider, first, the possibility that fathers earn more due to how men select into fa-
therhood (e.g. Kravdal and Rindfuss, 2008; Trimarchi and Van Bavel, 2017). Previous
research has carefully accounted for the fact that high-earning men are more likely to
become fathers. Selection though may also operate through the superior wage growth of
fathers-to-be, rather than just through their wage levels (Ludwig and Bru¨derl, 2018). Ac-
counting for both, this study provides a more severe test for the causal effect of fatherhood
on wages.
Second, adding to a literature mainly based on the US, my re-assessment is conducted
comparing Germany and the UK for a number of reasons. These two countries have
long supported male breadwinning, both through policy and culturally: The inability to
support a causal story for fatherhood and wages would thus be particularly meaningful
in such contexts. As male breadwinner norms have waned (Knight and Brinton, 2017)
and policies in both countries have extended family leave rights to men (Blum et al.,
2018), rich longitudinal data allows me to investigate heterogeneity across cohorts. The
latter has been overlooked in previous studies, perhaps partly because of the invariance
of the policy context of fatherhood in the US (at least at the federal level, e.g. Baum and
Ruhm, 2016).
If present in the past, wage premiums may have declined and particularly in Germany,
for comprehensive evidence has pointed to a (small) shift in effort from the market to
the household for German men in recent cohorts (Pollmann-Schult and Reynolds, 2017;
Leopold et al., 2018; Tamm, 2018). Notably, German fathers have increasingly accessed a
generous and relatively long parental leave provision put in place since 2007 (e.g. Bu¨nning,
2015). In the UK, evidence points to similar changes in men’s contribution to household
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production (e.g. Huerta et al., 2014; Altintas and Sullivan, 2016), but policy change
regarding fathers has been less extensive (Lewis, 2002; Lewis and Campbell, 2007; Tanaka
and Waldfogel, 2007). This further motivates a cross-country, cross-cohort comparative
perspective: If fatherhood wage premiums prove persisting, they may further deepen
gender wage gaps or make it such that, even if the mommy penalty will narrow down,
gender wage gaps will endure (Petersen et al., 2014).
Considering whether fatherhood, to this day, causally affects men’s wages is thus paramount
to disentangle the sources of gender economic inequality. In short, I ask here (i) if fa-
therhood premiums are causal or rather a by-product of the process by which men select
into fatherhood, (ii) whether premiums are found in contexts with strong, yet fading,
male-breadwinner legacies, and (iii) whether premiums for fathers have faded too or have
rather persisted across cohorts.
1. Background
1.1. Why there could be a fatherhood premium: reviewing previous evidence and mech-
anisms
Considering previous evidence, the fatherhood wage premium seems generally modest
in size and is not always detected across contexts. Both findings are in stark contrast
with research on motherhood wage penalties. Estimates of the gross premium for all
fathers have been the largest in North America, up to a range of 6-13% in Canada and
the US (Lundberg and Rose, 2000; Hodges and Budig, 2010; Cooke and Fuller, 2018).
In Norway and Denmark, differently, premiums have not been ascertained (Cools et al.,
2017; Kleven et al., 2018) or have at best amounted to 1-2% (Petersen et al., 2011). Few
studies have examined the premium in Germany and the UK, finding for the former a
2-3% wage boost for higher-order parities (Pollmann-Schult, 2011). For a comparison,
gross motherhood wage losses have typically been estimated in excess of 15% in Germany
(Beblo et al., 2008; Gangl and Ziefle, 2009; Ku¨hhirt and Ludwig, 2012) and of around
12% in the UK (Gangl and Ziefle, 2009; see also Harkness, 2016). Beyond Germany and
the UK, substantial economic losses for mothers seem rather universal across contexts
(e.g. Kleven et al., 2019).
When detected, wage premiums for fathers have been traced back to individual changes
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in work effort, couple specialisation, and employer discrimination. Based on previous
evidence and theoretical considerations though, the explanatory power of each of these
mechanisms seems dubious. For one, fatherhood may elicit an increase in men’s work effort
(e.g. Eggebeen and Knoester, 2001). Yet studies based on household data have not been
able to assess this due to the lack of precise measures of productivity, relying instead
on proxies of effort/productivity such as working hours. As previously acknowledged
(Killewald, 2013), working hours may be poor proxies of effort or only affect wages in the
long run, as hard-working employees signal themselves to employers and secure thereby
better-paid positions in internal labor markets (Gibbons and Waldman, 1999). In the
short run, working longer hours may increase total earnings rather than wage rates, but
studies of the fatherhood premium have typically been concerned with the latter (for an
exception, Cooke, 2014).
Further, fatherhood may propel a man to increase his work effort only conditional on
whether his earning potential exceeds that of his partner (Becker, 1981). The implication
of such a model of couple specialization is that fatherhood wage premiums should be
observed in particular for those men whose partner reduces working hours or leaves paid
work come parenthood. Indeed US-based studies find that married fathers, and among
them especially those whose wives interrupt employment or cut back work hours, add
extra working hours of their own and gain a wage premium (Lundberg and Rose, 2000;
Killewald and Gough, 2013; Killewald, 2013).
Assessing the impact of couple-level specialization on the wages of fathers, however,
presents additional complications given the “endogeneity of family” (Lundberg, 2005).
Couple formation is often a transitory event, considering that splitting and re-partnering
are commonplace (Elzinga and Liefbroer, 2007). If specialization affects couple formation
and stability, conditioning the analyses of fatherhood premiums on the presence and
characteristics of a partner may induce selection bias (Elwert and Winship, 2014). For
example, if couples in which women do not specialize in household production are more
likely to split (e.g. Kalmijn et al., 2007; Lepinteur et al., 2016; for a review, Cooke and
Baxter 2010), “surviving” couples at any given point in time may be the ones more likely
to (have) specialize(d). The role of couple specialization on the wages of fathers may thus
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be exaggerated, yet studies have neglected this point so far (e.g. Killewald and Gough,
2013).
Moving on from the behaviors of fathers and couples, wage premiums for fathers may also
precipitate from employer discrimination. Employers may have a preference for fathers,
rooted in the perception that fathers will be more productive, competent and/or commit-
ted than their childless counterparts (cf. Phelps, 1972; Correll et al., 2007). Despite the
lack of factual productivity differences between male employees, men could be differen-
tially treated in the workplace depending on parental status. In a lab experiment with US
undergraduate students, Correll and colleagues (2007) indeed find that fathers are evalu-
ated as more committed, would be hired more often, and would be offered higher starting
salaries than childless men, holding job applicants’ features equal. Yet, in the companion
field experiment, differences in call-back rates between “equivalent” fathers and childless
men were not detected. The same inconclusive evidence has recently emerged from a large
field experiment across multiple job titles in Sweden (Bygren et al., 2017).
Hence, a review of the size and generative mechanisms of the fatherhood bonus motivates
asking whether expecting a causal effect of fatherhood on wages is warranted in the first
place.
1.2. Contextual underpinnings of the wage trajectories of fathers in Germany and the
UK
While addressing wage determination at the individual level, contextual factors that may
shape the fatherhood premium (and its drivers) have been overlooked in the literature
(cf. Cooke, 2014). One might expect that a strong male-breadwinner norm, both cul-
turally and institutionally enforced, may foster shifts in market effort after fatherhood,
traditional specialization patterns within couples, or employer bias in favor of fathers.
Looking at the UK and Germany, I compare two countries with strong yet drifting male
breadwinner legacies (e.g. Crompton, 1999). Culturally, male-breadwinner norms have
been particularly strong in former West Germany rather than in the UK (Knight and
Brinton, 2017; Trappe et al., 2015). Unfavorable attitudes towards mothers’ employment –
whether full-time or in general during a child’s pre-school years – persist in both countries
(O’Reilly et al., 2014; Dechant and Rinklake, 2016). Still, attitudes in both countries have
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shifted away from traditionalist views that assigned to men the role of (sole) breadwinners
and to women that of full-time carers and home-makers (Knight and Brinton, 2017).
As for policy, fatherhood has long been synonym with “providing”, emphasised, for one,
by mandated cash transfers from fathers to mothers in case of couple dissolution (Hobson,
2002). Lately though, and to a somewhat greater extent in Germany, policy reform started
targeting fathers for their care obligations rather than for cash provision (Adler and Lenz,
2017). Germany introduced two bonus months of paid parental leave if both parents take
some leave at all (2007), and succeeded in increasing father involvement in the household
(e.g. Tamm, 2018) in times of a broader, if slow, gender convergence in the division of
labor in Germany (Pollmann-Schult and Reynolds, 2017; Leopold et al., 2018). The UK
opted for a paid statutory paternity leave (2003), with high uptake rates but lasting
only two weeks, and a parental leave scheme (2015), only partly paid and so far largely
unutilised by new parents (Blum et al., 2018). Change in the cultural and policy context
surrounding fatherhood thus further enriches the chance to understand the contextual
underpinnings of fatherhood premiums (if any) over time in the two countries.
First, fatherhood may act as a transforming event and spur men’s work effort particularly
in contexts where male breadwinning is culturally reinforced (Townsend, 2002). Yet the
transition to fatherhood does little to change men’s attitudes towards work and family,
as men seem not to become more (or less) traditional after the birth of a child (Grinza
et al., 2017; Kuziemko et al., 2018). Coherently, findings regarding fathers’ working hours
as a proxy for effort suggest that, even in former male-breadwinner regimes, men do
not commit more fully to breadwinning after the birth of a child. Indeed, average work-
ing hours actually decline after the transition to fatherhood in most European countries
(Bu¨nning and Pollmann-Schult, 2016). In Germany, becoming a father prompts an in-
crease in working hours for men born prior to 1960, but a decrease in working hours for
men belonging to younger cohorts, and both changes are modest in size (1 h of paid work
at most, Pollmann-Schult and Reynolds, 2017). For Britain, previous studies provide lit-
tle evidence that the presence of children affects men’s working hours at all (Bryan, 2007;
Paull, 2008; Schober, 2013).
Nevertheless and second, men could increase their work effort conditional on their part-
56
ner’s investment in the household, in line with a traditional mode of couple specialization.
Tax policies, for example, may provide incentives for particular arrangements of paid and
unpaid work between partners. Pooling the income of both partners to determine per-
sonal income tax, Germany discourages paid employment among the secondary earners,
typically women (Smith et al., 2003; Bick and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln, 2017), and may thereby
foster traditional couple specialization. Differently, Britain switched from joint to individ-
ual taxation in 1990, further pursuing tax credit policies since the end of the 1990s with
the aim of encouraging maternal labor supply (Francesconi and Van der Klaauw, 2007;
Francesconi et al., 2009). Perhaps surprisingly, though, couple specialization in both the
UK and Germany deviates from the Beckerian model when it comes to the transition
to parenthood. While mothers indeed trade off employment hours with time spent in
housework and childcare, fathers’ allocation of time to either paid or unpaid work is
hardly affected by parenthood regardless of their partner’s behavior (e.g. Schober, 2013;
Ku¨hhirt, 2012).
Employer bias in favor of fathers may still rest on the assumption, however justified,
that men will maintain or even increase their commitment to paid work after the birth
of a child. In recent years, such an assumption may have eroded because of fathers’ use
of paternity and parental leaves, which may signal a parallel and potentially conflicting
commitment to the family sphere. In Britain, around 80% of fathers now take time
off around the birth of a child, although mostly in the form of the two-week paternity
leave introduced in 2003 (Blum et al., 2018). In Germany, fathers have been entitled to
paid parental leave provisions since the end of the 1980s, but fathers’ uptake became
substantial only after the aforementioned 2007 reform. According to the latest figures,
more than 30% of German fathers now use parental leave provisions, typically for the
statutory minimum of two months (Bu¨nning, 2015; Kluve and Tamm, 2013). Notably,
these figures for German fathers approach those of their counterparts in Sweden. Swedish
fathers taking parental leave have been found to experience modest wage penalties after
returning to work, a finding scholars have interpreted as evidence of adverse signalling
(Albrecht et al., 2015; Evertsson et al., 2016). Also, wage penalties for fathers taking leave
may stem from a re-orientation of effort from the market to the household (Rege and Solli,
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2013). It is at best unclear, therefore, if employers may still assume a fuller commitment
to work from fathers and discriminate in their favor, particularly in modern-day Germany.
More broadly, as male breadwinner norms waned and policies also shifted emphasis from
“cash” to “care”, it could be that fatherhood premiums are at best a thing of the past
in both countries, and possibly even more in Germany rather than the UK. Other than
investigating the average causal effect of fatherhood on wages, I will look into its possible
heterogeneity across cohorts.
1.3. Why there might not be a fatherhood premium after all: the role of selection
Mixed support for the mechanisms seemingly generating wage premiums for fathers, even
when considering contexts in which we might expect them at work the most, prompts
taking a step back. It is natural to ask whether apparent wage boosts come fatherhood
are causal or rather driven by selection into fatherhood. I consider here two sources of
selection: selection on prior wage levels and selection on prior wage growth.
Similar to selection into marriage (for a review, Ludwig and Bru¨derl, 2018), selection on
prior wage levels entails that high-earning men are, by the same token, more likely to
become fathers. As Cooke and Fuller put it (2018: 783), “positive selection might account
for the gross (wage) premium if the men who become fathers have unmeasured charac-
teristics such as loyalty and commitment valued similarly by employers and potential
partners”. If such positive selection holds, ignoring it would lead to an overestimation of
fatherhood wage premiums.
Research on what kind of men eventually become fathers, and what kind does not, is
relatively under-developed (Balbo et al., 2013; Kreyenfeld and Konietzka, 2017). Across
countries, highly educated men have better chances of becoming a father than do low-
educated men, yet much is due to selection into union (e.g. Trimarchi and Van Bavel,
2017). If fatherhood and union formation are a compound, then one might expect the
type of selection into fatherhood to overlap with that into marriage, with both of them
being positive (for a review, Ludwig and Bru¨derl, 2018). As long as such drivers of
positive selection are unobserved, cross-sectional estimates of the bonus (e.g. Cooke, 2014;
Petersen et al., 2011, 2014; Cooke and Fuller, 2018) might thus suffer from selection
bias due to omitted variables in the regression equation. Panel estimates, differently,
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can be augmented by adding individual fixed effects to curb estimates from selection
on such time-invariant unobservables. Comparing the latter to cross-sectional estimates
has highlighted negative selection may be at play, as panel estimate of the daddy bonus
are typically bigger than their cross-sectional counterparts (Lundberg and Rose, 2000;
Hodges and Budig, 2010). Yet, once again, these studies have only focused on the US.
They could thus speak to the specificity of the American context where fatherhood – or
at least early fatherhood – may go hand in hand with markers of earning and life-course
disadvantage such as dropping out of high school or incarceration (e.g. Dariotis et al.,
2011). Hence, also the direction of selection on prior wage levels is at best ambiguous,
much like the effectiveness of mechanisms purportedly leading to a causal bonus discussed
in the previous sections.
Yet selection could also operate through a different path. Men may select into fatherhood,
depending on their wage growth rather than simply on their wage levels (Ludwig and
Bru¨derl, 2018). The transition to parenthood, much like that to marriage (Killewald and
Lundberg, 2017), may simply occur at times of fast wage growth in the career-cycle.
For one, as men who become fathers are disproportionately better educated (Kravdal
and Rindfuss, 2008; Trimarchi and Van Bavel, 2017), they do not simply enjoy high
wages but also steep wage growth paths (e.g. Lagakos et al., 2018) – steeper, possibly,
than that of relatively less educated men who are more likely to remain childless. This
might also be more pronounced for men belonging to younger cohorts, as they typically
have children later in life after considerable accumulation of experience and wages in the
market (McMunn et al., 2015; Struffolino et al., 2016). Once again, the US might not
provide the best context to assess this selection dynamic, as mean age at first birth has
not increased much across cohorts, and the transition to parenthood is prominent in the
early 20s when labor market careers are not yet consolidated (e.g. Mills et al., 2011).
Previous comparative studies for European countries, including the UK and Germany,
have indeed found that the wages of men are growing already in the period prior to
fatherhood (Smith Koslowski, 2011). Yet such literature has not drawn one important
implication out of this finding. If the wage spikes prior to fatherhood are comparable to the
wage spikes observed after fatherhood, then speaking of a bonus sparked by fatherhood is
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unwarranted given the observed data pattern (e.g. Killewald and Lundberg, 2017; Ludwig
and Bru¨derl, 2018). The tests I devise in this study, therefore, will try to detect a spike
in wages occurring in the aftermath of fatherhood, once men’s selection into fatherhood
– based on both wage levels and on wage growth – is accounted for.
2. Methods
2.1. Data and samples
I employ long-running household panel data, namely the German Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP v31 1984-2014, doi:10.5684/soep.v33) and the British Household Panel (1991-
2016, doi:10.5255/UKDA-SN-6614-11). Both are multipurpose household surveys fol-
lowing the lives of a representative sample of each country’s residents (Goebel et al.,
2018; Taylor et al., 2010; Buck and McFall, 2011). Both datasets are augmented by fer-
tility history files (see, respectively, Goebel, 2017; Pronzato, 2011) to recover information
on the transition to fatherhood.
For the UK, I rely on all BHPS sample members. While the BHPS was temporarily
discontinued in 2009, its sample started being interviewed again in 2010-11, within the
framework of the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS). My analyses thus rely on
the full data available for the BHPS sample, covering, despite the gap, the period 1991-
2016. For Germany I employ samples A to H, as well as refreshment samples J and K. In
the main analyses, I focus on men aged 20 to 50, working as dependent employees, with
non-missing information on their fertility history as well as on their current wage. Further,
given my focus on the transition to fatherhood, I restrict my analyses to men that, when
first observed in the panel, had no children. During the observation period then, part of
this initial pool will experience the transition to fatherhood (“treated group”), while the
rest will remain childless (“control group”). For some of the men in this latter group,
family histories may be truncated though: they might become fathers after the last data-
point in each panel or drop out of the panels prior to their transition to fatherhood. If
arguments on selection hold, this subgroup of men among the controls might actually be
more similar to fathers(-to-be) than to childless men, and this would in turn attenuate
estimates of the fatherhood premium. Hence, to ensure that the control group does not
include prospective fathers, who might be on a similar wage trajectory to that of the
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treated, I further limit my analysis to men who have been observed at least until age 40,
thereby selecting cohorts of men born not after 1974 for Germany and not after 1976 for
the UK. The cut-point at 40 is assumed to be indicative of completed fertility for men, as
less than 10% of the transitions to fatherhood occurred past age forty in the final samples
for both countries (see also Kleven et al., 2018). Applying or not this sample restriction,
however, does not alter the substantial conclusions of this paper (for sensitivity checks
and a discussion, see Appendix H).
Finally, due the requirements of one of the statistical models I will use (FEIS model, see
below), I further limit my analyses to men who have been observed for at least three
waves in the panel (Bru¨derl and Ludwig, 2015; Ludwig and Bru¨derl, 2018). All together,
these restrictions result in a sample of 2,709 men (1,012 of which will become first-time
fathers) and 34,879 person-year records for Germany, and a sample of 1,251 men (572 of
which will become first-time fathers) and 15,454 person-year records for the UK. In both
samples, men are followed for an average of roughly 12 waves. After (prior) the birth of a
child, in particular, first-time fathers are followed for an average of roughly 12 (5) waves
in the German sample and 10 (5) waves in the British sample.
Table 1 sums up all sample restrictions and relative sample sizes. Notably, restricting the
sample to individuals observed for at least three waves has a minor impact on the final
sample counts. My main findings, coherently, are unaltered by this choice (see Figure 1A,
Appendix B).
With the exception of the selection of suitable treatment and control groups, the most
substantial drop in sample size is observed because of the use of fertility history files in
SOEP. For Germany, SOEP started collecting men’s fertility histories only from 2000
onwards (Goebel, 2017). Respondents that dropped from the panel prior to that date are
not included in the analysis. Nevertheless, replicating the analyses for Germany using
fertility info from the core file (“number of children in the household”) does not alter any
of the conclusions on the impact of fatherhood on wages for German men (see Appendix
F).
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2.2. Measures
The outcome variable in this study is the log of real hourly wages. Hourly wages are
computed dividing gross monthly pay by the amount of weekly working hours multiplied
by 4.35, the approximate number of weeks in a month. For the BHPS arm of my analysis,
I sum weekly working hours and hours of overtime (Bryan and Sevilla-Sanz, 2011). For
SOEP, I use actual working hours or, when missing, the sum of contractual working hours
and of overtime (Ku¨hhirt and Ludwig, 2012). As per Table 1, listwise deletion on missing
wages only lead to marginal sample losses, of 0.3% and 0.4% of the potential sample in
SOEP and BHPS respectively.
Wages are then indexed at 2014 prices (2016 for the UK) and values below 1 or above
100 are trimmed, following standard practices in the literature (e.g. Ku¨hhirt and Ludwig,
2012). Taking the natural logarithm of real wages then enables the interpretation of coef-
ficients in terms of percentage effects on wage levels, since the log scale well approximates
the percentage-point scale as long as coefficients lie in the (–.25, .25) interval.
I deploy two measures to single out the effects of the transition to fatherhood. The first
is a simple dummy (Childit) that equals 0 prior to the birth of the first child and 1 in
its aftermath. In a second model specification, I consider the effect of the transition to
fatherhood as distributed along the life course of men (e.g. Dougherty, 2006). Instead of
a single dummy switching from 0 to 1 after the transition to fatherhood, I operationalize
fatherhood via a series of dummies k for each year t since the first child’s birth. Whenever
relevant data was available (thus, with the exclusion of the UKHLS arm), both measures
are corrected for the month in which the child is born. If the child’s birth occurred in the
interview year but months prior to the interview month the appropriate dummy is set
to 0; only if the interview occurred in the same month of birth or after, the appropriate
dummy is set to 1.
Focusing on the transition to fatherhood, and thus on first childbirth events, is consistent
with part of the literature on family events and wages (e.g. Kleven et al., 2018; Ludwig
and Bru¨derl, 2018). Many studies in the field have rather employed dummies for differ-
ent parities (e.g. Pollmann-Schult, 2011; Petersen et al., 2011) or a single counter for
the number of children (e.g. Gangl and Ziefle, 2009; Cooke, 2014). My operationalization
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choice was then driven by two types of considerations. One is that arguments being de-
veloped regarding both mechanisms and selection dynamics deal with the transition to
fatherhood and not with the effect of specific (higher-order) parities. It is posited, for
example, that employers treat differently fathers and childless men, rather than discrim-
inate among fathers depending on their number of children. As for selection dynamics,
the core contrast is between childless men who will eventually become fathers and men
who will not.
Differently it could be argued that the need for increasing work effort and for couple
specialization might be heightened after higher-order births, as additional children de-
mand higher income. Even if of sure interest, the effects of different parities might not
be easily disentangled in the regression framework though, considering that higher-order
births might be endogenous to previous births. Notably, one birth may causally affect
the chances of a subsequent birth via its effect on a parent’s labor market standing. If
men, say, receive a wage premium after the birth of a first child, this might increase
their chances of having a second one because they can afford a bigger family size. If, in
turn, the second birth propels men to specialise in paid work even more and get even
higher wages, part of the effect of a first birth on wages will “work through” the second
birth. Focusing on the transition to fatherhood, I therefore look for the total effect of
fatherhood on wages: Such total effect includes wage responses to higher-order parities,
yet avoids the empirical hurdles of disentangling separate effects for each endogenous
childbirth event.
Models throughout also include age and age squared to net out pure lifecycle effects.
Results are unchanged when opting for different polynomial forms (quadratic, cubic, and
quartic) or for a full set of dummies for age, potential labor market experience, and (for
SOEP only, due to data availability) actual labor market experience. Period dummies are
also included, grouping years in 3-year bans (with only two broader residual categories:
2011-14 for SOEP, 2012-2016 for BHPS). In SOEP, interviews are carried out annually:
when applying the within-individual transformation in fixed effects (FE) models, age and
interview year thus increase of one unit each year creating collinearity between the two
variables in the FE regression model. Grouping period dummies circumvents this issue.
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For consistency, I deploy 3-year dummies for the UK arm of the analysis as well, although
BHPS interviews naturally span over multiple years.
For cross-cohort comparisons, I identify three birth cohorts, distinguishing men born be-
tween 1950 and 1959, 1960 and 1967, and between 1968 and 1976 (1974 for Germany).
Cut-points derive, first, from the need to assure enough cell size in each group. Second,
I follow previous literature on Germany, suggesting that the relationship between father-
hood and labor market participation (and thus, perhaps, wages) changed starting from
men born in the 1960s (Pollmann-Schult and Reynolds, 2017). For the UK, I will not
report estimates for the 1950-59 British cohort since they would be based on relatively
older men (32 or older) experiencing the transition to fatherhood.
2.3. Fatherhood and wages: model specifications
I start from a simple OLS specification of the wage equation,
yit = α + βChildit + γ1Ageit + γ2Age
2
it + φt + it (1)
where yit is the log of real hourly wages. Apart from age (Ageit and Age
2
it) and period
(φt), no other variables are adjusted for on the right-hand side of the equation (e.g.
Loughran and Zissimopoulos, 2009; Killewald and Lundberg, 2017). My goal here is to
test whether data are compatible with a causal fatherhood wage bonus. Parsimony in
model specification allows, first, to estimate such gross bonus, if any. Second, parsimony
shields estimates from the risk of “overcontrol bias” (Elwert and Winship, 2014), that is,
of muting the effect fatherhood has on wages by accounting for the channels through which
the effect manifests in the first place. Adjusting for working hours, for example, could
already account for part of the bonus in accordance with the work effort mechanism. I
refrain, therefore, from including this and similar variables in the analyses, as the question
of whether data supports a causal fatherhood wage bonus predates asking what mediates
the bonus if present.
Still, pooling together all observations as if they belonged to different units, the OLS
model does not distinguish person-year records belonging to the same person from person-
year records belonging to a different one. Estimates of β in Equation 1, therefore, simply
64
contrast records in which the transition to fatherhood has occurred (Childit = 1) to
records in which the transition has not occurred (Childit = 0). The latter group of
observations includes both fathers-to-be prior to first childbirth and men belonging to
the control group of childless men.
Differently, to focus on within-individual change, and thus on the transition to fatherhood,
I contrast Equation 1 to the following fixed effects (FE) specification:
yit = βChildit + γ1Ageit + γ2Age
2
it + φt + θi + it (2)
The estimation of β associated with Childit in Equation 2 rests only on within-unit vari-
ance, thanks to the inclusion of individual fixed effects θi. It can be interpreted as the
average one-off shift in wages that men experience when becoming fathers (for details
on how this average is computed, see Borusyak and Jaravel, 2016; Imai and Kim, 2017).
Further, individual fixed effects curb estimates of β from time-invariant sources of selec-
tion into fatherhood. The role and direction of such type of selection can be assessed in
two ways. First, I contrast OLS and FE estimates of the β coefficient in both equations.
Negative selection on time-invariant individual characteristics should be signalled by an
increase in the magnitude of β in the FE model; positive selection, vice versa, by a de-
crease. Second, I look at the correlation coefficient r(θi, Childit), expressing the sign and
magnitude of selection into fatherhood in terms of the correlation between wage-relevant
time-constant unobservables θi and the variable for fatherhood, Childit (e.g. Gangl and
Ziefle, 2009).
While the model in Equation 2 nets out time-invariant sources of selection, it still makes
a number of assumptions. One is that the change in wage levels come fatherhood can be
expressed as a one-off change, summarized by a single coefficient β. Research on male
marital wage premiums and motherhood wage penalties alike has now well established
that family events impact wages in a dynamic fashion (e.g. Korenman and Neumark,
1991; Loughran and Zissimopoulos, 2009; Kleven et al., 2018). In other words, one is
better off modelling parenthood effects year by year after the birth of a child, as short-,
medium-, and long-run shifts in wage levels may differ. This first assumption is relaxed
by deploying an event-study design (e.g. Kleven et al., 2018), adding leads k of Childit
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as follows (see also, Imai and Kim, 2017):
yit =
k=10∑
k=0
βk1(k = t− Childi) + γ1Ageit + γ2Age2it + φt + θi + it (3)
With Childi, I now indicate the year in which the child’s birth occurs for an individual i.
Calendar time keeps being signalled by the subscript t. 1(k = ...) is the indicator function
whose argument can be either 1 or 0, i.e. a (set of) dummy variable(s). Equation 3 then
includes event-time dummies k for each year t since the year of first childbirth and up
to the tenth after. I cap the last indicator variable (for k = 10), coding as 1 also all
years after the tenth since first childbirth. Results out of Equation 3 are unaltered by
this choice (see also Appendix C; for cell sizes for each dummy k see Table 1A).
With Equation 3, I am thus able to capture the dynamic evolution of wages (if any) after
fatherhood. Yet, prior to fatherhood, fathers-to-be and childless men could be on different
wage growth paths. This would violate another assumption behind the FE estimator,
namely the strict exogeneity assumption for a treatment (here, Childit). Equations 2 and
3 indeed require that outcomes evolve in parallel for controls and treated prior to the
treatment (e.g. Wooldridge, 2010; Bru¨derl and Ludwig, 2015). In my case, childless men
and fathers-to-be (prior to fatherhood onset) should experience similar wage growth. This
might not be the case considering, for example, that much of selection into fatherhood
operates through selection into a union (e.g. Trimarchi and Van Bavel, 2017) and men who
enter a union are on steeper wage growth profiles compared to men who will remain single
(e.g. Ludwig and Bru¨derl, 2018). Since entry into a union has little causal effect per se on
men’s wages (ibidem: Loughran and Zissimopoulos, 2009; Killewald and Lundberg, 2017),
there is little risk of mistaking for fatherhood wage bonuses what are actually marital
wage bonuses. Adjusting estimates for men’s entry into union is likely not necessary to
achieve credible causal inference on fatherhood and wages (cf. Ludwig and Bru¨derl,
2018; see also Figure 4A in the Appendices). Rather, a process of selection on the basis
of wage growth might underlie family formation (union entry and fatherhood) and failing
to account for it may lead to incorrectly claim the existence of a positive wage boost
brought about by fatherhood.
Hence, to compound evidence obtained via the FE estimators in Equations 2 and 3, one
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can ask if any effect of fatherhood on wages can be detected once any individual trend in
wage growth is netted out (Ludwig and Bru¨derl, 2018). A more restrictive specification
of this kind fully accounts for the chance that fathers-to-be and childless men may be
on different wage-growth paths. It could permit wage growth to depend on any (time-
invariant) individual characteristic, since each man in the sample would basically have his
own wage slope. A fixed effects individual-slope (FEIS) model (e.g. Bru¨derl and Ludwig,
2015; Ludwig, 2019) is thus fitted in the following steps: first, one should estimate an
OLS regression for each individual i, regressing log-wages yit on a constant and a linear
term for age; second, get the predicted values and subtract them from yit, thus obtaining
wage values for each individual i that are both de-meaned (constant term in step 1)
and de-trended (linear term for age in step 1); third, repeat step 1 for all independent
variables to de-mean and de-trend them as well; finally, run an OLS on the transformed
data. All these steps are automated in the STATA routine xtfeis (Ludwig, 2019) which
I deploy. A more compact formulation of the model is as follows (Wooldridge, 2010: 377):
yit = βChildit + γ2Age
2
it + φt + W
′
itθi + it (4)
With respect to the fixed effects specification in Equation 2, I allow now for the product
of individual fixed effects θi and some observable variable, namely the linear term for age,
contained in the vector W′it. I ran such FEIS estimation both using the single dummy
variable Childit and, separately, the event-study approach of Equation 3. Notably, since
FEIS estimation is based on a OLS model for each single individual (step 1) including
two parameters (the constant term plus a linear slope for age), at least three observations
per person are needed, hence the aforementioned sample restriction (Ludwig and Bru¨derl,
2018).
Throughout, standard errors are handled via the Huber-White estimator to account for
the clustering of observations within each individual (via the option robust in STATA
14.0).
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3. Findings
Pooling data from all the available waves, Figure 1 depicts average wage levels from age
20 onwards and separately for men who will eventually become fathers and for men who
will not. Trends are similar in Germany and Britain. Wages at the mean grow at a slightly
faster pace for fathers relative to non-fathers up until their late 20s/early 30s. After that,
the wages of men who will remain childless stagnate, while men who did or will experience
the transition to parenthood earn even higher wages than in their youth. Such a pattern
could be consistent with the existence of a fatherhood wage bonus, as wage trajectories
diverge right around the age of first-time fatherhood in both countries (McMunn et al.,
2015; Struffolino et al., 2016). The picture cannot be conclusive, however, on whether
men experience a wage premium come parenthood or some antecedent factors boost the
wages of fathers-to-be.
Turning to statistical models, OLS estimates in the first column of Table 1A and Table 3
reflect the patterns displayed in Figure 1. Fatherhood is associated with an average wage
gain of about 14 percent in Germany (p < .001) and 17 percent in Britain (p < .001).
In terms of magnitude, these estimates are compatible, if not slightly higher, with those
highlighted for the US in previous studies (Lundberg and Rose, 2000; Hodges and Budig,
2010). Yet OLS regression pools all observations in the panel and does not distinguish
records belonging to the same individual from records belonging to a different individual.
As a result, OLS estimates in the first column of both tables simply contrast person-year
records of men once they have become fathers with person-year records of men who are
not (or not yet) fathers. I thus quantify the differential already shown in Figure 1, but
cannot address the potential bias stemming from selection into fatherhood.
A step forward in this direction comes from FE estimates in the second column of Tables
1A and 3. Such estimates focus on within-individual variation and therefore can be inter-
preted as the one-off shift in wage levels brought about, on average, by the transition to
fatherhood. Netting time-invariant differences between men by means of individual fixed
effects, estimates are reduced. The shift in wages brought about by fatherhood stops at
around 4.2 percent in Germany (p < .001). For British men, differently, the fatherhood
wage premium halts at around 2.6 percent (p = .059). The decrease in size compared to
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OLS estimates is opposite to what previous studies have found for the US. Selection into
fatherhood in both Germany and Britain seems to be positive, on average: high-earning
men in both countries are more likely to become fathers. At the bottom of both tables,
correlations r(θi, Childit) further support this conclusion. For both countries, I found
moderate and positive correlations between time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity θi
and my indicator variable for fatherhood. Unobserved, time-invariant factors relevant for
wage determination are thus positively correlated with the transition to fatherhood.
While netting out time-invariant heterogeneity between individuals substantially reduces
the bonus, FE estimates could still be biased if the wages of men who eventually become
fathers grow at a faster pace than those of their childless counterparts. In the third column
of Tables 1A and 3, fixed effects individual-slope (FEIS) estimates address this by letting
the wage-age profile vary between men. Now, including individual slopes, I cannot reject
the hypothesis that the effect fatherhood has on wages is actually nil for German men (β
= – 0.007, p = .505). The same can be said for British men looking at FEIS estimates
in Table 3 (β = – 0.003, p = .803). Hence, once the possibility of divergent individual
wage trajectories is accounted for, the evidence does not support a causal story for the
fatherhood wage bonus (as in Ludwig and Bru¨derl, 2018 for US men).
So far, I have assumed that fatherhood may bring about a one-off shift in men’s wage
levels. Such assumption could be unwarranted though. For example, men could increase
their work effort or specialize in paid work particularly in the first years following a child’s
birth, often compensating for mothers’ work interruptions and subsequent income loss in
that period. As many applied and methodological contributions have shown (e.g. Koren-
man and Neumark, 1991; Borusyak and Jaravel, 2016), a simple dummy for “before-after”
the event of childbirth will not help retrieving more complex, dynamic effects. Figure 2
thus displays estimates from an event-study approach, in which the wage response to fa-
therhood is singled out for each year after that of a child’s birth – as per Equation 3. For
German men, the figure supports the presence of a fatherhood wage bonus, especially
in the short term. FE estimates in the first five years are all positive and around the
size previously assessed with the single-dummy approach (≈ 5 percent). For British men,
point estimates are somewhat smaller in the aftermath of fatherhood, compatible with
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wage bonuses of around 2 to 4 percentage points.
Yet, turning to FEIS estimates and thus accounting for idiosyncratic wage growth, the
alleged premium reduces further. For Germany, in particular, estimates turn negative
already in years 0 (p = .478), 1 (p = .068), and 2 (p = .144). In later years, estimates are
not just negative in sign but substantial in size. Yet, as the number of fathers observed in
such later years shrinks, the precision of FEIS estimates in the long run becomes question-
able – with respect to both the sign of the point estimates and to the width of confidence
intervals (see also Ludwig and Bru¨derl, 2018; Appendix C for sensitivity checks). It is
therefore unwarranted to consider such estimates as evidence of some substantial long-run
fatherhood wage penalty in Germany.
FEIS estimates for the UK are close to 0 in the first years after childbirth, and quite
noisy thereafter. For the aforementioned sensitivity of such long-run estimates, caution
should be applied this time to the idea that fatherhood spurs substantial wage premiums
for British fathers in the long run.
Hence, even if the wage trajectories of fathers and non-fathers depicted in Figure 2 differ
markedly in both countries, there is no strong evidence to conclude that fatherhood
boosts men’s wages in Germany and the UK. Rather, the apparent wage premium can be
traced back, by and large, to positive selection both on the basis of wage levels (static)
and on the basis of wage growth (dynamic). Already prior to their child’s birth, that is,
fathers-to-be earn relatively higher wages and are on superior wage growth paths than
their childless counterparts.
3.1. Heterogeneous effects? A comparison across cohorts
On balance, the evidence presented in the previous section cannot support the idea of
a causal fatherhood wage premium. Regardless of the estimation method though, all
my analyses have tested for the presence of a premium for all men, on average. In the
remainder, I examine cohort differences: After all, fatherhood wage premiums might
simply be “a thing of the past”, as the UK and Germany shifted away from a traditional
male-breadwinner model in recent decades.
In Figure 3, I repeat the analyses for Germany separately by birth cohort. OLS esti-
mates suggest that fatherhood is associated with higher wages for men, especially for
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those belonging to the older cohorts (up to around 24% for the 1950-59 cohort). After
the inclusion of individual fixed effects, estimates are substantially reduced in the older
cohorts, while they remain small but stationary for the youngest. Finally, looking at the
FEIS specification, estimates further reduce and are no longer compatible with the idea of
a wage premium particularly in the youngest cohorts (for the 1950-59 cohort, somewhat
differently, βChildit = .02, p = .272).
Results for Britain in Figure 4 exhibit similar patterns across model specifications. In
the FEIS specification, in particular, fatherhood brings about a wage gain of around 2
percent for the 1960-67 cohort (p = .266) while the point estimate for the youngest cohort
is even negative (– 0.01, p = .496).
Given the partitioning of the sample in different cohorts, I refrain from presenting here
the event-study part of my analyses for each separate group due to the small cell size.
Nonetheless, event-study results (see Figures 5A and 6A in the Appendices), with both
FE and FEIS specifications, give no strong indication either of a fatherhood bonus across
cohorts in the UK and Germany.
At best, small causal fatherhood premiums are indeed a “thing of the past” in Germany
and the UK. Notably, cross-cohort analyses also reveal that selection into fatherhood on
the basis of wage-relevant, time-invariant characteristics may have become less positive
across subsequent cohorts. This is evidenced by the smaller and smaller contribution that
including individual fixed-effects makes to estimates of the premium across cohorts in
Figures 3 and 4.
4. Discussion and conclusion
In this study I ask whether men get a wage premium when they become fathers in
countries that have long supported male breadwinning. I propose that observed premiums
could be a statistical artifact if men who become fathers have a higher earning potential
and experience steeper wage growth than men that will eventually remain childless. By
deploying several model specifications that variously account for such selection dynamics,
I cannot reject the null of no effect of fatherhood on men’s wages. What is more, across
cohorts, both the size of premiums and the importance of selection into fatherhood appear
to be fading in Germany and the UK. Over time, fatherhood may have thus become less
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of a marker of breadwinning in the labor market, and traits associated with breadwinning
may have become less important for the transition to fatherhood in the marriage market.
Such findings stand in contrast with previous studies in a twofold sense. First, pertaining
to selection into fatherhood, I find that British and German men positively select into
parenthood on the basis of time-invariant unobserved factors. In the US, such selection
dynamic appears to be negative instead (Lundberg and Rose, 2000; Hodges and Budig,
2010; Killewald and Gough, 2013). The portion of the premium due to positive selec-
tion, also, has been decreasing across cohorts in both Germany and the UK. This differs
from findings from cross-cohort analyses carried out in Nordic countries, typically finding
persistent or even increasing positive selection of men into parenthood on the basis of
wage levels or on antecedents of earning power such as educational attainment (Kravdal
and Rindfuss, 2008; Hart, 2015; Jalovaara et al., 2018). As the question of “which” men
become fathers has broad implications – not limited to men’s own wage attainment, but
extending to income inequality across households or the intergenerational transmission
of (dis)advantage (e.g. McCall and Percheski, 2010; Huerta et al., 2014) – this study
motivates research on the demography of fatherhood and whether and how it is changing
over time.
Second, differently from the US-based literature, considering selection on both time-
invariant unobserved factors and on prior wage growth, I cannot conclude that father-
hood sparks the wage attainment of men in the UK and Germany. As a consequence,
highlighting the crucial role played by selection dynamics casts doubts on the credibil-
ity of estimates of fatherhood premiums derived by cross-sectional data, lest they will
account for selection into fatherhood as well. So far largely confined to the role of “unob-
servables”, results in this study prompt further research on those features (personality,
genetic variants, non-cognitive skills, beauty, etc., see e.g. Bowles et al., 2001) that may
matter for both wage attainment and the transition to fatherhood, to be considered in a
comparative and cross-cohort perspective.
Surely, the inability to reject the null in this study could reflect the fact that fatherhood
indeed has a negligible (causal) effect on men’s wages, but it may also stem from a) lack
of statistical power, b) measurement error, and c) deficiencies in the study design. Sample
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sizes in this study are highly comparable to previous longitudinal studies on fatherhood
and wages (e.g. Smith Koslowski, 2011; Killewald and Gough, 2013). Yet, if true effects
are small or very small I may have failed to detect them due to lack of statistical power.
Across both my main and sub-group analyses, at best fatherhood premiums amounted to
4-5%. If even smaller premiums exist and could not be detected here, however, it is worth
to question what their substantial significance would be, especially when contrasted, on
the other hand, with the order of magnitude of motherhood wage penalties (e.g. Gangl
and Ziefle, 2009; Harkness, 2016; Kleven et al., 2018; Cools et al., 2017).
Findings in this paper may also be invalidated by measurement errors. Measurement
error could affect the computation of log hourly wages as well as the construction of the
key independent variable operationalizing the transition to fatherhood. For the former, I
relied on well-established practices in the literature (e.g. Gangl and Ziefle, 2009; Bryan and
Sevilla-Sanz, 2011; Ku¨hhirt and Ludwig, 2012) and I can only note that my conclusions on
fatherhood and wages are in line with those of studies using perhaps more precise register
data, albeit for different countries (Kleven et al., 2018; Cools et al., 2017). Further, using
fertility history files has enabled me to detect the precise timing of the transition to
fatherhood, a crucial requirement for the event-study part of the analyses presented here.
Finally, while the study design of this paper has sought to curb estimates of the fatherhood
bonus from multiple sources of selection bias, evidence from alternative causal designs
should complement my findings. Examples of alternative designs could include quasi-
experimental studies matching childless men and fathers on time-constant and, especially,
time-varying confounders (e.g. Mincy et al., 2009 for the male marital wage premium),
or approaches based on instrumenting the transition to parenthood (e.g. Cools et al.,
2017; Kleven et al., 2018). Experimental studies, so far failing to detect a preference for
fathers in terms of hiring chances in field settings (Correll et al., 2007; Bygren et al.,
2017), could also complement the evidence of this study by investigating employers’ wage
offers to prospective male employees, depending on parental status. Additionally, while
this study has focused on the transition to fatherhood and possible heterogeneities by
cohort, future research could deploy the same stringent tests to assess how men’s wages
respond to higher-order parities and across other social groupings. Parity- and group-
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specific mechanisms should of course motivate these analyses.
All in all, the evidence amassed in this study cannot support the idea of a causal wage
premium for fathers in Germany and the UK. One consequence is that, as much as gender
wage gaps in the two countries are driven by the transition to parenthood, the penalty for
mothers rather than the premium for fathers really drives the gap in labor markets. The
wage response to motherhood, however, has yet to be put to test using FEIS, accounting
thereby for heterogeneous individual wage growth (but see Loughran and Zissimopoulos,
2009; Livermore et al., 2011). If, on average, mothers-to-be are on worse (better) wage
growth paths than women who will not become mothers, motherhood penalties could
have actually been overestimated (underestimated) in the literature so far. This study
motivates future research into the reciprocal relationship between wages and motherhood
too.
Absent wage boosts for fathers, nonetheless, it appears wage losses for mothers will not be
compensated for within the confines of households alone. Evidence on men’s wages in this
paper thus indirectly calls for continued research on those policies that may mitigate the
motherhood wage penalty and reduce gender economic inequalities more at large. Notably,
my findings for Germany and the UK are in line with those of similar event-study designs
for Scandinavian countries (for Denmark, Kleven et al., 2018; for Norway, Cools et al.,
2017), countries that have a much longer tradition of support for men’s role as carers and
women’s role as earners. As increasingly inclusive care policies are implemented in former
male-breadwinner societies too, especially in the form of parental leaves, future research
could evaluate their impact on men’s labor market outcomes (e.g. for Scandinavia, Rege
and Solli, 2013; Albrecht et al., 2015; Evertsson et al., 2016). Evidence in this study
cannot support a causal story linking wages and fatherhood per se, after all.
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Tables & graphs
Table 1: Summary of sample restrictions and relative sample sizes.
SOEP BHPS-UKHLS
N person-years
(N individuals)
Percent
N person-years
(N individuals)
Percent
All men aged 20-50
146,334
(20,109)
100
74,462
(10,883)
100
In dependent employment
106,054
(16,452)
72.5
(81.8)
53,550
(8,544)
71.9
(78.5)
Complete fertility history
88,088
(11,879)
60.2
(59.1)
52,917
(8,227)
71.1
(75.6)
First-time fathers and childless men
58,625
(7,591)
40.1
(37.7)
33,902
(5,395)
45.5
(49.6)
Observed at least until age 40
37,076
(3,236)
25.3
(16.1)
17,437
(1,649)
23.4
(15.1)
Non-missing on current wage
35,879
(3,156)
24.5
(15.6)
16,197
(1,536)
21.7
(14.1)
Observed for at least three waves
35,297
(2,743)
24.1
(13.6)
15,730
(1,283)
21.1
(11.8)
No child when first observed
34,879
(2,709)
23.8
(13.5)
15,454
(1,251)
20.7
(11.5)
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Figure 1: Average log hourly wages by age of the respondent, separately for childless men
and fathers. Sources: SOEP 1984-2014, BHPS 1991-2016.
Table 2: OLS, FE, and FEIS for the log of real hourly wages. German men (SOEP 1984-2014).
(1) (2) (3)
OLS FE FEIS
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
First-time father (ref. childless) 0.146*** 0.042*** −0.007
(0.005) (0.011) (0.010)
r(θi, Childit) 0.23
R2 (within R2 in Columns 2 and 3) 0.46 0.61 0.10
Number of individuals 2,743 2,743 2,743
Number of person-years 34,879 34,879 34,879
Notes: All models include period dummies and a quadratic for age. The latter is allowed to
vary across individuals in the FEIS specification. Standard errors are clustered at the indi-
vidual level.
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
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Table 3: OLS, FE, and FEIS for the log of real hourly wages. British men (BHPS 1991-2016).
(1) (2) (3)
OLS FE FEIS
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
First-time father (ref. childless) 0.177*** 0.026 −0.003
(0.008) (0.014) (0.013)
r(θi, Childit) 0.23
R2 (within R2 in Columns 2 and 3) 0.51 0.74 0.05
Number of individuals 1,251 1,251 1,251
Number of person-years 15,454 15,454 15,454
Notes: All models include period dummies and a quadratic for age. The latter is allowed to
vary across individuals in the FEIS specification. Standard errors are clustered at the indi-
vidual level.
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
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Figure 2: Point estimates and 95% CI for the event study of fatherhood and wages. fixed
effects (FE) estimates and fixed effects individual-slope (FEIS) estimates on display.
Models are detailed in the main text. Sources : SOEP 1984-2014, BHPS 1991-2016.
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Figure 3: Point estimates and 95% CI for the coefficient of first-time fatherhood on log
wages. Separate models for different birth cohorts. Sources: SOEP 1984-2014.
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Figure 4: Point estimates and 95% CI for the coefficient of first-time fatherhood on log
wages. Separate models for different birth cohorts. Source: BHPS 1991-2016.
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Appendices
A. Cell size for each dummy k after first childbirth
Table 1A: Number of first-time fathers (treated units) for each dummy k after fist child-
birth (Equations 3 and 4 in the main text).
SOEP BHPS-UKHLS
Years since first childbirth N first-time fathers N first-time fathers
Year 0 906 496
Year 1 909 495
Year 2 901 487
Year 3 891 469
Year 4 850 451
Year 5 841 431
Year 6 808 400
Year 7 762 380
Year 8 740 370
Year 9 686 332
Year 10+ 4,400 1,791
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B. With and without restrictions on the number of waves
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Figure 1A: Point estimates and 95% CIs. FE model specifications (Equation 3, e.g. Figure
2 in the main text) with and without restrictions on the number of waves. Sources: SOEP
1984-2014, BHPS 1991-2016.
C. Event-study dummies: investigating model dependence
In the following I replicate my event-study analyses displayed in Figure 2 in the main text.
Estimates corresponding to the main analyses are henceforth labeled “Main”. I contrast
here three alternative ways of dummy-coding the years k since the birth of the first child:
1. I include dummies for k = 0, 1, .., 10, but, differently from “Main”, I do not set
k10 = 1 if k > 10 (“No cap at k = 10”);
2. I exclude observations for fathers after k = 10 (“Trim if k > 10”);
3. Last (“Full set of dummies”), I include all dummies k for which at least 140 first-
time fathers were observed in the panel (capping at k = 20 for SOEP, k = 15 for
BHPS).
Estimates in FE specifications are substantially independent from such specification
choices. Estimates for FEIS specifications vary to a greater extent, but mainly with
respect to the uncertainty surrounding point estimates in later years after childbirth.
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Regardless, no specification choice for FEIS is compatible with a substantial, causal fa-
therhood wage bonus in the years immediately following the transition to fatherhood.
Also, uncertainty surrounding estimates may stem from the fewer number of units (fa-
thers) that are observed in later years after childbirth. The FEIS procedure requires
to “detrend” both the outcome and each predictor, and so each of the dummies k is
detrended via individual-specific OLS regression models. The predictions of these OLS
models, then plugged in for the estimation of FEIS coefficients, are likely to be more and
more imprecise the less the variation in k, i.e. the lower the number of fathers that are
observed in that particular year k after first childbirth.
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Figure 2A: Point estimates and 95% CIs. Source: SOEP 1984-2014.
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Figure 3A: Point estimates and 95% CIs. Source: BHPS 1991-2016.
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D. Adding a dummy for marriage
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Figure 4A: Point estimates and 95% CIs. FE and FEIS model specifications (Equations
3 and 4, respectively; e.g. Figure 2 in the main text) adjusting for marriage (1 if in a
union, 0 otherwise). Sources: SOEP 1984-2014, BHPS 1991-2016
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E. Cross-cohort event-study design
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Figure 5A: Point estimates and 95% CIs for the event-study design by men’s birth cohort.
Source: SOEP 1984-2014.
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Figure 6A: Point estimates and 95% CIs for the event-study design by men’s birth cohort.
Source: BHPS 1991-2016.
F. Missing fertility histories in SOEP
Only men who have been interviewed in 2000 or later completed fertility history ques-
tionnaires for SOEP. Men who dropped out of the panel prior to 2000 cannot therefore
participate to the estimates displayed in the main text. Table 1 in the main text reports
a substantial loss of around 12.5% of the potential sample when the restriction on the
availability of fertility info is applied.
Hence, I have replicated here my analyses exploiting info contained in the main question-
naire. Relying on the variable for the “the number of children in the household”, I code it
1 after first childbirth and 0 otherwise. Applying the same sample restrictions utilised for
the main analyses, with the exception of the one pertaining fertility histories, I am able
to retain 5,223 individuals (and 41,170 person-year records), of which 1,794 will become
first-time fathers in the observation period.
Figure 7 portrays FE and FEIS specifications in the augmented German sample. FE
estimates are similar in magnitude and uncertainty to those reported in the main text.
FEIS estimates, differently, are positive in the years following childbirth, although the
pattern is not clear-cut (e.g. β for year 0 = .01, p = .487, while β for year 1 = .02, p =
.017).
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Figure 7A: Point estimates and 95% CIs for men in the augmented German sample.
Source: SOEP 1984-2014.
This difference could be due to the composition of the new sample, now encompassing a
higher portion of men belonging to older cohorts as compared to the estimation sample in
the main text. To investigate this intuition, I have replicated the event-study design, split
by birth cohort, using the new augmented sample. Results for the FEIS specification in
Figure 8 support the idea that small causal premiums (at best, ≈ 4%) may resist adjusting
for selection on prior wage growth, only among older cohorts. For men in the youngest
cohort, estimates are instead indistinguishable from the average estimates reported in the
main test. As reported in the main text then, one can conclude that fatherhood wage
premiums are at best a “thing of the past” in Germany.
87
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
W
ag
e 
ch
an
ge
 (β
s)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Years since first childbirth
Germany - FE Event Study
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
W
ag
e 
ch
an
ge
 (β
s)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Years since first childbirth
Germany - FEIS Event Study
1950-59 cohort 1960-67 cohort
1968+ cohort
Figure 8A: Point estimates and 95% CIs for men in the augmented German sample, by
men’s birth cohort. Source: SOEP 1984-2014.
G. Adding dummies for the years preceding fatherhood
Event-study designs are typically specified by including dummies for years since the event
of interest as well as prior to it. Dummies for the years prior to fatherhood, however, are
not included in the paper as they would be superfluous in FEIS specifications. Concen-
trating on the years after the transition to fatherhood only, FE and FEIS specifications
are as similar as possible in the paper, and this helps comparing them.
Nonetheless, I here contrast my “Main” estimates (FE specification, Figure 2 in the text)
with the ones that can be obtained running a fully dynamic event-study specification. In
line with common practices in the literature, I include observations for the treated group
for each year up to the fifth prior to first childbirth and up to the tenth after. Person-
year records in which the treated where observed earlier or later than those moments are
dropped. The year preceding childbirth (k = – 1) serves as the reference category.
To a somewhat lesser extent in the German sample, estimates in the two specifications
closely resemble one another (Figure 9). Once again, evidence from FE specifications is
at best compatible with small wage premiums for fathers (particularly in Germany).
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Figure 9A: Point estimates and 95% CIs for the main model (Figure 2 in the main text)
and a FE model including dummies for up to the fifth year prior to the transition to
fatherhood (k = - 1 is the reference category). Sources: SOEP 1984-2014, BHPS 1991-
2016.
H. Age restrictions and suitable control groups
My final analytical sample only includes men who have been observed at least until age
40. This sample restriction is necessary to define the preferred control group consisting of
childless men. Yet it is not without consequences, first and foremost bringing about a sub-
stantial sample size loss (see Table 1, main text). Further, it may introduce bias by what
could be described as “conditioning on future outcomes”. If the argument about selection
holds, men who are high-earning and/or on steep wage growth paths are more likely to
become fathers. In a sense then, the control group I chose disproportionately consists of
men who will never attain wages high enough (or a wage growth steep enough) to make
them “suitable” for the transition to fatherhood. I am thus conditioning the definition
of the control group, being childless at age 40, to men’s wage levels and trajectory, their
“future outcomes” I can expect under a scenario of positive selection into fatherhood.
In a way, I may thus be contrasting “lucky” men (fathers-to-be) to “unlucky” men (never
fathers), luck being men’s wage attainment. It follows that this may, by design, lead to
overestimate wage premiums related to fatherhood. As a sensitivity check, I re-estimate
all the main models dropping the sample requirement to observe men at least until age
40. After applying all the other sample restrictions as per Table 1, I can rely on a much
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bigger analytical sample: 53,277 person-year records (5,343 men) for SOEP and 27,518
person-year records (2,790 men) for BHPS.
All the main analyses are here replicated, in Figure 10 for Germany and in Figure 11 for
the UK. Note that they now refer to a different contrast between groups, as the wage
attainment of first-time fathers is compared to men who will never become fathers or
may become fathers in the future. The latter may simply experience the transition to
fatherhood at a later date than when last observed in the panel. From a causal inference
perspective, this contrast provides an estimate of the effect of becoming a father v. not
having become a father yet. All the panels in both figures closely resemble the main
analyses, highlighting indeed, if anything, some overestimation of the wage premium in
FE models for the German sample.
Ultimately, this alternative design strengthens the paper’s main conclusions, that there
is no strong evidence pointing to a causal effect of fatherhood on the wages of German
and British men.
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Figure 10A: Point estimates and 95% CIs for the effect of fatherhood on wages in the
German sample, dropping age restrictions used to define the analytical sample in the
main text. Panel a. replicates the analyses displayed in Table 2 in the main text. Panel
b. replicates the event-study estimates displayed in Figure 2 in the main text. Panel c.
replicates the cross-cohort analyses of Figure 3 in the main text.
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Figure 11A: Point estimates and 95% CIs for the effect of fatherhood on wages in the
British sample, dropping age restrictions used to define the analytical sample in the
main text. Panel a. replicates the analyses displayed in Table 3 in the main text. Panel
b. replicates the event-study estimates displayed in Figure 2 in the main text. Panel c.
replicates the cross-cohort analyses of Figure 4 in the main text.
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Chapter 2
Do Parental Leaves Make the Motherhood Wage Penalty Worse?
Assessing Two Decades of German Reforms
Do Parental Leaves Make
the Motherhood Wage Penalty Worse?
Assessing Two Decades of German Reforms∗
Abstract
Women-friendly policies may have perverse effects on the wages of employed
women and mothers in particular. Yet few have addressed the causal impact of such
policies and the mechanisms they might trigger at the individual level to produce
such wage responses. We assess if and how two decades of reforms of parental
leave schemes in Germany have shaped changes in the motherhood wage penalty
over time. We compare two sweeps of reforms inspired by opposite principles, one
allowing for longer periods out of paid work, the other prompting quicker re-entry
in the labour market. We deploy panel data (SOEP 1985-2014) and a within-person
difference-in-differences design.
Motherhood wage penalties were found to be harsher than previously assessed in the
1990s. As parental leave reform triggered longer time spent on leave coupled with
better tenure accumulation, wage losses for mothers remained stable in this first
period. Conversely, we can no longer detect motherhood wage penalties for women
affected by the later reform. Shorter career breaks and increased work hours may
have benefited new mothers in the late 2000s, leading to a substantial improvement
in their wage prospects.
∗This paper is co-authored with Giorgio Cutuli. Access to the SOEP data was kindly granted by the
German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin, 2016. The data collector bears no responsibility
for the analyses and interpretations provided in this paper. The authors wish to thank Lynn Prince
Cooke, as well as participants at the Understanding Society Scientific Conference (University of Essex,
2017), the 2017 ECSR conference (Bocconi University, Milan), and in internal seminars at the University
of Trento and at the University of Bath, for their useful comments on previous versions of this paper. A
slightly different version of this paper is currently under review at an international peer-reviewed journal.
The paper also appeared as part of the SOEPPapers collection (dp1025, 2019)
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Employed mothers typically face wage losses when returning to paid work after childbirth,
to the point that such a motherhood wage penalty has become a key component of the
gender pay gap in labour markets (for a review, Ponthieux and Meurs, 2015). Women’s
labour supply patterns, particularly work interruptions for family-related reasons, account
for at least part of the wage dip (Albrecht et al., 1999; Gupta and Smith, 2002; Gangl and
Ziefle, 2009; Adda et al., 2017). Work interruptions are in turn influenced by family-leave
policies and reforms to those policies over time (Gregg et al., 2007; Lalive and Zweimu¨ller,
2009; Ziefle and Gangl, 2014; Baum and Ruhm, 2016), yet few studies have looked into
the corresponding changes, if any, in the motherhood wage penalty.
Prolonged absence from work granted by statutory leaves may spur human capital losses
(Gupta and Smith, 2002), effort re-allocation (Gangl and Ziefle, 2015), or signal low com-
mitment to current and future employers (Albrecht et al., 1999; Evertsson, 2016), all to
the detriment of women’s wages. At the same time, family leaves may offset the moth-
erhood wage penalty by granting job protection and thereby job continuity (Waldfogel,
1998; Zhang, 2010) or by encouraging a more equal division of childcare within couples
(Petersen et al., 2014; Andersen, 2018).
Leave arrangements, with their duration, job protection rights, and so forth, may thus
contribute to shape the motherhood wage penalty. In this paper, we aim to establish a link
between reforms of parental leave mandates and changes to the motherhood wage penalty
over time. We focus on Germany and rely on a within-person difference-in-differences
(DiD) design and on long-running panel data (SOEP 1985-2014). Parental leaves in Ger-
many have undergone substantial change in the last decades. A first round of reforms,
culminated in 1992-1993, gradually extended the duration of both benefits and job pro-
tection under the parental leave scheme. A second sweep in the 2000s prompted mothers
to quickly return to the workforce, while also introducing a take-it-or-leave-it quota to
encourage leave uptake among fathers. Germany thus offers an exemplary case study for
it once encompassed a maternalist leave scheme, de facto reserved to women and among
the longest and most generous in high-income countries, and has now shifted to flexible
and shared provisions similar to those of Scandinavian countries (Ray et al., 2010).
Our contribution is threefold. First, by showing how family policies shape the motherhood
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wage penalty in a single country, our findings complement previous comparative work.
Studies have mainly inferred the importance of the institutional setting by comparing
the magnitude of the penalty across countries (e.g. Davies and Pierre, 2005; Gangl and
Ziefle, 2009). Differently, we examine how parental leave mandates have causally affected
the motherhood wage penalty over time in Germany, and which mechanisms have been
triggered at the individual level to produce such wage responses.
Our second aim is to contribute to the broader debate on women-friendly family policies.
The consensus in the literature reads that such policies may help women maintain their
footing in paid work at the cost of lower wages and inferior career attainment (Ruhm,
1998; Albrecht et al., 2003; Mandel and Semyonov, 2005, 2006; Arulampalam et al., 2007;
Mandel, 2012; Aisenbrey and Fasang, 2017). Most of these studies have featured cross-
national comparisons, often using cross-sectional data or, when taking advantage of panel
data, without explicitly testing for the impact of family policies. In the following, we thus
aim to contribute with a within-country, longitudinal account of how the design of family
policies may influence the motherhood wage penalty.
Third and last, we add here to the rich body of evidence on two decades of parental leave
reform in Germany. The effects of changing parental leave arrangements on the labour
supply of German women have been extensively examined (Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck,
2014; Ziefle and Gangl, 2014; Fitzenberger et al., 2013; Bergemann and Riphahn, 2017;
Kluve and Schmitz, 2018). Beyond labour supply, the impact of parental leave reform
has been assessed with respect to fertility behaviour (Cygan-Rehm, 2016), breastfeeding
practices (Kottwitz et al., 2016), child development (Huebener et al., 2018), and father’s
involvement in childcare and housework (Kluve and Tamm, 2013; Tamm, 2018). Evidence
on the wage responses to parental leave reform is relatively under-developed instead (cf.
Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck, 2014). This omission is particularly relevant when considering
Germany, a country where both wage penalties for mothers and the gender wage gap more
broadly are among the harshest in international comparison (e.g. Gangl and Ziefle, 2009;
Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2008). These gender gaps arising in the labour market arguably
raise the opportunity costs of parenthood amid Germany’s fertility decline (Buhr and
Huinink, 2015) and hamper women’s accumulation of personal wealth and pension income
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later in life (Lersch et al., 2017; OECD, 2017: 173). The consequences of parental leave
reform on the motherhood wage penalty may thus be far-reaching, making Germany a
compelling avenue for the study of gender economic inequality more at large.
1. Background
1.1. Parental leave reforms and women’s return to paid work
Maternity leave in Germany has long covered a period of 14 weeks, six weeks before
and eight weeks after delivery, with full income replacement and job protection. Parental
leave, on the other hand, has been redesigned by multiple reforms touching both benefits
and the job guarantee, that is, the right to return to a comparable job with the pre-birth
employer.
Prior to 1986, employed (West) German mothers could access up to 6 months of paid and
job-guaranteed parental leave. A number of reforms progressively increased the duration
of the job guarantee. Most strikingly, such duration was doubled in 1992, from 18 to
36 months. In the meantime, the parental leave benefit also changed, switching from
earnings-related to a mix of flat-rate and means-tested payments. It became available
to all mothers regardless of pre-birth employment status (1986), for up to 18 months in
1992, then raised to 24 months the following year.
In 2001 a monetary incentive for shorter leaves granted a more generous benefit to mothers
returning to paid work after 12 rather than 24 months of benefit. Parents, maintaining
their eligibility intact, could also work up to 30 hours a week while on leave – in contrast to
the 19-hour limit in place prior to 2001. The 2007 reform (Elternzeitgesetz ) went further,
limiting paid leave to 12 months, or 14 if each parent takes at least two months. Benefits
are now earnings-related once again, with a replacement rate of 67% of the pre-birth net
labour earnings and a cap at 1,800 euros a month. Parents who are not in employment
in the year prior to childbirth are entitled to a minimum of 300 euros a month, similar to
the pre-2007 regime. Quite importantly, the job guarantee period remained unchanged
throughout. In short, reforms in the 1980s/90s broadened benefit receipt and extended
the job guarantee period to allow mothers a prolonged absence from paid work. Reforms
in the 2000s squeezed more generous benefits in shorter periods of benefit receipt with
the explicit aim of maintaining mothers in employment (see also Kluve and Tamm, 2013;
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Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck, 2014; Ziefle and Gangl, 2014).
Introducing or expanding paid leaves leads to sharp reductions in women’s employment
probability right after childbirth (e.g. Gregg et al., 2007; Lalive and Zweimu¨ller, 2009).
In the long run, however, paid leaves exert positive effects on job continuity and increase
the share of women returning to the labour market when entitlements expire (e.g. Baker
and Milligan, 2008; Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck, 2014; Baum and Ruhm, 2016). In Germany,
parental leave reform neatly shaped the short-term labour supply of mothers (Scho¨nberg
and Ludsteck, 2014; Ziefle and Gangl, 2014). After 1992, the median length of leave
periods in the West rose to 27 months and returns started peaking also at 36 months,
coinciding with the exhaustion of the job guarantee. In the East, mothers responded sim-
ilarly to policy change, albeit to a lesser extent given historically superior female labour
force participation. Early reforms particularly depressed mothers’ short-run chances of
working full-time (Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck, 2014; Arntz et al., 2017). Part-time employ-
ment conversely became the norm for mothers returning to paid work, particularly in
former West Germany and, to a lesser extent but increasingly over time, in the former
East too (Trappe et al., 2015; Dieckhoff et al., 2016). Although around half of returners
maintained their pre-birth employer in the aftermath of 1992, the share of returners with
a new employer and that of those having a second child out of inactivity also increased
(Arntz et al., 2017). Yet, in the long run, the impact of parental leave expansion on
mothers’ accumulated labour market experience was modest (Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck,
2014; see also Lalive and Zweimu¨ller, 2009 for similar conclusions on leave expansion
in Austria). Reforms seemingly accentuated positive selection into employment, as em-
ployment (and job) continuity after motherhood became even more skewed in favour of
highly-educated women (Drasch, 2012; Arntz et al., 2017).
In the midst of and contributing to rising female labour market participation, parental
leave reforms in the 2000s lead to a reversal in mothers’ behaviour in the first years af-
ter childbirth. While evidence is mixed on the role of the 2001 reform (cfr. Fitzenberger
et al., 2013; Ziefle and Gangl, 2014), the more radical overhaul of the benefit in 2007 fu-
elled strong labour supply responses. Consistent evidence in the literature indeed points
to increased time spent off work in the first year after childbirth – that is, during the
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entitlement period – coupled though with higher re-employment chances and longer work-
ing hours after the 12-month mark, when the benefit expires (Kluve and Tamm, 2013;
Ziefle and Gangl, 2014; Bergemann and Riphahn, 2017; Kluve and Schmitz, 2018). Still,
long-run maternal labour force participation was little affected by the new regime and
women’s higher propensity to reprise working part-time rather than full-time, as well as
the ‘high-skill skew’ among employed mothers, have persisted (Drasch, 2012; Bergemann
and Riphahn, 2017; Kluve and Schmitz, 2018).
1.2. Wage responses to parental leave reform
Overall, parental leave reform triggered longer short-term dips in the labour supply of
mothers, and these dips decisively reduced only in the late 2000s. Selective return and
part-time working remained common, among new mothers, all along. The extension of
the job guarantee period in 1992 and the reform of the benefit scheme in 2007 have
been identified as the two watershed reforms with respect to the labour supply behaviour
of German mothers (Ziefle and Gangl, 2014; Kluve and Tamm, 2013; Bergemann and
Riphahn, 2017; see also Fitzenberger et al., 2013; Gangl and Ziefle, 2015). In the remain-
der, we will focus on these two reform moments. The effects of these policies spilled over
into the wages of mothers through three main channels: human capital loss during leave
periods, the re-allocation of effort/commitment from paid work to the household, and
adverse signalling to employers.
Following human capital theory, first, prolonged time off may result in forgone experience1
and tenure, missed opportunities for training and promotion, and the depreciation of one’s
extant stock of skills. This kind of skill atrophy will be reflected in lower wage offers for
mothers returning to paid work after childbirth (Gupta and Smith, 2002; Anderson et al.,
2003; Adda et al., 2017). Expanding the duration of parental leaves might exacerbate
motherhood wage penalties by extending short-term career breaks and, thereby, leading
to human capital loss. At the same time, job guarantee rights also boost job continuity
(Baker and Milligan, 2008; Arntz et al., 2017). If preserving their pre-birth employer and
thus firm-specific human capital, mothers could effectively offset wage losses (Waldfogel,
1998; Zhang, 2010; Ferna´ndez-Kranz et al., 2013). Whether the 1992 reform propelled
human capital loss is therefore unclear, since it doubled the time on leave available to
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mothers, but it did so while also providing job guarantee rights for the whole leave period
of 36 months. Differently, after 2007, opting for a shorter benefit duration should have
mitigated skill atrophy and its costs by prompting mothers to reprise paid work more
quickly.
Second, mothers could re-orient their work-family preferences during long work interrup-
tions, to the detriment of work commitment (Evertsson, 2013; Gangl and Ziefle, 2015).
The expansion of job-guaranteed leave in 1992 has indeed lead to a sizeable slump in
mothers’ work commitment, i.e. the relative importance individuals assign to having a
career over having a family for life satisfaction. Such a change, in turn, played a part in
mothers’ labour supply responses to the reform (Gangl and Ziefle, 2015). That German
mothers have been pushed to divert effort/commitment from paid to unpaid work is also
coherent with mothers’ heightened chances of a higher-order birth after parental leave
expansion (Arntz et al., 2017).
Hence, a worsening of the motherhood wage dip after 1992 would be consistent with a shift
in effort, job guarantee notwithstanding. Conversely, the shorter paid leave introduced
in 2007 may have spurred a re-allocation of effort to the market, to the economic benefit
of mothers. This is in line with the observed increase in mothers’ labour supply at the
intensive margin after the 2007 reform (e.g. Kluve and Schmitz, 2018). New mandates for
fathers may play a role in this regard: parental leave uptake by fathers gradually increased
from around 3% before 2007 to around 30% in recent years, with leave periods typically
averaging two months (Bu¨nning, 2015; Tamm, 2018). The heightened involvement of
fathers in childcare and housework, also after the leave period, may in turn free up
time for mothers to work longer hours (Tamm, 2018) and mitigate the motherhood wage
penalty (Andersen, 2018; Petersen et al., 2014).
Third and last, it could be that employers pick up changes in the behaviours and pref-
erences of mothers as market signals. Since leave uptake is widespread among mothers,
leave length may serve as a signal (Albrecht et al., 1999, 2015; Evertsson, 2016). The price
of taking family leave may spike if women stay out more than what is statutorily granted
or if – given the choice – they spread their leave period rather than exhaust it all at once,
thus signalling low commitment to the job or to employment in general. Coherently, re-
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search has highlighted a significant jump in the wage penalty for leaves exceeding the
job-guaranteed arc of 36 months in Germany in the period 1994-2005 (Buligescu et al.,
2009). Similar ‘threshold effects’ have been shown to hold also in other countries (Al-
brecht et al., 2015; Evertsson, 2016). Signalling may thus generate heterogeneity in the
effects of each reform. In the midst of a general drift towards longer career interruptions
after 1992, mothers taking shorter leaves could have positively signalled themselves to
employers, perhaps avoiding a (more) negative wage shock. At the opposite, women could
have sent adverse signals by not complying with the new 12-month interruption norm
after 2007 (e.g. Bergemann and Riphahn, 2017), resulting in accrued motherhood wage
penalties also under the new leave regime.
Table 1 sums up our expectations regarding the wage responses mothers may have con-
fronted as a result of parental leave reforms in 1992 and 2007. If skill atrophy during
work interruptions is key, then the 1992 reform could have exacerbated the motherhood
wage penalty. Yet, if job protections shield mothers from the loss of firm-specific hu-
man capital, extending the job guarantee in 1992 may have generated relatively smaller
penalties for those who return to the same employer rather than changing. Differently,
effort-based arguments point, unambiguously, to a worsening of the wage penalty for
mothers in the aftermath of 1992, regardless of job continuity. With respect to both hu-
man capital loss and effort re-allocation, our hypotheses for the causal impact of the 2007
reform are largely symmetrical. We predict a shrinkage in the motherhood wage penalty
as a by-product of a quicker re-entry in the labour market and longer working hours.
Over and beyond, signalling dynamics may have generated heterogeneity in the impact
of each policy shift, depending on the timing of mothers’ return to work.
2. Empirical approach
2.1. Data, sample, and design
We use longitudinal data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP v. 31.1, German
Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin, 2016), a multipurpose household panel
survey carried out annually since 1984 (Goebel et al., 2018). We rely on samples A to K,
that is, all original samples for both West and East Germany as well as refreshment and
booster samples added up to 2012.
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We ran separate analyses for two periods. To evaluate the extension of the job guarantee
in 1992 (Reform 1, hereafter), we focus on the period between 1985 and 1998. To examine
the change in the benefit scheme carried out in 2007 (Reform 2, hereafter), we select the
subsequent time window between 1999 and 2014. The choice of these thresholds allows us
to have periods of equal length prior and after each reform, a requirement of our preferred
modelling strategy (Francesconi and Van der Klaauw, 2007). The two midpoints, 1992
and 2007 respectively, fit precisely with the culmination points of each sweep of reforms,
as previously discussed. The extensiveness of the time window is also motivated by the
specificity of the treatment effects we are investigating (e.g. Ziefle and Gangl, 2014). Since
women may take up to three years of parental leave from 1992 onwards, and since we
necessarily measure their post-birth wages only once they returned to the labour market
anyway, we need to allow (enough) women in our sample to make such re-entry in paid
work.
Following conventional practices in the literature, our sample is restricted to women aged
16 to 45, working as dependent employees, with at least two valid wage observations, and
with non-missing information on all variables involved in the analysis. To fully reconstruct
women’s fertility biographies, we take advantage of data from the Biography and Life
History module of SOEP (Goebel, 2017). We are thus able to build on info on the timing
of childbirth events, precise to the month and available up to the fifteenth parity.
We define the group treated by the policy change as those women who become mothers
for the first time between 1992 and 1998 for Reform 1 and between 2007 and 2014 for
Reform 2. The control group in each case is similarly made up of first-time mothers, who
have given birth for the first time between 1985 and 1991 for Reform 1 and between
1999 and 2006 for Reform 2. To avoid overlaps between the two treatment arms, mothers
belonging to each control group never give birth to a child in the respective post-reform
period and are thus unaffected by parental leave reforms. We are thus left with 709 women
(of which 456 are treated) for the evaluation of Reform 1 and 1,040 women (of which 490
are treated) for Reform 2, followed for an average of around 6 and 7 waves respectively.
These numbers are comparable to those of previous research on parental leave effects on
labour supply and earnings (e.g. Joseph et al., 2013; Bergemann and Riphahn, 2017).
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2.2. Estimating the effects of parental leave reforms
To identify the causal effect of parental leave reforms on the motherhood wage penalty, we
implement a person-level difference-in-differences (DiD) design relying on the fixed-effects
(FE) estimator (Francesconi and Van der Klaauw, 2007; Gangl and Ziefle, 2015). Rather
than focusing on a group-level comparison, as in classic DiD, our strategy singles out
within-individual variation and accounts for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Via
the inclusion of individual fixed effects, indeed, we manage to net out, first, compositional
differences across treatment groups and, second, endogenous changes to women’s fertility
and labour market participation choices, as long as time-constant factors are at the root
of both these sources of bias (see the discussion in the next paragraph). Additionally, the
choice of the FE estimator makes our design more comparable to the bulk of the literature
on the motherhood wage penalty, also deploying such specification strategy (e.g. Anderson
et al., 2003; Gangl and Ziefle, 2009; Ku¨hhirt and Ludwig, 2012; Ferna´ndez-Kranz et al.,
2013; Harkness, 2016).
The core of our model boils down to the product between event-time dummies capturing
the effects of motherhood on log-hourly wages and a dummy for treatment status Di.
More specifically, our model takes the form:
yit =
k=K∑
k=0
βk1(k = t− ei)×Di + X′itγ + θi + it (1)
where the dependent variable is the log of real hourly wages for an individual i in year t.
Hourly wages are obtained by dividing gross monthly earnings by the amount of actual
weekly working hours multiplied by 4.35 (the approximate number of weeks in a month).
If the actual working time is not available, we substitute for it adding up the amount
of contractual working hours and the reported hours of overtime (Ku¨hhirt and Ludwig,
2012). Wages are then logged and indexed at 2014 consumer prices. We also trim obser-
vations whose wage values were smaller than 1 or bigger than 100 to reduce the influence
of outliers on our estimates.
To study the effect of motherhood on wages before and after a given reform, we use an
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event-study specification (e.g. Kleven et al., 2018; Kuziemko et al., 2018). Let ei denote
the year of the event of interest, the birth of a first child for a woman i, and t be the
calendar year. Our specification includes event-time dummies k for each year since the
event, starting from k = 0, i.e. the first interview year after a child’s birth, to year K,
the most recent interview year observable for a given woman after the birth of her fist
child. Since the post-reform period for Reform 1 runs from 1992 to 1998, a woman giving
birth in 1992 would possibly be observed up to k = 6, one giving birth in 1993 up to k
= 5, and so forth. Similar, for the period after Reform 2 running from 2007 to 2014, we
are able to track treated women up to year k = 7 after a child’s birth. Hence, we will
compare wage changes for treated and controls for k = 0, 1, 2, .., 6 for Reform 1 and k
= 0, 1, 2, .., 7 for Reform 2. Control-group women will be observed for longer periods of
event time and dummies for such later years k will also be included in the model.
Sample sizes in each cell k in which we have both treated and control-group women are
reported in Table 1A in the Appendix. Given the extremely small number of treated
women in k = 6 for Reform 1 and k = 7 for Reform 2, we will report but not focus on
the corresponding estimates in our regression models. Year-specific sample sizes in the
remaining years vary from a minimum of 30 women to a maximum of 274 women. This
may raise concerns on whether our design is under-powered and with what consequences
for the credibility of our estimates (e.g. Gelman and Carlin, 2014), an issue we will return
to in our Robustness section. Even if under-powered, we chose an event-study specification
for one main reason. We follow both studies on the wages of German mothers (Ejrnæs
and Kunze, 2013) and on the motherhood wage penalty more broadly (e.g. Loughran and
Zissimopoulos, 2009; Ferna´ndez-Kranz et al., 2013; Kleven et al., 2018), who commonly
suggest to disentangle short, medium, and (if possible) long run effects of motherhood on
wages. As years go by since the event, estimates may vary in magnitude as well as in the
amount of uncertainty that surrounds them. Simpler approaches – e.g. a single dummy
for before-after first childbirth – would assume this heterogeneity away and may provide
severely biased estimates of the “effect” of interest (for recent appraisals, see Borusyak
and Jaravel, 2016; Imai and Kim, 2017).
Multiplying our event-time dummies by the indicator variableDi (= 1 if treated by a given
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reform), we obtain an estimate of the effects motherhood has on wages as years go by after
first childbirth and separately for women belonging to each treatment arm. Since we do
not explicitly model benefit receipt, the differences between the effects motherhood has
on the wages of treated vis-a`-vis control-group women have to be regarded as intention-
to-treat (ITT) effects of each parental leave reform. Also, when attributing such effects
to parental leave reforms, we are assuming that no contemporaneous shock could have
also induced changes to the motherhood wage penalty. In other words, there should not
be any contextual policy change explicitly targeting our treated group and so much so
to produce wage effects for this group relative to the controls. Recent federal expansions
of state-subsidised childcare for toddlers, however, fit this profile. These reforms, being
carried out in 2005 and 2008, surround the 2007 parental leave reform and similarly
target new mothers. The subsequent increase of childcare availability has been associated
with a reduction in the length of work interruptions for (West) German women and an
increase in their probability of returning to paid work (Zoch and Hondralis, 2017). Yet,
these associations were limited to women experiencing second-order parities, a finding
that further motivates our choice to focus on first-time mothers instead.
Among variables in the vector X
′
it, we include a quadratic for age, to net out pure
lifecycle effects, and dummies for region of residence2. Individual fixed effects θi and an
idiosyncratic error term it complete our preferred specification. Robust standard errors
are estimated to account for the possibility of serial correlation in the disturbance term.
Regression coefficients in our wage equations are in the log scale. They can be considered
accurate approximations of changes in wage levels in the percent-change scale insofar as
they lie roughly in the (–.25, .25) interval. For the purpose of substantial interpretation,
we will map coefficients that exceeds these thresholds back to the percent-change scale
(using the transformation eβk − 1).
Finally, to investigate mechanisms, we ran the same model displayed in Equation 1 on
three auxiliary outcomes. First, we track a woman’s take-up of leave provisions by deter-
mining the share of months she spent on leave in the year preceding the current interview
(e.g. Buligescu et al., 2009). Leave shares range from 0, indicating that no time was spent
on leave in the year prior to the current interview, to 1, indicating that a mother spent
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on leave all twelve calendar months in the previous year. Importantly, we kept focusing
on first births only, meaning that leave uptake following a higher-order parity does not
contribute to a woman’s leave share for the purposes of our analysis. We look at leave
share to assess changing family-related career interruptions prior and after each reform,
for both the purpose of validating our design with respect to the ample previous litera-
ture on the topic and to look into the role of human capital and signalling mechanisms in
shaping motherhood wage penalties. Also, since leave share can be observed regardless of
whether a woman works or not, for this outcome we include in the estimation sample all
available person-year records for both the 709 women on which we evaluate the impact of
Reform 1 (7,476 total person-year records) and for the 1,040 women on which we evaluate
Reform 2 (11,789 total person-year records).
For the other two outcomes, observed only if a woman is in paid work at a given point
in time t, we stick to person-year records in which women were employed as in the main
models for wages3. Specifically, to track work effort, we complement previous evidence
(e.g. Gangl and Ziefle, 2015) by focusing on changes in women’s actual working hours.
As for job continuity, implicated by the job guarantee built in parental leave provisions,
our dependent variable becomes tenure with the current employer.
2.3. Endogenous fertility: weighting by means of IPTW
Endogenous fertility behaviour and sample selection bias are well-recognised threats in
the study of motherhood and wages (e.g. Elwert and Winship, 2014) and our design is
no exception. Specifically, fertility behaviour might be endogenous to the reform process
itself. After all, treatment assignment is here conditional on giving birth to a child af-
ter a given reform threshold (1992 or 2007). Bias could derive then from differences in
the characteristics of women selecting into parenthood before and after the reform (e.g.
Tamm, 2013).
Fixed-effects estimation takes care of time-invariant factors affecting fertility and, thereby,
treatment assignment. We can thus exclude compositional differences in the “type” of
women becoming first-time mothers before and after a given reform, as long as these dif-
ferences lie in time-invariant characteristics. Also, we focus on first-time mothers consid-
ering that parental leave reforms in Germany may have affected second- and higher-order
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births. Birth spacing has seemingly declined following the expansion of parental leave in
1992 (Arntz et al., 2017) and conversely appears to have extended after the retrenchment
of the benefit scheme in 2007 (Cygan-Rehm, 2016).
Nevertheless, to improve the credibility of our design, we weight our models by means
of inverse probability of treatment weighting (IPTW, e.g. Morgan and Winship, 2007;
Hernan and Robins, forthcoming; for recent applications in sociology, see e.g. Breen and
Ermisch, 2017; Biegert and Ku¨hhirt, 2018). Weights are first derived by running a logistic
regression for the probability of belonging to the treated group (Di = 1) rather than the
control group (Di = 0) for a given reform. We model this probability as a function
of covariates Zi measured in the wave prior to the first child’s birth for each woman.
Covariates tap both women’s work history up to that point and the characteristics of
their household. Specifically, we include: years spent in full-time employment; years spent
in part-time employment; years spent in unemployment; employment status (dummy, 1 if
employed); weekly working hours, the hourly wage, and tenure with the current employer
(all three set to 0 if not employed); marital status (dummy, 1 if married); household
income and household income squared (both divided by 100 and excluding a woman’s
own labour income); the years spent in unemployment by a woman’s partner, plus an
indicator for whether this information is missing4.
We deploy stabilised treatment weights stwi defined as the ratio between the uncondi-
tional probability for an individual i to belong to the her treatment arm and the same
probability conditional on covariates Zi,
stwDi=1 =
P (Di = 1)
P (Di = 1|Zi) stwDi=0 =
1− P (Di = 1)
1− P (Di = 1|Zi)
Weighting by means of IPTW creates a pseudopopulation in which treatment assignment
is independent from observable confounders Zi. In other words, observations with covari-
ate values that are over-represented among one treatment arm are down-weighted, while
observations with covariate values that are under-represented in one treatment arm are
up-weighted. Stabilised treatment weights, in particular, typically take less extreme val-
ues than conventional IPT weights (e.g. twDi=1 =
1
P (Di|Zi)) for those units with either very
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low or very high probabilities of treatment, thus limiting the influence of such outliers on
the final weighted estimates5. To further counteract this risk, we also bottom code our
weights at the 5th percentile and top code them at the 95th percentile, following previous
empirical applications in the literature (Biegert and Ku¨hhirt, 2018).
Covariate balance obtained by deploying stabilised treatment weights is assessed in Table
2, in which we display the weighted average of each variable in the treated and control
groups. Normalised differences6 between means in each group are all below the threshold
of ± .25, signalling a satisfying balance between treatment arms is achieved thanks to
our weighting strategy (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). To strengthen our claims on
time-varying confounding, Figures 1A and 2A plot the the main variables included in
Zi, respectively for Reform 1 and Reform 2. We compute the mean of each variable and
weight it by stwi, separately for control and treatment groups and over event time. To
validate our design, covariate balance across treated and controls should hold in the years
prior to first childbirth. Visual inspection suggests that a good balance on observable
characteristics holds in the re-weighted treatment groups for both reforms, with the only
possible exception of the unbalance in household income across Reform 1 groups. Overall
balance also extends to years prior to the one immediately preceding first childbirth (k
= – 1), i.e. the year in which variables Zi are measured to compute our weights. We are
thus confident that IPTW eliminates or at least reduces observable group differences in
the type of women becoming first-time mothers before and after each reform7.
2.4. Selection into employment and fixed-effects estimation
A second source of concern is the extent to which our findings might be tainted by sample
selection bias. At any given point in time t, women take part in the estimation sample only
if observed in gainful employment. If such women systematically differ from their non-
employed counterparts, estimates based only on the former group might be biased. More
specifically, since both motherhood and the magnitude of wage offers influence a woman’s
chances to accept paid work, conditioning our estimates to the sub-sample of employed
women may invalidate the claim of a causal motherhood wage penalty. Accepting paid
work becomes a collider on the causal path between motherhood and wages, as formalised
by Elwert and Winship (2014).
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Studies focused more broadly on the gender wage gap suggest that German women are,
on average, positively selected into employment (Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2008). Women
with better earnings potentials will thus be disproportionately represented in our esti-
mation sample. Such positive selection may be particularly pronounced in the aftermath
of motherhood and even more so for mothers subjected to subsequent parental leave
regimes. Indeed, highly-educated women are more likely to return (faster) to paid work
after childbirth (Gutie´rrez-Dome`nech, 2005; Fitzenberger et al., 2013) and have been so
more clearly after parental leave reform in the early 1990s (Drasch, 2012; Arntz et al.,
2017), with no indication of a reversal in the 2000s (Stahl and Schober, 2017; Kluve and
Schmitz, 2018). Hence, our estimates of both the motherhood penalty per se and of the
effects of parental leave reform could be regarded as conservative. Yet, fixed-effects es-
timation should take care of the changing composition of women after motherhood and
after policy reform, insofar as these changes in the composition of women can be traced
back to time-invariant variables such as a woman’s level of education (see Francesconi
and Van der Klaauw, 2007).
3. Findings
3.1. Wage responses
Our main findings are depicted in Figure 1 and full estimates are available in Tables
2A and 3A in the Appendix. On the left panel of Figure 1, we contrast motherhood
wage effects for control-group and treated women, respectively prior and after Reform 1.
Control-group women, who gave birth prior to parental leave expansion in 1992, experi-
ence a sizeable motherhood wage penalty in the years following birth. Such wage losses
oscillate between roughly 13 log points in Year 2 after first childbirth to 35 log points
(e(−.354) = – 29 percent) in Year 6. As for treated women, giving birth after parental leave
expansion in 1992, the motherhood penalty mostly hangs between 10 (Years 0 and 2 to
5) and 16 log points (Year 1), with the exception of Year 6 after first birth (around 37 log
points, e(−.377) = – 31 percent). Overall, differences in the two sets of estimates suggest
little change in the motherhood penalty per Reform 1 and, if anything, an improvement
felt by women treated by parental leave expansion. As displayed in the third column
of Table 2A, differences across treated and controls are typically quite noisy, with the
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exception of Years 4 (p = .083) and 5 (p = .015).
Turning to the right panel of Figure 1, control-group women, who had their first child
prior to 2007, experience a wage penalty from Year 2 onwards. Wage losses range from 8
to little in excess of 20 log points, from Year 2 onwards. Differently, for women benefiting
from the new parental leave benefit in 2007, wage effects in the aftermath of motherhood
are closer to zero and noisier, as 95% confidence interval include both negative and
positive values. At the same time, we cannot rule out nil differences between treated and
controls with the exception of Years 4 (p = .001) and 5 (p<.001).
Overall, both reforms seem to have brought about modest changes to the motherhood
wage penalty in Germany. For Reform 1, estimates in the first years after childbirth
are, for the most part, statistically indistinguishable between treated and controls. This
suggests limited scope for the kind of positive signalling that one might have expected
after Reform 1. Mothers contributing to those estimates are “early returners” with respect
to the norm in Germany at the time, especially considering the 36-months job guarantee
period installed in 1992. Yet, also such early returners face wage losses. The persistence
of the penalty in the following years, albeit somewhat improved for women treated by
Reform 1, may suggest that the negative wage effects of human capital loss and the
positive wage effects of job continuity, both spurred by the expanded job guarantee,
cancel each other out on average.
As for Reform 2, we can no longer detect a motherhood wage penalty for women treated
by the overhaul of the parental leave benefit in 2007. At the same time, as displayed
more fully in the last column of Table 3A, estimates across treated and controls do not
statistically differ from each other in the first years after childbirth, but only later on.
Coherent with a human capital argument, it could be that treated women reap the benefits
of shorter career breaks per effect of Reform 2. Differently, in line with negative signalling
arguments, we would have expected a harsher, not lighter, penalty in the years long after
first childbirth, as “late returners” now deflect the new norm of reprising work after the
12 months of benefit receipt8. To shed light on the possible mechanisms underlying wage
responses to both reforms we then turn to our auxiliary outcomes.
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3.2. Mechanisms
Figure 2 contrasts treated and control-group women for Reform 1, first, in terms of their
leave share following first childbirths. Complementing previous evidence on the labour
supply responses to parental leave expansion (Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck, 2014; Ziefle and
Gangl, 2014), we find evidence of sizeable increases in the share of time treated mothers
spend on leave in Years 0 to 3 after first childbirth. Differences in leave share between
treated and control-group women range from 9 percentage points in Year 3 to 37 and 35
in Years 1 and 2 respectively (p<.001 for each difference between treated and controls in
Years 0, 1, 2, and 3). Especially in later years (2 and 3), such increases thus testify to
the use new mothers make of the longer job guarantee period installed in 1992.
As for working hours, we do not find any evidence of change in the aftermath of Reform
1. In each year following childbirth, mothers in the treated and control group similarly
reduce their weekly working hours by around 5-6 hours in Year 0 and up to around 13 in
the following years. As much as working hours can proxy for work effort, we thus do not
identify a shift in effort in our sample of employed mothers after Reform 1 (cf. Gangl and
Ziefle, 2015). Differently, the third panel of Figure 2 suggests substantial improvements
for the treated in terms of tenure with the current employer, especially in Years 0 to 3.
In line with existing research (Baker and Milligan, 2008), extending job guarantee rights
may have thus improved German mothers’ job continuity. At the same time, the effects
of motherhood on tenure remain negative also for the treated, suggesting that switching
employers after motherhood was not at all infrequent despite the longer job-guaranteed
period installed in 1992 (e.g. Arntz et al., 2017).
On balance, the combination of longer leave uptake, stable reductions in working hours,
and somewhat improved job continuity may account for the overall stability in the mother-
hood wage penalty we have observed comparing prior and after Reform 1. Our conclusion
is that the costs attached to extended career breaks, on the one hand, and the benefits
of maintaining one’s pre-birth employer, on the other, largely cancel each other out on
average.
Change in the same auxiliary outcomes is also investigated in Figure 3, this time compar-
ing treated and controls for Reform 2. In the first panel, evidence supports the idea that
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the 2007 Reform reduced the share of time spent on leave in the medium run. Specifi-
cally, we find reductions in leave share for the treated vis-a`-vis the controls in Years 2
and 3 afer first childbirth. While control-group women experienced an increase in leave
share of around 36 and 12 percentage points in Years 2 and 3 (p<.001), treated women
experienced increases of around 23 and 5 percentage points in the same years (p<.001).
Differences between the two sets of estimates for treated and controls in Years 2 and 3
could also be detected (p<.001 and p = .002 respectively). Conversely, in Years 0 and 1
treated and controls increase their leave share similarly, even if with a slight increase for
the treated in Year 1 (βControls,Y ear1 = .63, βTreated,Y ear1 = .67, p for the difference between
the two = .140). We take this to be in line with studies highlighting how German mothers,
after 2007, expanded their time spent on leave in the period of benefit receipt and started
to return more often right after its expiration (Ziefle and Gangl, 2014; Bergemann and
Riphahn, 2017; Kluve and Schmitz, 2018).
We can also detect modest increases in working hours for the treated as compared to
control-group women, in the years immediately following childbirth. As depicted in the
central panel of Figure 3, while both treated and controls substantially reduce working
hours after first childbirth, mothers after 2007 register some increase in working hours
vis-a`-vis the controls, notably of around 3.1 hours in Year 0 (p = .137), 3.8 hours in
Year 1 (p = .008), 2.6 hours in Year 2 (p = .052), and 2.3 hours in Year 3 (p = .088).
This pattern is in line with previous evidence pointing to an increase in working hours –
among part-timers – spurred by the 2007 reform (Kluve and Schmitz, 2018). Differently,
we cannot find any evidence of changes in tenure accumulated with the current employer
on average, when comparing treated and controls in the third panel of Figure 3 (cf.
ibidem).
All in all, if the wage prospects of German mothers improved after 2007, evidence in
Figure 3 points to shorter time spent on leave and slight increases in working hours,
providing some evidence for human capital and effort mechanisms as motors behind the
wage responses to Reform 2.
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4. Robustness
Having examined motherhood wage penalties before and after two parental leave reforms
in Germany, we come to two main findings. As a result of longer work interruptions
covered though by job protection rights, wage penalties for German women persisted
after Reform 1, yet the size of such penalties reduced especially in the medium term.
Reform 2 in 2007 also mitigated wage penalties, again detected primarily in the medium
term. We attribute this to human capital and effort channels, as German mothers cut
their time on leave after the very first years after childbirth and slightly increased their
weekly working hours. We find limited scope for signalling accounts throughout.
Netting out time-constant unobserved heterogeneity via individual fixed effects, our find-
ings critically hinge on a selection on time-varying observables assumption. We use IPT
weights to address imbalance across treatment groups on a set of time-varying variables
we were able to observe in the year prior to first childbirth. As noted in the previous sec-
tions (and per Table 2 and Figures 1A and 2A), weighted average characteristics across
treatment groups are similar enough, with few exceptions. For example, treated women
in 1992 have higher levels of household income, on average, than control-group women
in the years prior to birth. Improvements in the wage penalty for treated women after
Reform 1 may thus still reflect this composition imbalance, rather than a causal effect of
the reform itself.
To address this, we repeated our analysis using an even stronger balancing technique,
namely entropy balancing (Hainmueller, 2012). Entropy balancing is a non-parametric
algorithm that estimates weights such that, once re-weighted, the distribution of a set of
variables in the control group matches that of the treated. The algorithm matches covari-
ates across treatment groups directly on sample moments (mean, variance, skewness). As
displayed in Figure 4A in the Appendix, covariates after balancing are matched exactly
across treatment groups, and differences in means between treated and controls reduce
to 0.
We apply entropy-balancing weights and re-estimate our main models for the mother-
hood wage penalty across parental leave reforms. As portrayed in Figure 4, estimates for
treated and controls now closely resemble one another in the case of Reform 1. For both
112
groups, we find a motherhood wage penalty of around 20 log points or more from Year 1
onwards. Hence, our diagnosis of persistence in the motherhood penalty before and after
Reform 1 comes out reinforced. Such findings are in line with previous literature similarly
documenting persisting motherhood wage penalties across cohorts of German mothers in
the same period (Gangl and Ziefle, 2009). Our event-study approach, though, provides
larger estimates of motherhood wage losses with respect to previous studies, especially
when it comes to older cohorts of women such as control-group mothers before Reform 1
(cf. ibidem; Ku¨hhirt and Ludwig, 2012).
Differently, we can no longer detect motherhood wage penalties after Reform 2. The right
panel of Figure 4 shows that such conclusions for Reform 2 are substantially unchanged
when applying entropy balancing rather than IPT weigths. Beside the assumption of
selection on observables, though, small cell size may limit the credibility of our conclusions
due to low statistical power. For Reform 2 only, we can partially address this issue by
augmenting our sample size, adding the SOEP sub-sample L1. L1 is a booster sample
of a specific family type, that of households having at least one newborn between 2007
and 2009. Among L1 sample members we thus select women aged 16-45 with their fist
childbirth occurring in 2007 or afterwards, i.e. women that qualify to be in the treatment
group for the 2007 reform. We added them up to our main Reform 2 sample and ended
up with an augmented sample of 1,747 women (707 more than in the main analyses) and
9,444 person-year records. For such augmented sample, however, we cannot re-weight
estimates by means of IPT or entropy-balancing weights since women in the L1 sub-
sample were not interviewed the year prior to first childbirth.
Nevertheless, we repeated our main analyses for Reform 2 on such bigger sample to
increase statistical power. Figure 5 juxtaposes our main estimates for Reform 2 on the
left panel and their replication adding the booster sample on the right. Our substantial
conclusions on the effect of Reform 2 hold in that, particularly in the augmented sample,
we see a neat improvement in the motherhood wage penalty for the treated vis-a`-vis
the controls. Differences between the two groups can be ascertained already starting in
Year 2 and, for the treated, we can no longer detect a motherhood wage penalty in
any of the years following childbirth. To be sure, our conclusion is then that Reform
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2 lead to an improvement in the wage effects of motherhood. Both our main estimates
for 2007 (Figure 1) and the augmented ones in Figure 5 are consistent with the absence
of a penalty. Yet, lower bounds of our 95% confidence intervals are also consistent with
penalties of non-negligible size for those women treated by Reform 2 (e.g. Bernardi et al.,
2017).
Discussion and conclusions
We have examined the causal effects that parental leave legislation may have had on
motherhood wage penalties in Germany. From 1992 onwards, a maternalist leave scheme
combined long periods of benefit receipt and even longer periods protected with job-
guarantee rights. These provisions further delayed German women’s re-entry into the
labour market. Yet we find that longer time spent on leave coupled with improved tenure
with the current employer resulted in an overall stable penalty, before and after 1992.
Conversely, since 2007, German parental leave features a shorter, earnings-related benefit,
intact job guarantee rights, and a take-it-or-leave-it quota usually taken up by fathers.
Per effect of this reform, we can no longer detect a wage penalty for new mothers, who
now concentrate their leave taking in their first years after childbirth and also work longer
hours in the same years.
Our findings complement previous comparative work who inferred the importance of
labour market and welfare institutions indirectly, comparing motherhood wage penalties
across countries. The design we pursued here traces wage penalties back to how parental
leave legislation changes, sometimes drastically, over time within a single country. Such
approach also sheds light on how “women/family-friendly” policies may have or not per-
verse effects on the careers of women depending on context and policy design (e.g. Mun
and Jung, 2018).
We sought to identify the effects of a single policy program as it changes over time.
Following a vast literature on German women’s labour supply behaviour, we focused on
parental leave reforms in 1992 and 2007. Nevertheless, policy changes are often gradual
and concomitant. Future research could tease out the wage effects, if any, of policy trans-
formation beyond parental leave mandates, such as those related to the availability of
childcare service or to the flexibilisation of working-time arrangements.
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Additionally, with a small sample size, our conclusions regard only first-time mothers
and are only concerned with the “average” wage penalty. A second limit of our analyses
is thus that we cannot ascertain heterogeneity in women’s wage responses. In particu-
lar, previous research has shown that the labour supply benefits of Reform 2 were only
felt by highly-educated/high-income mothers (Bergemann and Riphahn, 2017; Kluve and
Schmitz, 2018). Our findings suggest that such changes to labour supply behaviour im-
proved the motherhood wage penalty. It is therefore worth to ask if wage gains were also
a prerogative of “advantaged” women and with what consequences for class-and-gender
inequality (cf. Mandel, 2012).
Related to effect heterogeneity across social groups is the quest for mechanisms behind
such effects. We cannot claim that the wage responses we have highlighted are uniquely
ascribable to human capital, effort, or signalling. With respect to employers’ role, for
example, a prominent demand-sided explanation hinges upon theories of statistical dis-
crimination. Risk-averse employers might pay women less than (equally productive) men,
believing that women will eventually take time out from work, have their working hours
reduced or leave their job altogether. In the eyes of employers, long and generous leaves
raise the costs and uncertainties surrounding female labour turnover and work effort.
Employers might thereby resort to statistical discrimination to insure themselves against
employing female workers they deem more ‘risky’.
Although commonplace in the literature (e.g. Gangl and Ziefle, 2009), we suggest that the
causal chain linking parental leaves to the motherhood wage penalty through statistical
discrimination may need refinement. It is unclear, first, if such discriminatory practices
would apply to mothers, thus contributing to their wage penalty, or more generally to
women of childbearing age who might have kids and take leaves in the future (e.g. Gupta
and Smith, 2002; Ejrnæs and Kunze, 2013).
Second, even if applying to all women of childbearing age, statistical discrimination hardly
applies to all women equally. Facing uncertainty regarding which women will take advan-
tage of leave schemes, employers could end up paying unfairly low wages particularly
to those women who will eventually remain childless or that will manage to commit to
a career even after motherhood, thus defying employers’ ‘group’ expectations. Employer
115
discrimination in this framework amounts to overshooting, hurting the most those women
‘advantaged’ in terms of human capital, skill, occupational attainment, career aspirations,
and so forth (Mandel, 2012).
Hence, we believe future research could tackle whether Reform 1, or similar policy
schemes, depressed the wages of childbearing-age women more generally and highly-
educated women in particular, providing some grounds for the model of statistical dis-
crimination we sketched here. Conversely, it could be that Reform 2 mitigated employers’
expectation of long motherhood breaks, with positive spillover effects on the wages of
(highly-educated) women of childbearing age more broadly. We leave these hypotheses to
further research.
To wrap up, motherhood wage penalties in Germany persisted in the last decades, up until
a substantial improvement in the late 2000s. Both early stability and later improvement
are here credited to the design of parental leave policy and to the behavioural responses
parental leave provisions might have triggered. Our contribution suggests that the nuts
and bolts of specific institutions may thus critically shape gender economic inequality, at
times maintaining it and at times reducing it.
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Notes
1Given the high usage of part-time work at labour market re-entry, encouraged by parental leave
schemes themselves (Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck, 2014; Bergemann and Riphahn, 2017), (West) German
mothers could have experienced wage losses due to the lower returns to work experience for part-timers
(e.g. Ferna´ndez-Kranz et al., 2015). Part-time employment is relatively well-paid in Germany though,
both with respect to full-time equivalent jobs and in international comparison (Bardasi and Gornick,
2008), and previous research has suggested that maternal part-time working has little to do with the
motherhood wage penalty in this context (Gangl and Ziefle, 2009; Ku¨hhirt and Ludwig, 2012).
2We also probed our models to the inclusion of year fixed effects to account for exogenous shocks that
may similarly hit the wages of treated and control-group women. Our main results are substantially un-
changed (output available upon request). Year fixed effects, nonetheless, may introduce multicollinearity
with respect to event time dummies and therefore we deem it safer to exclude them (e.g. Borusyak and
Jaravel, 2016; Imai and Kim, 2017).
3With respect to the main analyses on wages, due to missing data on tenure with a woman’s current
employer, we lose a relatively small number of person-year records for Reform 1 (36 observations) and
for Reform 2 (3 observations).
4We build these two variables such that, for instance, if the information on partner’s unemployment
is missing (e.g. because a woman has no partner), “years spent in unemployment by the partner” is set
to 0 while the indicator for “missing information on partner” is set to 1.
5In our analytical samples, weights stwi,Reform1 have a mean equal to 0.92 (SD = 0.27), while weights
stwi,Reform2 have a mean equal to 0.96 (SD = 0.24). Weights whose mean value is close to 1 and whose
standard deviation is relatively small suggest that the positivity assumption holds, i.e. there is a non-zero
probability of belonging to each treatment group Di for any combination of the values of covariates Zi
(e.g. Hernan and Robins, forthcoming; Biegert and Ku¨hhirt, 2018).
6Normalised differences are given by the difference in means of a given x between treated and controls,
scaled by the square root of the sum of the variances of x for treated and controls (Imbens and Wooldridge,
2009).
7To validate our design, we also looked at whether re-weighted control and treatment groups exhibit
parallel trends in the development of our dependent variable prior to first childbirth. Figure 3A in the
Appendix plots the within-transformed log of hourly wages separately for each reform period, treatment
group, and year prior to first childbirth (up to five years prior). Visual inspection suggests no substantial
violation of the parallel trend assumption for each reform pair.
8Notably though, in our estimates we simply disentangle wage responses separately by each year since
first childbirth, not depending on the timing of a woman’s re-entry more specifically. This means that,
while in Year 0 our estimation sample comprises only women who have returned to work by that time,
in Year 1 women in the estimation sample will comprise returners in Year 0 and 1, in Year 2 returners
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in Year 0, 1, and 2, and so forth. In other words, we are bound to mix women with different timings
of re-entry for our wage estimates in the medium and long run. We do not conduct separate analyses
depending on the timing of a mother’s re-entry for two reasons, namely sample size considerations and
due to the endogeneity of such timing to the design of parental leave policy itself.
118
Tables & graphs
Table 1: Summary of the expected changes to the motherhood wage penalty as a conse-
quence of each reform of parental leave in Germany.
PL Reforms Labour supply Mechanisms Wage responses
1992 Reform
Drift to longer career breaks
Job continuity
Maternal PT work
Selective return to paid work
Human capital +/–
Effort –
Signalling +/–
2007 Reform
Career breaks scaled back
Maternal PT work
Selective return to paid work
Human capital +
Effort +
Signalling +/–
Note: PL = Parental leave; PT = Part-time.
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Table 2: Summary of selected variables for treatment and control groups, weighted by
means of IPTW.
Reform 1 Reform 2
Means Means
Controls Treated
Normalized
differences
Controls Treated
Normalised
differences
Years in full-time (FT) 5.37 5.61 0.04 5.97 5.98 0.00
Years in part-time (PT) 0.36 0.44 0.05 1.00 1.23 0.08
Years unemployed 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.40 0.39 0.00
Employed 0.79 0.80 0.01 0.82 0.83 0.01
Hourly wage 4.61 5.09 0.07 8.26 8.80 0.06
Working hours 29.85 30.67 0.03 32.13 32.33 0.01
Tenure 3.80 3.91 0.02 4.02 4.06 0.01
Married 0.65 0.66 0.01 0.47 0.47 0.00
Household income/100 145.85 179.88 0.17 269.81 285.32 0.05
Household income2/100 32216.87 60607.67 0.10 125147.10 145714.20 0.05
Years unemployed (partner) 0.24 0.22 −0.02 0.33 0.33 −0.01
Missing “Years unemployed (partner)” 0.30 0.27 −0.05 0.30 0.31 0.01
Number of individuals 253 456 550 490
Notes: All variables are measured in the interview year occurring prior to the first childbirth event.
Source: SOEP 1985-2014.
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Figure 1: FE estimates (95% confidence intervals) of the motherhood wage penalty across
reforms, treatment groups, and relative to event time. Estimates are weighted by IPTW,
as detailed in the main text (SOEP 1985-2014).
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Figure 2: FE estimates (95% confidence intervals) of motherhood effects on (i) leave
share, (ii) working hours, and (iii) tenure. Estimates refer to Reform 1, across treatment
groups and relative to event time. Estimates are weighted by IPTW, as detailed in the
main text (SOEP 1985-1998).
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Figure 3: FE estimates (95% confidence intervals) of motherhood effects on (i) leave
share, (ii) working hours, and (iii) tenure. Estimates refer to Reform 2, across treatment
groups and relative to event time. Estimates are weighted by IPTW, as detailed in the
main text (SOEP 1999-2014).
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Figure 4: FE estimates (95% confidence intervals) of the motherhood wage penalty across
reforms, treatment groups, and relative to event time. Estimates are weighted by means
of entropy-balancing weights, as detailed in the main text (SOEP 1985-2014).
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Figure 5: FE estimates (95% confidence intervals) of the motherhood wage penalty across
treatment groups and relative to event time. Estimates on the left panel are weighted by
means of IPTW, as detailed in the main text (SOEP 1985-2014).
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Appendix
Table 1A: Sample size for each treatment group by year since first childbirth (companion
to the estimates in Figure 1, Tables 2A and 3A). Unweighted counts are raw sample
counts, weighted counts are sample counts weighted by IPTW.
Reform 1 Reform 2
Controls Treated Controls Treated
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Year 0: first birth 61 53.8 41 38.1 124 122.3 62 63.6
Year 1 after first birth 86 72.3 86 84.6 180 178.7 203 199.5
Year 2 after first birth 94 78.3 94 95.9 219 207.1 177 179.0
Year 3 after first birth 98 83.0 79 80.2 244 232.9 117 118.6
Year 4 after first birth 109 90.6 59 60.2 261 252.6 86 89.7
Year 5 after first birth 111 93.9 30 31.8 274 267.2 57 59.1
Year 6 after first birth 115 99.7 7 7.7 253 240.8 36 40.5
Year 7 after first birth . . . . 251 235.7 4 3.5
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Figure 1A: Means of selected variables for treated and control units (Reform 1, SOEP
1985-1998). Means are computed for each year up to the fifth year prior (after) first
childbirth. All means are weighted by IPTW as detailed in the main text.
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Figure 2A: Means of selected variables for treated and control units (Reform 2, SOEP
1999-2014). Means are computed for each year up to the fifth year prior (after) first
childbirth (x axis). All means are weighted by IPTW as detailed in the main text.
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Figure 3A: Within-transformed log of real hourly wages plotted over years to first child-
birth, for treated and control units across reform periods. Dashed lines are obtained fitting
a linear trend for each treatment-reform group using Stata’s lfit (SOEP 1985-2014).
128
Table 2A: FE estimates for the motherhood wage penalty, by treatment group and year
since first childbirth (Reform 1).
Reform 1
(1) (2) (3)
Controls Treated Difference
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
Year 0: first birth -0.254*** -0.106 0.148
(0.074) (0.072) (0.104)
Year 1 after first birth -0.136** -0.166*** -0.030
(0.066) (0.048) (0.078)
Year 2 after first birth -0.194*** -0.118* 0.076
(0.065) (0.061) (0.084)
Year 3 after first birth -0.206*** -0.123* 0.083
(0.059) (0.069) (0.081)
Year 4 after first birth -0.251*** -0.114* 0.137*
(0.066) (0.065) (0.079)
Year 5 after first birth -0.308*** -0.109 0.198**
(0.063) (0.076) (0.081)
Year 6 after first birth -0.354*** -0.377*** -0.023
(0.067) (0.103) (0.104)
Number of individuals 709 709 709
Number of person-years 4,300 4,300 4,300
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
Notes: All models include individual fixed effects, as well as dummies for each additional year after childbirth (control
group only), a quadratic for age, and dummies for region of residence. Standard errors are clustered at the individual
level.
Source: SOEP 1985-1998.
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Table 3A: FE estimates for the motherhood wage penalty, by treatment group and year
since first childbirth (Reform 2).
Reform 2
(1) (2) (3)
Controls Treated Difference
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
Year 0: first birth -0.047 0.044 0.091
(0.051) (0.062) (0.079)
Year 1 after first birth -0.014 -0.010 0.004
(0.038) (0.037) (0.049)
Year 2 after first birth -0.088** -0.023 0.065
(0.037) (0.045) (0.052)
Year 3 after first birth -0.131*** -0.057 0.074
(0.037) (0.045) (0.048)
Year 4 after first birth -0.228*** -0.033 0.195***
(0.039) (0.060) (0.058)
Year 5 after first birth -0.215*** 0.021 0.236***
(0.044) (0.061) (0.057)
Year 6 after first birth -0.212*** -0.098 0.114
(0.046) (0.085) (0.079)
Year 7 after first birth -0.241*** 0.110 0.351***
(0.051) (0.093) (0.081)
Number of individuals 1,040 1,040 1,040
Number of person-years 7,668 7,668 7,668
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
Notes: All models include individual fixed effects, as well as dummies for each additional year after childbirth (control
group only), a quadratic for age, and dummies for region of residence. Standard errors are clustered at the individual
level.
Source: SOEP 1999-2014.
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Table 4A: FE estimates for leave share, by treatment group and year since first childbirth
(Reform 1).
Reform 1
(1) (2) (3)
Controls Treated Difference
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
Year 0: first birth 0.194*** 0.310*** 0.116***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.023)
Year 1 after first birth 0.372*** 0.740*** 0.368***
(0.027) (0.021) (0.035)
Year 2 after first birth 0.057*** 0.410*** 0.354***
(0.012) (0.028) (0.031)
Year 3 after first birth 0.018** 0.108*** 0.090***
(0.007) (0.020) (0.021)
Year 4 after first birth 0.017** 0.002 -0.015*
(0.007) (0.010) (0.009)
Year 5 after first birth 0.018** 0.021* 0.003
(0.008) (0.013) (0.011)
Year 6 after first birth 0.018* 0.045*** 0.027
(0.010) (0.017) (0.016)
Number of individuals 709 709 709
Number of person-years 7,476 7,476 7,476
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
Notes: All models include individual fixed effects, as well as dummies for each additional year after childbirth (control
group only), a quadratic for age, and dummies for region of residence. Standard errors are clustered at the individual
level.
Source: SOEP 1985-1998.
131
Table 5A: FE estimates for weekly working hours, by treatment group and year since first
childbirth (Reform 1).
Reform 1
(1) (2) (3)
Controls Treated Difference
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
Year 0: first birth -5.742*** -6.854*** -1.350
(1.823) (1.892) (2.567)
Year 1 after first birth -13.406*** -13.632*** -0.030
(1.439) (1.525) (2.042)
Year 2 after first birth -13.524*** -13.594*** -0.586
(1.565) (1.352) (1.928)
Year 3 after first birth -13.946*** -13.091*** 0.360
(1.535) (1.784) (2.184)
Year 4 after first birth -13.258*** -13.197*** 0.182
(1.452) (1.942) (2.141)
Year 5 after first birth -13.844*** -10.585*** 3.045
(1.559) (3.494) (3.465)
Year 6 after first birth -12.869*** -11.707*** 0.754
(1.611) (3.949) (3.759)
Number of individuals 709 709 709
Number of person-years 4,300 4,300 4,300
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
Notes: All models include individual fixed effects, as well as dummies for each additional year after childbirth (control
group only), a quadratic for age, and dummies for region of residence. Standard errors are clustered at the individual
level.
Source: SOEP 1985-1998.
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Table 6A: FE estimates for tenure with current employer, by treatment group and year
since first childbirth (Reform 1).
Reform 1
(1) (2) (3)
Controls Treated Difference
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
Year 0: first birth -1.145*** 0.248 1.392**
(0.424) (0.335) (0.549)
Year 1 after first birth -1.628*** -0.529* 1.099**
(0.414) (0.314) (0.515)
Year 2 after first birth -2.402*** -0.526 1.875***
(0.426) (0.352) (0.530)
Year 3 after first birth -2.728*** -0.630 2.098***
(0.459) (0.441) (0.591)
Year 4 after first birth -3.231*** -1.552** 1.680**
(0.503) (0.749) (0.854)
Year 5 after first birth -3.454*** -1.301 2.153**
(0.545) (0.816) (0.884)
Year 6 after first birth -3.639*** -2.244 1.395
(0.606) (1.433) (1.452)
Number of individuals 709 709 709
Number of person-years 4,264 4,264 4,264
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
Notes: All models include individual fixed effects, as well as dummies for each additional year after childbirth (control
group only), a quadratic for age, and dummies for region of residence. Standard errors are clustered at the individual
level.
Source: SOEP 1985-1998.
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Table 7A: FE estimates for leave share, by treatment group and year since first childbirth
(Reform 2).
Reform 2
(1) (2) (3)
Controls Treated Difference
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
Year 0: first birth 0.331*** 0.333*** 0.002
(0.013) (0.014) (0.019)
Year 1 after first birth 0.626*** 0.667*** 0.041
(0.020) (0.020) (0.028)
Year 2 after first birth 0.362*** 0.235*** -0.128***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.032)
Year 3 after first birth 0.120*** 0.052*** -0.068***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.022)
Year 4 after first birth -0.005 -0.015** -0.010
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Year 5 after first birth -0.024*** -0.006 0.018**
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Year 6 after first birth -0.027*** -0.006 0.021*
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Year 7 after first birth -0.024** 0.004 0.028**
(0.010) (0.014) (0.014)
Number of individuals 1,040 1,040 1,040
Number of person-years 11,789 11,789 11,789
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
Notes: All models include individual fixed effects, as well as dummies for each additional year after childbirth (control
group only), a quadratic for age, and dummies for region of residence. Standard errors are clustered at the individual
level.
Source: SOEP 1999-2014.
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Table 8A: FE estimates for weekly working hours, by treatment group and year since first
childbirth (Reform 2).
Reform 2
(1) (2) (3)
Controls Treated Difference
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
Year 0: first birth -13.714*** -10.588*** 3.126
(1.409) (1.593) (2.098)
Year 1 after first birth -16.726*** -12.926*** 3.800***
(1.065) (1.068) (1.431)
Year 2 after first birth -15.341*** -12.742*** 2.599*
(0.984) (1.110) (1.334)
Year 3 after first birth -15.547*** -13.194*** 2.353*
(0.951) (1.279) (1.378)
Year 4 after first birth -15.301*** -14.023*** 1.278
(1.017) (1.483) (1.522)
Year 5 after first birth -14.692*** -13.049*** 1.643
(1.057) (1.724) (1.696)
Year 6 after first birth -13.575*** -12.742*** 0.833
(1.167) (2.274) (2.158)
Year 7 after first birth -13.566*** -4.721** 8.845***
(1.254) (2.147) (1.819)
Number of individuals 1,040 1,040 1,040
Number of person-years 7,668 7,668 7,668
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
Notes: All models include individual fixed effects, as well as dummies for each additional year after childbirth (control
group only), a quadratic for age, and dummies for region of residence. Standard errors are clustered at the individual
level.
Source: SOEP 1999-2014.
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Table 9A: FE estimates for tenure with current employer, by treatment group and year
since first childbirth (Reform 2).
Reform 2
(1) (2) (3)
Controls Treated Difference
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
Year 0: first birth -0.594** -0.608** -0.014
(0.289) (0.281) (0.396)
Year 1 after first birth -0.767*** -0.608** 0.159
(0.248) (0.290) (0.363)
Year 2 after first birth -0.781*** -0.626* 0.155
(0.271) (0.322) (0.384)
Year 3 after first birth -1.353*** -1.043** 0.310
(0.313) (0.411) (0.467)
Year 4 after first birth -1.517*** -1.821*** -0.304
(0.349) (0.501) (0.562)
Year 5 after first birth -1.500*** -1.867*** -0.367
(0.386) (0.592) (0.655)
Year 6 after first birth -1.398*** -1.732** -0.334
(0.426) (0.707) (0.751)
Year 7 after first birth -1.392*** 0.599 1.991
(0.476) (1.725) (1.718)
Number of individuals 1,040 1,040 1,040
Number of person-years 7,665 7,665 7,665
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
Notes: All models include individual fixed effects, as well as dummies for each additional year after childbirth (control
group only), a quadratic for age, and dummies for region of residence. Standard errors are clustered at the individual
level.
Source: SOEP 1999-2014.
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Figure 4A: Standardised differences between the means for treated and control-group
women, by reform group. “Balanced” differences are obtained re-weighting via entropy
balancing (SOEP 1985-2014).
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Chapter 3
Policy, Compensating Differentials, and Gender Career Gaps: Evi-
dence from a ‘Right-to-Request’ Reform
Policy, Compensating Differentials,
and Gender Career Gaps:
Evidence from a ‘Right-to-Request’ Reform∗
Abstract
A commonly held account of the family gap in labour markets is that mothers
favour flexible working-time arrangements over career attainment, yet little is known
on whether this compensating differential is shaped directly by public policy. Relying
on panel data and a difference-in-difference design, I examine the introduction of a
‘right to request’ flexible schedules for parents of small children in Britain. Fitting the
theory of compensating differentials, mothers experience wage cuts combined with a
reduction in working hours and accrued satisfaction with working-time arrangements.
This is especially the case for mothers of children aged 0-2 at the time of the reform.
Evidence also suggests that the negative economic impact of the reform might have
deepened gender gaps in the British labour market. For mothers of older children
though, I can only detect wage losses and not reductions in working hours or increases
in satisfaction with working time.
∗Data from the BHPS were made available through the UK Data Archive (University of Essex, Institute
for Social and Economic Research, 2018). Neither the original collectors of the data nor the archive bear any
responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here. I wish to thank Melanie Jones as well as
participants in an invited seminar at the University of Bath (February 2018) and in the Gender Economics
and the Workplace workshop (Nuremberg, November 2018) for their comments on previous versions of this
paper. The paper is currently being prepared for submission to an international peer-reviewed journal.
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A prominent explanation for persisting gender gaps in labour markets holds that women
may favour flexible working-time arrangements even when less lucrative (Goldin, 2014). If
flexible schedules combine with and offset lower career attainment (especially, lower wages),
compensating differentials are said to arise. Employed mothers in particular may be willing
to forgo their position on the career track and move toward flexible jobs, as a strategy to
juggle childcare duties and paid work. Other than accounting for career gaps between women
and men, compensating differentials may thus underlie motherhood penalties, that is, how
women’s career prospects worsen after as compared to before the birth of a child (Felfe,
2012a,b; Hotz et al., 2017).
Little is known however on if and how public policy may alleviate or rather reinforce the
career costs attached to working flexibly (cf. Smith, 1979). Studies on Scandinavian coun-
tries often suggest that high-quality part-time may generate compensating differentials to
the detriment of women’s career attainment (Albrecht et al., 2003; Hardoy et al., 2017). In
countries where part-time is of much poorer quality, its compensatory value is questionable.
The UK presents a puzzle in this respect, with female part-timers clearly disadvantaged
as compared to their full-time counterparts – on pay, training, promotion prospects – yet
reporting higher job satisfaction (e.g. Arulampalam and Booth, 1998; Manning and Petron-
golo, 2008; Booth and Van Ours, 2008; Matteazzi et al., 2014). In 2003, Britain introduced
a ‘right to request’ changes to working-time arrangements, making it easier for parents of
young children to work flexibly with their current employer. I ask therefore, first, if such
a policy helped install compensating differentials, fostering moves to and satisfaction with
flexible work arrangements at the expense of career attainment, particularly for mothers of
small children. Second, I investigate whether these newly-minted compensating differentials
deepened career gaps between women and men.
Taken together, I exploit the introduction of this new right to assess how working-time flexi-
bility affects career gaps among women with and without children, as well as between women
and men. The right-to-request policy under examination, implemented also in other Euro-
pean countries (e.g. Hegewisch, 2005; Ferna´ndez-Kranz and Rodriguez-Planas, 2013; Begall
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and Grunow, 2015), ascribes in fact to a broader class of ‘women-’ and ‘family-friendly’
policies aimed at sustaining women’s participation in paid employment. Research has con-
sistently suggested that such policies may achieve their purported goal while simultaneously
hindering career attainment for employed women and mothers in particular (e.g. Ruhm, 1998;
Albrecht et al., 2003; Arulampalam et al., 2007; Gupta et al., 2008; Blau and Kahn, 2013).
I contribute here to this latter strand of literature, as few of these studies are longitudinal
in design or attempt to evaluate the causal impact of a given policy.
1. Background
1.1. Flexible schedules and compensating differentials
As originally suggested by Smith (Smith, 1776), compensating differentials arise as jobs
bundle together monetary and non-monetary features such as that losses on one end are
counterbalanced by gains on the other (Rosen, 1986). Job amenities like flexible schedules
might then be associated with lower wages and still attract workers that value flexibility
over pay. Women and mothers in particular may discount career attainment in favour of
family-friendly schedules, more so than men and fathers, opening up gender and family gaps
in labour markets (Filer, 1985; Felfe, 2012b; Cha and Weeden, 2014; Wiswall and Zafar,
2017).
While some have argued for the ‘pervasive absence’ of compensating differentials in labour
markets by analyzing men and women together (Bonhomme and Jolivet, 2009), other studies
point to a trade-off between career attainment and flexibility for women and mothers specif-
ically. As highlighted by Felfe for Germany (2012b), employed mothers display a ‘willingness
to pay’ for flexible schedules (such as working during the evening or in rotating shifts) at the
cost of lower wages, when also maintaining the right to return to their pre-pregnancy em-
ployer after taking parental leave. Coherent evidence also comes from Scandinavian countries,
showing that motherhood exerts a (small) negative effect on wages only in the family-friendly
public sector in Denmark (Simonsen and Skipper, 2006) or that job sorting accounts for most
of the motherhood wage penalty in Norway (Petersen et al., 2010). Considering career pro-
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gression, including that to supervisory and managerial roles, Kunze (Kunze, 2015) finds
part-time work to explain part of the motherhood penalty she highlights, also for Norway
(see also Hardoy et al., 2017).
Similar to their counterparts across Europe, British women work part-time in high propor-
tions, reducing their working hours specially to reconcile work and family (Paull, 2008).
In the British labour market though, part-time work is associated with particularly dismal
working conditions compared to the aforementioned contexts of Germany or Scandinavia.
Part-time jobs pay a substantial wage penalty to full-time equivalents (cf. Manning and
Petrongolo, 2008; Hardoy and Schøne, 2006), are less likely to involve training (Arulam-
palam and Booth, 1998), and are both vertically and horizontally segregated (Connolly and
Gregory, 2008; Matteazzi et al., 2014). At the same time, British women holding part-time
jobs report relatively high levels of job satisfaction, both as compared to full-timers (Booth
and Van Ours, 2008) and to part-timers in other European countries (Gallie et al., 2016).
Further, most female part-timers are ‘unconstrained’ in their job posts, meaning that they
would not change their working hours if given the chance (Bo¨heim and Taylor, 2004).
Combining career costs with high job satisfaction, part-time work may thus fit in a com-
pensating differential story for British women and mothers in particular (see also Gangl
and Ziefle, 2009). Such equilibrium may be sustained by a mix of institutional and cultural
factors (e.g. Pollmann-Schult, 2016), from the lack of childcare coverage for children under
3 (The´venon, 2011) to widespread social norms negatively sanctioning mothers of young
children working full-time (O’Reilly et al., 2014). Whether regulations directly concerning
part-time and flexible work also shape compensating differentials – and, as a consequence,
gender gaps in the British labour market – is an empirical question.
1.2. The introduction of the ‘right to request’ flexible schedules
Under the provisions of the Employment Act, and effective since April 2003, parents of
children under six years of age1 have been granted the statutory right to request flexible
working-time arrangements in Britain (Hegewisch, 2005). Eligibility criteria included being
a dependent employee, continuously employed for at least 26 weeks, and not on a temporary-
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work agency contract. Employers, who opposed more binding early drafts of this legislation
(Lewis and Campbell, 2007), were charged with the duty to consider such requests and refuse
them only on the basis of business reasons defined by the law. Following its implementation,
monitoring suggested three stylized facts about the reform (Hegewisch, 2005; Hooker et al.,
2011). First, awareness of the new right gradually built up and particularly among women,
who requested flexible solutions primarily to deal with childcare. Second, the majority of
requests under the new regime were fully granted by employers, with acceptance rates ranging
from over 60% to 80% depending on the year and survey. Finally, a reduction in working
hours and moves to part-time work were the most frequent changes requested by employees.
The reform thus created a ‘before’ and ‘after’ for mothers of children under six. Adding new
legal protections, it may have made part-time work more appealing and facilitated achieving
hour flexibility with one’s current employer. This could have been of particular value in the
UK, as hour inflexibility has been shown to be prominent within employers, meaning that
workers who wish to adjust their working hours are better off switching employers altogether
(Bo¨heim and Taylor, 2004; Blundell et al., 2008). Women switch to part-time jobs across
employers in particular after family-related work interruptions (Manning and Robinson, 2004;
Connolly and Gregory, 2008), a move made more necessary given the aforementioned lack
of coverage of childcare services for children aged 0-2.
If the reform thus fostered compensating differentials, I expect eligible mothers of children
under six to become more likely to move to part-time jobs and experience accrued satisfaction
with their working-time arrangements, after the reform and relative to women not eligible for
the new right. These advantages should then mix up with career costs, such as a reduction in
pay. As mothers more than fathers work flexibly, both generally and as a result of requests
under the new law (Paull, 2008; Hooker et al., 2011), gender career gaps may have worsened
after the reform as an unintended result of compensating differentials arising for women
but not for men. Both within-gender and between-gender dynamics should be particularly
pronounced when considering parents of children under 3.
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2. Empirical approach
2.1. Data and samples
I rely on the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a multipurpose household panel
focusing on the living conditions and life histories of UK residents running from 1991 to
2009 (Taylor et al., 2010; University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research,
2018). The analyses are here restricted to waves 10 to 15 and thus cover the period 2000-
2006. This time window excludes further normative changes, as the first expansion of the
right was granted by the Work and Families Act of 2006 and came into effect in April 2007.
The analytical sample comprises individuals aged 20 to 55, working as dependent employ-
ees, and with at least one valid person-year observation. Employees holding temporary-
work agency (TWA) contracts were outside the scope of the right-to-request legislation, and
person-year records in which individuals hold a TWA are therefore excluded from the anal-
yses. Differently, and limiting the precision of my estimates, BHPS data does not allow me
to precisely identify employees with at least 26 weeks of tenure, a second eligibility criterion.
After retrieving individual fertility histories from the BHPS Consolidated Marital, Cohabi-
tation, and Fertility Histories (1991-2009) file (Pronzato, 2011), I define women treated by
the 2003 reform as those with at least one child under 6 years of age born prior to April
2003 and not giving birth in its aftermath. I thus focus on women with at least one of their
youngest children born between 1998 and 2002. Such a restriction addresses two concerns.
One is the potential for endogenous fertility behaviour among the treated, although, to the
best of my knowledge, there is no evidence available on the fertility effects of this particular
reform. Secondly, concomitant (and subsequent) reforms to maternity leave rights (Lewis and
Campbell, 2007) may invalidate the evaluation strategy, yet they would necessarily apply
only to women who give birth also from 2003 onwards, and these women are therefore not
part of the analytical sample. The control group is drawn from the pool of ineligible women,
thus comprising childless women and mothers of children aged 6 or older in 2003. Mirroring
the selection made for the treated, mothers in the control group have given birth between
1993 and 1997 and not afterwards.
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To assess whether the 2003 reform affected gender gaps in the British labour market, I follow
the same sample restrictions to define treated and controls among men. Among the treated, I
retain fathers of children under 6 years of age born prior to 2003. The control group comprises
fathers of older children and childless men. Both within-gender and between-gender analyses
are then repeated looking at more narrowly defined treated groups, one consisting only of
parents of children born in 2001-2 and thus under 3 at the moment of the 2003 reform, and
one consisting of parents of children born in 1998 to 2000 and thus aged 3 to 5 at the moment
of the 2003 reform. All contrasts between treated and controls are summed up in Table 1,
also reporting sample sizes in each cell.
2.2. Difference-in-differences and triple-difference strategies
Following the literature on compensating differentials (Rosen, 1986; Bonhomme and Jolivet,
2009; Felfe, 2012a), I estimate a number of empirical models, sharing the same specification,
for outcomes capturing career attainment (e.g. hourly wages) on the one hand, and non-
monetary job amenities (e.g. flexible schedules) on the other. Particularly for those women
treated by the 2003 reform, I expect losses on the first class of outcomes balanced by gains
on the second class, highlighting a trade-off between them.
To gauge whether, how, and for whom right-to-request policies gave rise to compensating
differentials, I adopt a difference-in-differences (DD) framework. All models are linear or
linear probability models for dichotomous outcomes, with the following specification for the
2003 reform
yit = α1POST03t + α2(POST03t ×Di) + X′itγ + θi + φt + it (1)
where yit is one of six outcomes. Monetary job features are classically involved in the trade-
off underlying compensating differentials (Filer, 1985; Rosen, 1986) and are here modelled
as the log of real2 hourly wages. Hourly wages are obtained by dividing gross monthly pay
by the sum of regular and overtime weekly working hours multiplied by 4.35 (e.g. Bryan and
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Sevilla-Sanz, 2011). Wages below 1 or above 100 are trimmed.
Given that the expected trade-off centres around working hours and time flexibility, I also
analyse career attainment in terms of access to managerial jobs, whose long hours are likely
to prove incompatible with part-time work (Manning and Petrongolo, 2008; ONS, 2011). A
second outcome in the analysis is therefore a dummy variable that equals 1 if individuals hold
a managerial post and 0 otherwise, derived from a direct question concerning respondents’
managerial responsibilities in their current job.
Moving to the other end of the trade-off, I first look at changes in working hours (excluding
overtime) and transitions to part-time work (a dummy that equals 1 if employees work under
30 hours a week, e.g. Matteazzi et al., 2014). Further, I investigate subjective evaluations of
one’s current employment situation. Self-reported job satisfaction concerning working hours
is my fifth outcome. In line with previous studies in the field (Rosen, 1986; Bonhomme and
Jolivet, 2009), I take the original variable measured on a scale from 1 “Not satisfied at all”
to 7 “Completely satisfied” and derive a dummy that distinguishes two levels of satisfac-
tion, coded 1 if respondents’ score is 5 or higher and 0 otherwise. Last, as an alternative
measure of satisfaction with working-time arrangements, I look at the likelihood of feeling
‘unconstrained’ in the current job (Bo¨heim and Taylor, 2004). Workers are considered to be
unconstrained when reporting that they would not alter their working hours, upwards or
downwards, if given the chance to do so keeping their current pay rate.
To fully exploit the panel nature of the data, I include individual fixed effects (FE, θi).
Time-invariant individual characteristics are thereby netted out. Examples of such unob-
served characteristics include the time-invariant components of individual productivity (e.g.
ability) or of preferences regarding job (dis)amenities (Hotz et al., 2017). Notably, high-
ability individuals might have both a higher earnings potential and be better poised to “pur-
chase” job amenities in the labour market – being better at negotiation with their current
employer or at job search. This can create a spurious positive correlation between earnings
and job amenities (Heywood et al., 2007). Individual fixed effects take care of the fact that
high-ability workers may sort in jobs that combine desirable monetary and non-monetary
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features.
Adding individual fixed effects also allows to account for compositional changes over time
among treated and controls, including changes due to attrition in unbalanced panel data,
as long as these are due to time-invariant individual features (e.g. Francesconi and Van der
Klaauw, 2007). Although the main effect of treatment status cannot be identified, since
treatment status is time-invariant as well, one can still retrieve the DD estimator as it
involves the interaction of treatment status (Di = 1 if parent of a child under 6) and a
time-varying dummy (POST03t). The latter distinguishes the pre-reform and post-reform
period, respectively before and after April 2003 for the 2003 reform. The FE-DD estimator
α2 thus expresses within-individual variation among the treated vis-a`-vis the controls, after
as compared to before the 2003 reform (Lechner et al., 2016). Since assignment to treatment
and control group is here defined in terms of eligibility to the new right, all estimates are
intention-to-treat ones.
The main empirical model for the assessment of the 2003 reform is completed by a set of
control variables X
′
it, namely a quadratic for age, dummies for region of residence, and the
log of the regional unemployment rate, as well as interview year fixed effects φt. Standard
errors are clustered at the individual level to account for serial correlation within units over
time.
In a second step of the analysis, I re-ran the model as specified in Equation 1 on the sample
comprising both men and women to evaluate whether the 2003 reform affected gender gaps
in the British labour market, installing compensating differentials for women and not (or
more so than) for men. This amounts to let the reform-relevant parameters α1 and α2 vary
by gender:
yit = (1 + FEMALEi)× [(α1POST03t + α2(POST03t ×Di)] + X′itγ + θi + φt + it (2)
I thus retrieve a triple-difference estimator (DDD), namely the (within-individual) difference
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for women vis-a`-vis men in the difference between treated and controls, comparing the post-
and pre-reform period. To gauge whether compensating differentials hold in particular for
parents of small children, both DD and DDD analyses are replicated considering, on the one
hand, only parents of children 0-2 and, on the other, only parents of children aged 3 to 5 at
the time of the 2003 reform as alternative groups of treated units.
2.3. Parallel trends
The empirical strategy chosen here shields estimates from time-invariant sources of confound-
ing via the inclusion of individual fixed effects. In DD settings, one then relies on the parallel
trend assumption to exclude time-varying confounding. Prior to a given intervention, in my
case the 2003 reform, outcomes in the treated and control group should evolve in parallel
over time. Had there not been the intervention, one assumes outcomes for the two groups
would have continued on their parallel paths. The DD strategy then retrieves an unbiased
estimate of the causal impact of the intervention, expressing how much a given outcome
deviates from the parallel path for the treated vis-a`-vis the controls in the aftermath of the
treatment (assignment) period.
I assess outcome trends prior to the intervention of interest and conditional on the covariates,
time- and individual fixed effects comprised in the main statistical model. In practice, this
entails running a series of models of the following form
yit = X
′
itγ + θi + φt + it (3)
for each of the six outcomes yit and limiting the analysis to the pre-reform period (2000-
2002). Similar to the main models, I include the vector X
′
it (a quadratic for age, dummies
for region of residence, and the log of the regional unemployment rate), as well as individual
and interview-year fixed effects (θi and φt, respectively).
Predicted values are then averaged across interview years and treatment groups. A graphical
inspection of the obtained conditional outcome trends is portrayed in Figure 1, focusing
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on the main contrast between mothers of children 0-5 (Treated) v. childless women and
mothers of children older than 5 (Controls). Looking at the left panel and for most of the
outcomes, outcome trends do not diverge substantially across groups even without any data
pre-processing (“Unweighted”). Hourly wages are the only exception: the trend for women
in the treated group is monotonically increasing, while control-group women experience
somewhat of a decline in hourly wages during the pre-reform years. Since I expect a wage
drop for the treated vis-a`-vis the controls in the aftermath of the reform, I ran the risk of
underestimating such reduction given that hourly wages for control-group women (but not
the treated) were already declining in years prior to the reform.
Nevertheless, I also replicate my analyses addressing the potential violation of parallel trends.
I augment both DD and DDD estimates via entropy balancing to increase the comparability
of treatment groups with respect to time-varying confounders (e.g. Freier et al., 2015). En-
tropy balancing is a non-parametric algorithm (Hainmueller, 2012) that estimates weights
such that, once re-weighted, the distribution of a set of variables in the control group resem-
bles that of the treated, matching directly on sample moments (mean, variance, skewness).
I balance each of the contrasts displayed in Table 1 on the means of a set of covariates
measured in waves 11 and 12 (carried out in the pre-reform period 2000-2002). Overall,
pre-treatment outcome trends in Figure 1 display an good balance, and I thus refrain from
balancing samples on pre-treatment outcomes (see also Chabe´-Ferret et al., 2017). Yet moth-
ers of small children treated by the reform may still differ substantially from control-group
women, including both mothers of older children and childless women, particularly with re-
spect to labour supply patterns. It thus could be, for example, that one finds mothers of
younger children to be more likely to reduce their working hours vis-a`-vis the controls not
because of the policy reform itself, but because of how childcare obligations and, thereby,
labour supply simply differ between the two groups.
The set of covariates deployed for balancing is thus meant to capture factors related to
women’s labour supply decisions. Covariates include a counter for the number of children in
the household, a dummy for employment status (1 if employed), a dummy for marital status
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(1 if married), a counter for the number of weeks spent in inactivity in the year prior to the
interview, and household income (excluding the individual’s own labour income).
Figure 2 depicts standardised differences between means, across treatment groups, of all vari-
ables used for entropy balancing. For illustrative purposes, I focus on the main treated group,
that of mothers of children younger than 6, and their control group comprising mothers of
older children and childless women. Positive differences indicate an imbalance “in favour” of
the treated group, negative differences one “in favour” of controls. Prior to balancing, treated
and control groups display evident imbalances in terms of number of children and proportion
married, imbalances in the direction that could be expected given that the treated consist of
mothers of young(er) children. Specifically, treated women have a higher number of children,
are more often married, have spent longer periods inactive, and are less often employed than
control-group women. After balancing, standardised differences for these and all the other
variables reduce to 03.
Parallel trends for the main sample, re-weighted by means of entropy balancing, are displayed
in the right panel of Figure 1 (“Weighted”). Applying the balancing algorithm on a limited
set of covariates, outcome trends for hourly wages now appear to follow parallel trends across
treatment groups in the pre-reform period. Balancing is similarly applied to all other sample
contrasts and seemingly ameliorates the observed component of parallel trends across all
such contrasts (see Figures 1A, 2A, 3A in the Appendix).
3. Findings
The first panel of Table 2 displays how the introduction of the right to request flexible
schedules in 2003 changed the outcomes of mothers of children 0-5 relative to a control group
comprising mothers of older children and childless women. Predictions following the theory
of compensating differentials would lead to expect, first, career penalties for the treated. The
hourly wages of mothers in the treated group indeed fell by around 7% (p < .001) relative
to the controls in the post-reform period. Differently, I cannot ascertain a relative penalty,
despite the small coefficient being in the expected direction, in terms of access to managerial
posts (α2 = – .02, p = .405).
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Compensating monetary losses, I find some evidence for the hypothesised increased job
amenity value of working-time flexibility. Mothers in the treated group experience a reduction
in working hours, of around .6 hours on average (p = .068), although this does not seem
to have been accomplished through increased access to part-time (α2 = .012, p = .546).
Treatment effects for job satisfaction and unconstrained status are all positive, yet small in
size (and p = .403, p = .204, respectively). Overall, eligible mothers in the treated group
seem to have experienced a trade-off between wage attainment and working hours, but little
evidence suggest this was accompanied by higher satisfaction with the newly reduced working
schedule.
The second and third panel of Table 2 investigate whether the 2003 reform had heterogeneous
effects depending on the age of the youngest child in the household at the time of the
reform. Mothers of children aged 0-2 should confront the steepest search costs and hurdles
in combining paid and unpaid work. Similar to the main estimates, mothers in this narrower
treatment group experienced a pay cut of around 6% in the post-reform period (p = .006).
Their chances of attaining managerial posts decline of around 5 percentage points vis-a`-vis
the controls (albeit p = .114). Results in columns 3, 5, and 6 indicate that the 2003 reform
lead to strong changes in working hours (–3 weekly hours, p < .001) accompanied by accrued
chances of feeling satisfied with working-time arrangements and feeling unconstrained with
respect to working hours (8 and 10 percentage points, respectively). Chances of working
part-time increase by around 10 percentage points (p = .003) for the group of mothers of
children 0-2. Differently, moving to the bottom of Table 2, I can detect a relative wage
penalty still standing at 7.5% (p < .001) for mothers of children 3-5. Yet, women in this
treated group increase their working hours and their chances of working part-time decrease
in the aftermath of the reform. This may signal the use of different sources of working-
time flexibility other than reduced hours and part-time, still bearing a wage penalty and,
in addition, not leading to heightened satisfaction (as per columns 5 and 6). On balance,
results highlight how introducing the right to request in 2003 may have benefited employed
mothers, especially mothers of toddlers at the time of the reform, in terms of working time
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and the amenity value they associate with it. Career costs, in the form of wage drops, also
emerge, albeit coherently with a compensating differential story only for mothers of children
0-2.
If compensating differentials arise for women, specially to ease (early) childcare duties, it
might be that the 2003 reform had the unintended effect of deepening gender career gaps in
the British labour market. Triple-difference estimates help assessing whether the effects of
the 2003 reform were felt more among women than among men, thereby widening gender
gaps. Finding negative DDD estimates for hourly wages might suggest, for example, that
mothers vis-a`-vis their controls have experienced harsher wage losses than fathers vis-a`-vis
their controls per effect of the 2003 reform. Column 1 of Table 3 points in this direction. Per
effect of the reform, the pay cut for eligible mothers of children aged 0-5 vis-a`-vis control-
group women is around 5% larger than the wage change detected for similarly eligible fathers
with respect to control-group men (p = .022). DDD wage estimates are similarly around 5.7%
(p = .061) and 4% (p = .142) when considering only parents of children 0-2 or of children
3-5, respectively. Differently, I find small but noisier estimates associated with access to
managerial posts suggesting nonetheless a stronger penalty for treated women as compared
to female controls rather than treated men compared to male controls in all three sample
contrasts. DDD estimates for career attainment mirror by and large the findings for women
only, suggesting that the wage penalty for eligible mothers may contribute to gender career
gaps more broadly.
As for working time and its amenity value, estimates in columns 3 to 6 are somewhat coherent
with those of Table 2. The 2003 reform widened the gap in working hours between parents
of small children and their controls, especially for women and especially when considering
parents of toddlers. In the latter treated group, women also appear more likely than men to
switch to part-time (around 10 percentage points, p = .006), as compared to their respective
control groups and per effect of the 2003 reform. The likelihood of feeling unconstrained
and satisfied with working time appears to have increased differentially for women and men,
by and large in line with what found when analysing women only. Notably, estimates for
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working hours and part-time in the DDD analysis for the subgroup of parents of children
3-5 suggest once again an increase in the working hours of eligible mothers. This seems not
to be accompanied by substantial changes in job satisfaction or in the chances of feeling
unconstrained, reflecting the findings of the DD analysis. This suggests that the wage cut
for mothers of children aged 3 to 5 does not square well with a compensating differential
mechanism.
4. Robustness
In Figures 3 and 4, I compare estimates for my main specifications in Tables 2 and 3 (“Un-
weighted”) with those obtained after re-weighting via entropy balancing (“Weighting”).
Overall, estimates prove robust to the weighting procedure here deployed to improve on
parallel outcome trends across treatment groups prior to the reform.
For the DD analysis in particular (Figure 3), weighted estimates reinforce the main finding
of a trade-off between hourly wages losses on the one hand, and reductions in working hours,
access to part-time positions, and an accrued feeling of being ‘unconstrained’ with respect
to working hours, on the other. This is primarily experienced by mothers of children under
2 and cannot be ascertained for mothers of older children still eligible for the new right.
Gender gaps, highlighted by the DDD analysis in Figure 4, evolve in accordance to the
patterns assessed for women only.
Discussion and conclusion
Introducing a right to request changes to working-time arrangements for parents of young
children may have perverse effects on the career attainment of mothers. Fitting the theory of
compensating differentials, eligible mothers after the reform decrease their working hours and
become more satisfied with their working-time arrangements vis-a`-vis the pool of ineligible
women. Yet, this comes at an economic price in terms of wage losses. This is particularly
true for mothers of children aged 0 to 2 at the time of the reform, whereas I cannot ascertain
whether eligible mothers of older children are also compensated for wage losses. I also find
some support for the idea that the reform, while widening the gap between women who were
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eligible for the new right and those who were not, also widened gender (pay) gaps more at
large.
Mothers of young children seem to have exploited the reform for reductions in working hours,
as well as for moves to part-time. Previous research for Germany also shows shortened work-
schedules, but not necessarily different working-time arrangements altogether, are a likely
choice for new mothers (Felfe, 2012a). I have not assessed here whether and how the reform
affected moves to a broader spectrum of flexible schedules also encompassed in the new right
to request. This would include flexitime (flexible daily start and finishing times), working
compressed or annualised hours, shift work, job sharing, or working from home. The career
costs attached to such options are under-researched though (but see Heywood et al., 2007),
whereas those attached to part-time and reduced hours are well established (e.g. Connolly
and Gregory, 2008; Manning and Petrongolo, 2008; Matteazzi et al., 2014). Investigating
compensating differentials, it is thus reasonable to start from the latter, also considering
they have been the main options requested by women in the framework of the right-to-
request policy (Hegewisch, 2005; Hooker et al., 2011).
Compensating differentials hold particularly for mothers of toddlers. These mothers arguably
face the highest obstacles in combining childcare and paid work (e.g. Felfe, 2012b). Evidence
on the increased job satisfaction of this group after the reform suggests that policies affecting
working time help these mothers obtain effective flexible solutions. On the flip side though,
mothers incur in career costs. Future research could shed a light on whether other policies,
especially those centred around the availability and affordability of childcare for toddlers,
may help mitigate this trade-off.
Working-time policies more broadly fall in the category of women-friendly policies previous
studies have scrutinised for their boomerang effects on women’s careers. Evidence in this
paper suggests that detrimental effects may be particularly felt by mothers of young children
via the instalment of compensating differentials, even in a context such as that of Britain
where the main flexible option, part-time employment, is of particularly low quality. In the
UK, expansions of the ‘right to request’ were carried out in 2006 and 2014, first encompassing
154
parents of older children and then all employees regardless of parental status. Building on
evidence presented in this study, further research could assess whether policies targeting all
women (and men), rather than mothers (parents) in particular, also have unintended effects
on between- and within-gender inequality in labour markets.
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Notes
1Parents of disabled children under 18 were also entitled under the provisions of 2002-3, yet I cannot
identify this group in my analyses due to data constraints.
2Throughout, wages are deflated at 2006 prices using the annual CHAW-RPI index provided by the Office
for National Statistics.
3The same exact balancing on the means of past outcomes and selected covariates is achieved for all
sample contrasts used for the evaluation of the 2003 reform (figures available upon request)
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Tables & graphs
Table 1: Number of unique individuals (person-year records in parentheses) for all the con-
trasts between treated and controls.
Treated Controls
Motherschild0−5 v. Childless women + Motherschild≥6
476
(1,759)
1,251
(5,270)
Fatherschild0−5 v. Childless men + Fatherschild≥6
446
(1,822)
1,433
(5,785)
Motherschild0−2 v. Childless women + Motherschild≥6
177
(628)
1,251
(5,007)
Fatherschild0−2 v. Childless men + Fatherschild≥6
189
(823)
1,433
(5,785)
Motherschild3−5 v. Childless women + Motherschild≥6
299
(1,004)
1,251
(5,007)
Fatherschild3−5 v. Childless men + Fatherschild≥6
257
(999)
1,433
(5,785)
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Figure 1: Predicted outcomes averaged over treatment groups and interview years, prior
to the 2003 right-to-request reform (Equation 3). The left panel refers to estimates before
weighting (“Unweighted”), the right panel after weighting by means of entropy balancing
(“Weighted”). The group of “Controls” comprises childless women and mothers of children
aged 6 or older (BHPS, 2000-2002).
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Figure 2: Standardised differences between the means of selected variables for treated and
control groups. Selected variables are measured in pre-reform waves 11 and 12. Balanced
differences are computed after weighting by means of entropy balancing. The treated group
comprises mothers of children aged 0-5, controls comprise childless women and mothers of
older children (BHPS waves 11 and 12).
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Table 2: Fixed-effects (FE) DD estimates for the effects of the 2003 reform on mothers.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(wage)
Managerial
job
Working
hours
Part-time
Job
Satisfaction
Unconstrained
POST03×Mumchild0−5 −0.072*** −0.017 −0.679* 0.012 0.020 0.036
(0.016) (0.021) (0.371) (0.020) (0.024) (0.028)
Number of individuals 1,727 1,727 1,727 1,727 1,727 1,727
Number of person-years 6,639 6,639 6,639 6,639 6,639 6,639
POST03×Mumchild0−2 −0.066*** −0.049 −3.080*** 0.103*** 0.076* 0.105**
(0.024) (0.031) (0.552) (0.035) (0.040) (0.044)
Number of individuals 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428
Number of person-years 5,635 5,635 5,635 5,635 5,635 5,635
POST03×Mumchild3−5 −0.075*** 0.003 0.917** −0.049** −0.017 −0.009
(0.020) (0.025) (0.418) (0.021) (0.027) (0.033)
Number of individuals 1,550 1,550 1,550 1,550 1,550 1,550
Number of person-years 6,011 6,011 6,011 6,011 6,011 6,011
Notes: All models include a post-reform dummy, a quadratic for age, dummies for region of residence, the log of
regional unemployment rate, and individual and interview-year fixed effects. Estimates are weighted by means
of entropy balancing as detailed in the text. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p≤ .10, **p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .01.
Source: BHPS waves 10-15
160
Table 3: Fixed-effects (FE) DDD estimates for the effects of the 2003 reform on gender gaps.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(wage)
Managerial
job
Working
hours
Part-time
Job
Satisfaction
Unconstrained
POST03× Parentchild0−5 × Female −0.050** −0.026 −0.677 0.015 0.023 0.029
(0.022) (0.027) (0.470) (0.021) (0.034) (0.038)
Number of individuals 3,606 3,606 3,606 3,606 3,606 3,606
Number of person-years 14,246 14,246 14,246 14,246 14,246 14,246
POST03× Parentchild0−2 × Female −0.057* −0.052 −3.138*** 0.103*** 0.086* 0.047
(0.030) (0.039) (0.670) (0.037) (0.050) (0.055)
Number of individuals 3,050 3,050 3,050 3,050 3,050 3,050
Number of person-years 12,243 12,243 12,243 12,243 12,243 12,243
POST03× Parentchild3−5 × Female −0.042 −0.014 0.923* −0.042* −0.019 0.033
(0.028) (0.035) (0.559) (0.022) (0.042) (0.047)
Number of individuals 3,240 3,240 3,240 3,240 3,240 3,240
Number of person-years 12,795 12,795 12,795 12,795 12,795 12,795
Notes: All models include a post-reform dummy, a quadratic for age, dummies for region of residence, the log of
regional unemployment rate, and individual and interview-year fixed effects. Estimates are weighted by means of
entropy balancing as detailed in the text. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p≤ .10, **p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .01.
Source: BHPS waves 10-15
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Figure 3: Fixed-effects (FE) DD estimates for the effects of the 2003 reform on mothers,
without (“Unweighted”, see Table 2) and with entropy balancing (“Weighted”).
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Figure 4: Fixed-effects (FE) DDD estimates for the effects of the 2003 reform on gender
gaps, without (“Unweigthed”, see Table 3) and with entropy balancing (“Weighted”).
163
Appendix
1.7
1.8
1.9
2
2000 2001 2002
ln(hourly wage)
.2
.22
.24
.26
.28
2000 2001 2002
Managerial job
33
33.2
33.4
33.6
2000 2001 2002
Working hours
.16
.18
.2
.22
.24
2000 2001 2002
Part-time
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
2000 2001 2002
Job satisfaction
.5
.6
.7
.8
2000 2001 2002
Unconstrained
Unweighted
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2
2000 2001 2002
ln(hourly wage)
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
2000 2001 2002
Managerial job
23
24
25
26
27
2000 2001 2002
Working hours
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
2000 2001 2002
Part-time
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
2000 2001 2002
Job satisfaction
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
2000 2001 2002
Unconstrained
Weighthed
Controls Treated: MumsChild 0-2
Figure 1A: Predicted outcomes averaged over treatment groups and interview years, prior
to the 2003 right-to-request reform (Equation 3). The left panel refers to estimates before
weighting (“Unweighted”), the right panel after weighting by means of entropy balancing
(“Weighted”). The group of “Controls” comprises childless women and mothers of children
aged 6 or older (BHPS, 2000-2002).
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Figure 2A: Predicted outcomes averaged over treatment groups and interview years, prior
to the 2003 right-to-request reform (Equation 3). The left panel refers to estimates before
weighting (“Unweighted”), the right panel after weighting by means of entropy balancing
(“Weighted”). The group of “Controls” comprises childless women and mothers of children
aged 6 or older (BHPS, 2000-2002).
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Figure 3A: Predicted outcomes averaged over treatment groups and interview years, prior
to the 2003 right-to-request reform (Equation 3). The left panel refers to estimates before
weighting (“Unweighted”), the right panel after weighting by means of entropy balancing
(“Weighted”). The group of “Controls” comprises childless men and fathers of children aged
6 or older (BHPS, 2000-2002).
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Chapter 4
Gender, Parenthood, and Hiring Decisions in Sex-Typical Jobs: In-
sights from Two Survey Experiments
Gender, Parenthood, and Hiring Decisions
in Sex-Typical Jobs:
Insights from Two Survey Experiments∗
Abstract
We ran two survey experiments with Dutch employers to investigate hiring discrimi-
nation in sex-typical jobs. We ask if women are especially discriminated against when
they have children, whether discrimination applies similarly in different occupations,
and whether statistical discrimination or status-characteristic theories best account
for discriminatory practices (if any). Employers rate fictitious candidates for either a
female-typical job (primary-school teacher) or a male-typical job (software engineer).
Employers are found to display a slight preference for female candidates when filling a
teacher post, although such bias is less strong for female applicants with children. No
such ranking is found for a software engineer vacancy, nor do we find different salary
offers across candidates and across vacancies. Employers do not appear to favour men
over women for positions likely to be on the career track, as predicted by statistical
discrimination theories, nor do they expect women to be less capable than men, as
posited by status-characteristic theory. Female candidates with children, however, are
expected to be less committed to their job and work fewer hours, especially in the
teacher experiment. Such expectations seem to have small consequences for the hiring
decisions and salary offers Dutch employers make in our study.
∗This paper is co-authored with Ruud Luijkx. In this paper we make use of data from the LISS (Longitu-
dinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences) panel administered by CentERdata (Tilburg University, The
Netherlands). The LISS panel data were collected by CentERdata (Tilburg University, The Netherlands)
through its MESS project funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research. Funding for this
research project was provided by Tilburg University, School of Social and Behavioral Sciences. The authors
wish to thank Marije Oudejans for managing the data collection process. We also wish to thank participants
at the 2017 ESRA Conference in Lisbon, as well as in seminars at Tilburg University and at the University
of Trento for their comments and suggestions. A slightly different version of this paper is currently under
review at an international peer-reviewed journal.
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Employers may shape gender disparities in the workplace when they treat differently other-
wise equally-productive men and women. Favouring male candidates over comparable female
ones at the hiring stage is one instance of such discriminatory practices. Hiring decisions are
increasingly understood as key drivers of labour market inequalities (e.g. Bills et al., 2017;
Protsch and Solga, 2015; Di Stasio and van de Werfhorst, 2016) and gender discrimina-
tion in hiring is well-documented (Azmat and Petrongolo, 2014; Neumark, 2016). Questions
still loom, however, on whether women are especially discriminated against when they have
children, whether discrimination applies similarly in different occupations, and which mech-
anisms drive discrimination. We address here this threefold gap by means of two survey
experiments on the hiring decisions of Dutch employers.
First, previous research has yielded mixed support for gender-by-parental-status discrimina-
tion resulting in a motherhood penalty at the hiring stage. A seminal study combining a lab
and a field experiment in the US found mothers to be the least-preferred candidate for hire
in marketing and business jobs (Correll et al., 2007). Field experiments in the financial sector
in France (Petit, 2007) and across a wide array of jobs in Sweden (Bygren et al., 2017) have
not replicated this finding. Differently, a comparably large field experiment in Spain found
lower callback probabilities for women especially if with children (Gonza´lez et al., 2019) and
a vignette study in Switzerland found evidence of a motherhood penalty for women applying
for a HR assistant position (Oesch et al., 2017). We add to this debate by examining how
employers evaluate job candidates at the intersection of gender and parental status in the
Netherlands. The Dutch context features a “residual” gender wage gap of around 8% that
studies attribute in part to discrimination (Fransen et al., 2012), as well as persistent gender
segregation by field of study and, consequently, occupation (van de Werfhorst, 2017; OECD,
2017b: p. 144). At the same time, the evidence for a motherhood penalty is mixed in the
Dutch labour market (cf. Davies and Pierre, 2005; De Hoon et al., 2017) making the Nether-
lands a compelling litmus test for the analysis of gender-by-parental-status discrimination.
Our second contribution consists in running one experiment for a male-typical job (software
engineer) and one for a female-typical job (primary-school teacher). Research on the moth-
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erhood penalty in hiring has focused on mixed occupations (for an exception, Bygren et al.,
2017). Yet, experimental studies on gender discrimination at large have found differential
treatment in favour of women in female-typical jobs and, albeit to a lesser extent, against
women in male-typical jobs (Riach and Rich, 2002; Rich, 2014; Neumark, 2016). We comple-
ment these findings by assessing if and how parental status modifies gender discrimination
in sex-typical occupations.
Finally, we develop and test the predictions of two theories, statistical discrimination theory
and status-characteristic theory (e.g. Correll and Benard, 2006). While the former frame-
work would predict particularly pronounced gender differentials in male-typical jobs and
holding irrespective of parental status, the latter would suggest that mothers may be better
off in female-typical jobs. Further, employers’ propensity to discriminate statistically may
vary depending on the length of the prospective employment relationship, with permanent
contracts being conducive to higher risk-aversion on the part of employers and thereby lower
hiring chances for the groups employers deem less reliable or productive. Alternatively, we
measure the expectations employers form regarding different candidates’ ability and commit-
ment and assess the role of these constructs in accounting for hiring patterns, as predicted
by status-characteristic theory.
In short, we ask if there is a motherhood penalty in hiring chances, whether it varies along
occupational and type-of-contract lines, and if such variation fits with the predictions of
either economic or socio-psychological models of discrimination. Rather than relying on un-
dergraduate students as in most experimental simulations of the hiring process (Koch et al.,
2015), participants in our study are real-world employers selected among the respondents of
LISS, a web panel carried out since 2007 on a true probability sample of the Dutch popu-
lation (Scherpenzeel, 2011). While field experiments involve real-world employers too, what
is typically measured is only the outcome of employers’ decision over a candidate, that is,
whether or not a given job applicant gets a callback. We are able here not only to survey
employers’ decision over a candidate, but also to inquire about employers’ motives.
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1. Background
1.1. Statistical discrimination: risk aversion in hiring decisions
The design of our study is informed by economic and socio-psychological models of dis-
crimination, namely statistical discrimination theory and status-characteristic theory, both
commonly featured in the literature on motherhood penalties in labour markets (e.g. Correll
et al., 2007; Gangl and Ziefle, 2009; Bygren et al., 2017; Oesch et al., 2017).
Under statistical discrimination, employers are rational actors aiming at maximizing ex-
pected profits in labour markets characterized by imperfect information (for a review, Fang
and Moro, 2011). Specifically, employers may find it difficult or too expensive to access pre-
cise information on the individual productivity of job applicants. Group markers such as a
candidate’s sex are instead easily accessible – on CVs, at job interviews, etc. – and employers
may thereby determine individual productivity by combining the expected productivity of
a given female (male) candidate with the group-level productivity they estimate for women
(men). Even if employers believe women and men to be equally productive on average, the
productivity signals of a female applicant might be deemed more noisy (Aigner and Cain,
1977; Charles and Guryan, 2011). The underlying assumption employers make is that, despite
equal educational credentials, accumulated work experience etc., female employees might be
more likely than men to take career breaks, reduce their working hours, or leave their job
altogether for family-related reasons.
To compensate for this “risk”, employers become more reluctant to hire women and pay them
less than men all else equal. Economic discrimination arises then because of overshooting,
as female employees deciding against motherhood or whose productivity is not affected by
the presence of children will be discriminated against. In this framework, employers are thus
forward-looking and their concern lies with women potentially becoming parents and altering
their labour supply in ways harmful to productivity. Women of childbearing age, irrespective
of current parental status, could be discriminated against with respect to men (Gupta and
Smith, 2002; Petit, 2007; Yip and Wong, 2014; Baert, 2014; Biewen and Seifert, 2016). We
name this our family-risk hypothesis.
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What can be done to modify employers’ propensity to discriminate statistically? Two vari-
ables can be manipulated, namely the information available for each job applicant and the
risk employers associate with hiring him or her. Supplying precise and cheap information on
individual productivity could help employers correct the signal-to-noise ratio in their pro-
ductivity estimates (e.g. Altonji and Pierret, 2001; Pinkston, 2006). Although information
on job candidates has indeed been manipulated to detect statistical discrimination in exper-
imental settings, doing so is problematic for two reasons (Neumark, 2016). First, researchers
may not know which information employers need to forgo using group markers as proxies
for individual productivity. Besides, even if such information is known to the experimenters,
withholding it in a “low-information” experimental condition may prove to be unrealistic
with respect to real-world job applications1.
Instead of information then, we turn to the manipulation of risk as a function of a) the
length of the work contract being offered and b) the type of occupation. For the statistically-
discriminating employer, investing in female job applicants may be more risky in permanent
employment relationships as compared to temporary ones. While a temporary contract may
be used to screen employees and get rid of bad matches at a low or no cost when the contract
itself expires, permanent contracts are typically harder to terminate. This especially holds
in contexts such as the Dutch one, where recent labour market reforms have relaxed the
level of employment protection attached to temporary contracts but left largely untouched
that of permanent contracts (e.g. Mooi-Reci and Dekker, 2015) – and the latter remains
above the European average in the Netherlands (OECD, 2014). Other than with a costly
dismissal, permanent contracts are also more likely to be associated with employer-funded
training than are temporary contracts (Fouarge et al., 2012; Akgu¨ndu¨z and van Huizen,
2015). Therefore, given that hiring an employee on a permanent contract entails higher
economic costs, risk-averse Dutch employers will be more prone to discriminate statistically
against female applicants when filling a permanent rather than a temporary job vacancy
(contract-risk hypothesis).
In the same spirit, we might expect both our family-risk hypothesis and our contract-risk
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hypothesis to find more support in male-typical rather than in female-typical lines of work
(occupation-risk hypothesis). Occupations that are held predominantly by men often have
steeper career ladders than female-dominated ones. Foreseeing further investments in terms
of training and promotions, employers in male-typical jobs may thus be reluctant to hire fe-
male applicants, especially if permanently. The evidence for gender discrimination in hiring
in male-dominated jobs is mixed though, with some field experiments finding lower callback
rates for women vis-a`-vis men and others finding such rates to be substantially and statis-
tically indistinguishable (e.g. Riach and Rich, 2006; Carlsson, 2011; Bygren et al., 2017; for
reviews, Riach and Rich, 2002; Rich, 2014; Neumark, 2016). To the best of our knowledge,
only one previous study incorporated the type of work contract as an additional experimen-
tal condition, finding hiring discrimination against young childless women for permanent
vacancies in the financial sector in France (Petit, 2007). More to this point, Baert and col-
leagues (2016) find substantially lower callback rates for young women for jobs that imply
promotion prospects in a large field experiment in Belgium. Keeping this in mind, we argue
that the long-term investment of hiring an applicant for a ‘career’ rather than simply for
a ‘job’ makes filling permanent posts in male-typical occupations more prone to statistical
discrimination against women of childbearing age.
1.2. Status-characteristic theory: the role of status beliefs penalizing mothers
According to status-characteristic theory, no matter information asymmetries and risk aver-
sion, status beliefs may bias employers’ evaluations against women and, particularly, mothers
(Ridgeway and Correll, 2004; Correll and Benard, 2006; Correll et al., 2007). Status beliefs
are conceived as a particular class of stereotypes (e.g. Fiske et al., 2002) by virtue of which
individuals categorize members of social groups on the basis of perceived competence. Any
nominal characteristic that groups together individuals in a social setting – sex, ethnicity,
sexual orientation, and so forth – may become a status characteristic if actors share be-
liefs regarding that group’s competence, further conceptualized as the sum of ability and
commitment (Berger et al., 1977; Ridgeway and Correll, 2006; Mark et al., 2009; Ridgeway
et al., 2009). Seeking coordination with one another, individuals may activate performance
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expectations regarding how capable and committed others will be with respect to the task
at hand, depending on the salient social memberships. Performance expectations may then
drive the distribution of rewards such that, in the hiring setting, low-status actors end up
penalized in terms of hiring chances or salary offers (Correll et al., 2007; Pedulla, 2016, 2018;
for a review, Ridgeway, 2011).
Motherhood is such a status characteristic insofar as it amplifies status beliefs morphed
along gender lines (Ridgeway and Correll, 2004; Correll et al., 2007), following a pattern of
“amplified congruence” between status characteristics (Pedulla, 2018). Specifically, women,
especially if mothers, are perceived to be less capable than men in workplace settings (Cuddy
et al., 2004; Correll et al., 2007; The´baud, 2015). Superior ability may be granted to mothers
only for tasks that involve nurturance and care (Ridgeway and Correll, 2004), in line with
stereotypes broadly associating women with communion, i.e. being selfless and concerned
with others, rather than with agency, i.e. being assertive and motivated to master a task
(for a review, Ellemers, 2018). As for commitment, women and mothers in particular are not
expected to prioritize work over family obligations nor to make sacrifices to build a career
as much as men would (Correll et al., 2007; Rivera and Tilcsik, 2016; Ridgeway and Correll,
2004). We can therefore expect mothers to be the least-preferred candidate for hire and to
receive the lowest salary offers (motherhood penalty hypothesis). Employers will attribute the
lowest levels of expected competence, i.e. of ability and commitment, to female job applicants
who are also mothers (status belief hypothesis).
Yet, in female-typical jobs where nurturing and caring skills are crucial (teaching, nursing,
social work etc.), proponents of status-characteristic theory suggest women and mothers
might actually be highly regarded in terms of competence (Ridgeway and Correll, 2004).
This proposition may help explain the large body of evidence on gender discrimination in
favour of women in female-typical lines of work (e.g. Booth and Leigh, 2010; Carlsson, 2011;
Rich, 2014; Carlsson and Eriksson, 2017). In reviewing such findings, Neumark notes that
they pose “a bit of a puzzle for labor economists, since our models of discrimination do not
naturally predict this pattern. That said, perspectives on discrimination from other fields,
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such as those emphasizing norms regarding who does which job, might fit these facts better”
(Neumark, 2016: p. 77). Our hypothesis is that women, and mothers in particular, may top
employers’ ratings of competence in female-dominated jobs and be therefore more likely to
be hired and receive higher salary offers than men (see also Koch et al., 2015). We name this
our status reversal hypothesis.
2. Empirical approach
2.1. Data, sample, and setup
Participants in our study are sample members of the Longitudinal Internet Study for the
Social Sciences (LISS), a web household panel carried out since October 2007 on a true
probability sample of the Dutch population (e.g. Scherpenzeel, 2011). The core modules of
the LISS questionnaire allow to track the lifecourse changes and living conditions of panel
members on a yearly basis, much like in traditional household panel surveys. Ad hoc modules
can be submitted for consideration to CentERdata, a survey research institute affiliated with
Tilburg University, and appended to one of the monthly rounds of interviews. From December
2016 to August 2017, we were thus able to ran our survey experiments thanks to the LISS
infrastructure.
To select our “employers”, we administered four filter questions targeting respondents aged
25 to 65 and in paid work at the time of the most recent interview of LISS Work & Schooling
module (Wave 8, April-May 2015). Of the 2,985 individuals on target, 2,252 (75.4%) were
re-interviewed in December 2016 and 2,207 (73.9%) answered to all of our filter questions
that month.
Four yes/no filter questions covered respondents’ HR responsibilities in their current job.
Specifically, we asked whether respondents 1) had the power to hire/fire employees, 2) took
part in any phase of the recruitment process (screening of CVs, job interviews, etc.), 3) could
set or influence the rate of pay received by other employees, and 4) could have influence on
or decide over the promotion of other employees. 749 respondents, who answered “Yes” to
at least one of these four questions, form the pool of potential participants in our study. We
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refer to them as employers in the study jargon.
Employers were later involved in a simulation of the hiring process (e.g. Correll et al., 2007;
Di Stasio and Ge¨rxhani, 2015; Di Stasio and van de Werfhorst, 2016). Employers were solely
instructed that they would be taking part in such a simulation, with no explanation regarding
the goals of the study. We ran two separate survey experiments, identical in design and
questionnaire, but different in terms of the type of job vacancy employers were asked to rate
candidates for (software engineer or primary-school teacher). After being randomly allocated
to one of the two job vacancies, employers were presented with a CV for a first job applicant
and asked to fill in a survey to evaluate him or her for the position. Employers were then
presented with a second CV and repeated the questionnaire for a second candidate for the
same position.
In March 2017, 150 employers were contacted for the pre-test phase and 132 (88%) completed
the task, 66 for the software engineer vacancy and 66 for the teacher vacancy. In June and
August 2017, a total of 480 respondents were targeted for the test phase, so that each survey
experiment would have a sample size of 240 employers2. Restricting our analysis to complete
cases, we work with 239 participants – and 478 observations, since each employer evaluates
a pair of CVs – for the teacher experiment and 237 (474 observations) for the software
engineer experiment. As reported in Table 1, employers in both experiments are more likely
to be men, highly-educated, and to have a partner (either married or cohabiting). Looking
at their real-world HR responsibilities, the overwhelming majority of employers is involved
in the screening of job applicants, matching well with our focus on employers’ ratings of job
candidates based on their CVs.
2.2. Choice of jobs and job ads
We picked software engineer and primary-school teacher for our male-typical and female-
typical job, respectively. Both are examples of gender-segregated occupations in top-income
countries. In the Netherlands, women made up to 86% of primary-school teachers as re-
cently as 2015 (OECD, 2017a: p. 400), while only around 12% of Dutch women figured
among computing professionals in 2007 (broadly defined, ISCO-88 code 213; see Bettio and
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Verashchagina, 2009)3.
Beyond being on opposite sides of the spectrum in terms of gender segregation, our two
jobs require similar educational qualifications (namely HBOs, the degrees obtained in the
vocational track of the Dutch university system) yet widely differ in task content (e.g. Gath-
mann and Scho¨nberg, 2010). Teaching primarily entails interactive tasks, with nurturance
and care of small children being key at the primary-school level. Status beliefs on women’s
and mothers’ higher competence might thus be activated in these realms, as predicted by
status-characteristic theory. Further, even if in the public sector, primary-school teachers
are hired directly by schools in the Netherlands, a feature that makes the hiring process
comparable to that of private-sector jobs4. Software engineering jobs, on the other hand, not
only primarily involve analytical tasks, but are also training-intensive and typically installed
on well-structured career ladders, making them ideal to test our statistical discrimination
argument.
As for previous studies on gender discrimination in these lines of work, only Bygren and
colleagues (2017) have investigated the intersection of sex of the applicant and parental
status in similar occupations. As part of a larger correspondence study in Sweden, they have
found similar odds of a callback by sex and parental status for “computer specialists” and
for “elementary school teachers”. More generally, evidence is often nil (Petersen et al., 2000;
Carlsson, 2011; Di Stasio and van de Werfhorst, 2016; Fernandez and Campero, 2017; but
see Riach and Rich, 2006) on gender discrimination in hiring in tech jobs. Our choice of jobs
therefore provides a stringent test for our theoretical predictions.
Job ads in our study consisted of paragraphs of around seven lines of text (see Supplemen-
tary material). The wording and information provided was derived from real ads accessible
through online databases5 and from fake ads used in previous studies (e.g. Di Stasio and
Ge¨rxhani, 2015). Ads included a range of possible salary offers for applicants with different
levels of experience, as well as a range of possible weekly working hours (32 to 40). Employers
were referred to such ranges when asked about their salary offer to a given candidate and
about the weekly working hours they would have expected the candidate to put in if hired.
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Ads also comprised our first manipulation, posting either a permanent or a temporary job
vacancy to manipulate the risk associated with the prospective employment relationship.
2.3. CVs, job candidates, and manipulations
The CVs we presented to employers are stylized syntheses of real CVs accessed through free
online databases (e.g. indeed.nl). CVs included the following information regarding the
candidate: name, date of birth, marital status, previous work experience, maximum level
and field of education attained, language skills, training courses for teachers/programming
languages for engineers, and hobbies. Following previous studies (Correll et al., 2007; Petit,
2007), we sought to create a pair of similar but not identical CVs (CV A and CV B) for each
job type, to minimize participants’ suspicion about manipulations and about the purpose
of the experiment. Specifically, we tweaked the precise date of birth, the dates, locations,
and content of previous work experiences, where and when candidates got their degree, the
content and dates of training courses for teachers, which programming languages engineers
knew and with which proficiency, and the hobbies listed.
In the pre-test phase, we made sure that such heterogeneity across the CV pair did not result
in systematic differences in the evaluation of candidate A vis-a`-vis candidate B. Employers
evaluated each candidate separately on a set of items for ability, commitment, and expressed
the likelihood with which they would hire each candidate on a scale from 0 to 100 (see
Section 2.4 for details on our dependent variables). Similar to later in the test, we looked
for differences between candidates A and B in terms of each outcome by means of multilevel
linear models. None of these differences were statistically significant at conventional levels
nor sizeable (for all outcomes, Cohen’s d < .2). Nevertheless, to further ensure that CV type
(A or B) did not influence our results, treatments were assigned orthogonally to CV type in
the test phase.
In line with common practices in the literature (for a review, Neumark, 2016), we manipu-
lated our second binary treatment variable, sex of the job applicant, by varying the names
of job candidates. Four pairs of Dutch names and surnames were randomly extracted from a
list compiled in a previous study similarly manipulating names, albeit to gauge the presence
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of ethnic discrimination in the Dutch labour market (Blommaert et al., 2014). The four re-
sulting pairs were Roos Kosters and Eline Vos for women, Thijs Blom and Bram Ouwehand
for men. We stuck to Dutch-native names and surnames, as the analysis of the intersection
of sex and ethnic discrimination is beyond the scope of our experiment. Considering that the
average age at first childbirth for Dutch women is around 29 years old (OECD, 2016), we set
the age of candidates at around 30 years old. This choice makes it credible for a job candi-
date to have one child or, if not, to be of childbearing age anyway. Indeed, under our model
of statistical discrimination, we expect employers to display risk aversion against women
of childbearing age, regardless of actual parental status. As for the exact manipulation of
parental status, our third binary treatment, the candidate is either referred to as “married,
with one child” for parents or simply “married” otherwise (e.g. Petit, 2007; Bygren et al.,
2017).
To recap, our two survey experiments share a 2 (sex) by 2 (parental status) by 2 (type of
contract) factorial design. Sex of the applicant is a between-subjects factor, to avoid excessive
suspicion on the purpose of the survey on the part of participants. The type of contract is also
a between-subjects factor to ease participants’ task so that they would have to read only one
job ad. Finally, parental status is a within-subjects factor coherently with previous studies
(Correll et al., 2007). This means that, for instance, a given participant could start from a
job ad for a primary-school teacher, with a temporary contract being offered, and evaluate
first a CV (type B) for the candidate Roos Kosters without kids and secondly evaluate a
CV (type A) for the candidate Eline Vos with kids6. The order in which CV types A and
B, names of the candidates, and mentions of parental status appeared was counterbalanced
across participants in such a way to avoid any systematic order effect.
2.4. Outcomes and models: candidate evaluations and hiring decisions
Once presented with a CV, employers evaluated the candidate first in terms of expected com-
petence, further decomposed into the two constructs of ability and commitment (Ridgeway
and Correll, 2004; Correll et al., 2007; Ridgeway, 2011). To capture the ability component we
adopted seven items from previous studies (e.g. Fiske et al., 2002; Correll et al., 2007) and
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asked how “competent”, “confident”, “independent”, “competitive”, “intelligent”, “skilled”,
and “well-trained” employers found a given candidate. For commitment (e.g. Correll et al.,
2007; Heilman and Okimoto, 2008), we asked to what extent employers expected the candi-
date “to be very committed to the company (school)”, “to make sacrifices for the job”, and
“to make work a top priority” if hired. Each of these items was measured on a 7-point scale,
with responses ranging from “not at all” (1) to “extremely” (7). Both in the pre-test and
test phases we achieved high reliability for the resulting composite measures of ability and
commitment, with Cronbach’s αs ranging from a minimum of 0.77 to a maximum of 0.93.
We also included a more factual measure of work commitment by asking employers how many
hours they would expect a given candidate to work on a weekly basis. Similar to the online
job ads we surveyed, our fictitious job ads featured a 32- to 40-hour working week. Given
that part-time work (under 35 h) is notoriously widespread in the Netherlands, especially
among women and not limited to those among them with small children (e.g. Bosch et al.,
2010), we are cautious nonetheless on the extent to which this variable may tap expected
commitment.
Finally, employers were asked to estimate with what likelihood they would recommend a
candidate for hire on a scale from 0 to 100 (e.g. Di Stasio and Ge¨rxhani, 2015) and what
monthly salary offer they would make to the candidate (e.g. Correll et al., 2007). Both out-
comes are transformed, dividing by 100 the likelihood of hire and taking the logarithm of
the salary offer, to enable the interpretation of regression coefficients in terms of percentage-
point changes7. Hiring decisions (likelihood of hire, salary) and candidate ratings (ability,
commitment, and expected hours) are our dependent variables in multilevel linear regression
models8, with job candidates (CVs) nested within employers. For each of our dependent vari-
ables, our specification of choice includes the main effects of job candidates’ sex and parental
status. The interaction between the two is our main focus as it captures the motherhood
penalty, if any (e.g. Correll et al., 2007). For both job types, we ran our models first on the
full sample and secondly separate by type of work contract. Full estimation results, including
a simple bivariate model comprising only the main effect for sex of the job candidate, are
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available in the Appendix.
3. Findings
Evidence from our primary-school teacher experiment is summarized in Figure 1 (see column
2 of Tables A1-A5 in the Appendix). For the likelihood of hire, we find a small positive effect
of candidate’s sex (≈ 4 percentage points, p = .030) indicating a preference for women,
conditional though on the fact that they are childless. Looking at the interaction between
candidate’s sex and parental status, parental status depresses the likelihood of hire more
for women than for men (–2.5 percentage points, p = .062). The ranking of candidates for
hire in the teacher vacancy sees childless women come first, followed by mothers, and with
men ranked at the bottom. No such pattern is discernible in the second panel of Figure 1,
when looking at salary offers. Hence, while we do find some support for a pro-women bias in
female-typical jobs, candidates giving evidence of being a mother share smaller advantages
over men than childless women do. This stands in partial contrast with our status reversal
hypothesis, since a motherhood penalty is found for our primary-school teacher vacancy,
even if only with respect to childless women.
To make sense of hiring decisions we then look at ability and commitment ratings, as well as
at expected working hours in the third to fifth panel of Figure 1. While we reach no conclusion
on ability rankings, we find similar patterns to the ones highlighted for the likelihood of hire
for commitment ratings. These are slightly skewed in favour of women, but again parental
status moderates this advantage to the detriment of mothers. As for expected working hours,
candidates’ parental status reduces employers’ estimate and particularly so for women as
compared to men, as indicated by the interaction coefficient (≈ –2 hours, p < .001). All in
all, little support is found for a status reversal in the primary-school teacher job. Mothers
are perceived as less committed and this has (small) negative consequences in terms of their
hiring chances, with respect to childless women but not men.
Turning to the software engineer job vacancy in Figure 2 (see column 2 in Tables A6 to
A10), we surprisingly find the same ranking of candidates in terms of likelihood of hire, with
childless women topping employers’ preferences, followed by mothers and men. Differences
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between candidates are smaller in size, as compared to the teacher experiment, and none of
them reaches statistical significance at conventional levels. Also similar to our female-typical
vacancy, we cannot detect any gradient by sex of the candidate and parental status in terms
of salary offers or ability.
For our measures of commitment, evidence is mixed. The presence of children reduces em-
ployers’ expectation regarding a candidate’s commitment more for women than for men
(gender-by-parental status interaction = –.199, p = .053). Differently, employers rank men
at the top of expected hours, followed by childless women, and then by male and female par-
ents. As shown in the fifth panel of Figure 2, both being female and being a parent decrease
a candidate’s expected working hours, but parental status seems not to hurt women more
than men (gender-by-parental status interaction = –.692, p = .186).
Taken together, findings from both experiments fit with neither economic nor sociopsycholog-
ical models of discrimination. Contrary to our family-risk hypothesis, core to the statistical
discrimination scenario, women are not disadvantaged irrespective of parental status. Impor-
tantly, this lack of pro-male bias is more evident in male-typical jobs where our occupation-
risk hypothesis would have predicted harsher statistical discrimination against women. As
for status-characteristic theory, we do find some support for a motherhood penalty, but sur-
prisingly only with respect to childless women and for primary-school teacher job vacancies.
Also, if status beliefs are at work, they do so similarly across our male- and female-typical
jobs. We cannot discern a status ranking in terms of ability, but only in terms of expected
commitment, disadvantaging mothers albeit with respect to childless women only.
In line with our last, contract-risk hypothesis, we investigate heterogeneity by work contract.
This may unveil patterns coherent with statistical discrimination, which we expected to be
more prominent when permanent contracts are offered in male-typical jobs. We examine
this prediction in Figures 3 and 4 (corresponding to columns 3 and 4 of Tables A1-A10).
Comparing coefficients across models separate by type of contract, we find little evidence
of heterogeneous effects. For our male-typical job vacancy in particular (Figure 4), female
candidates are no less (nor more) likely to be hired or paid lower salaries than men when a
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permanent contract is offered.
4. Discussion and conclusions
Confronting fictitious and identical CVs, Dutch employers in our study would hire women
slightly more than men, and childless women more than mothers, to fill a primary-school
teacher vacancy. Such preference ranking is not detected in a second experiment, this time
for a software engineer job vacancy, nor do we detect discrimination in salary offers in both
experiments. Female candidates that give evidence of being a mother are expected to be less
committed to their job, but again their disadvantage is small in size. Clear-cut and sizeable
effects are only detected for expected working hours, with mothers (both parents) expected
to work the lowest amount of weekly hours when applying for a primary-school teacher job
(software engineer job).
Our conclusions are, first of all, sample-dependent. We were able to draw on a sample of
Dutch individuals, participating in a pre-existing online panel survey and with HR responsi-
bilities in their current job. The latter feature in particular enhances the external validity of
our study, improving on previous research typically relying on undergraduates in controlled
experimental settings (Correll et al., 2007; Koch et al., 2015). Since our employers came
from all sectors of the economy, however, they may not have had specialised knowledge of
the two occupation-specific job markets of primary school teacher and software engineer.
Yet, previous studies could not detect a preference for male over female candidates for the
position of software engineer, even when involving Dutch employers in the IT sector (Di Sta-
sio and van de Werfhorst, 2016). For the teacher vacancy, our findings are in line with those
of two field experiments ran in Sweden for similar job titles (Carlsson, 2011; Bygren et al.,
2017). Effect sizes are also in line with those found investigating gender-by-parental-status
interactions in previous studies for other European countries (e.g. Bygren et al., 2017; Oesch
et al., 2017). The small magnitude of these effects stands out, particularly in comparison
with that highlighted for the US context (Correll et al., 2007).
Findings from our two survey experiments are also bounded to the successful manipulation
of our treatments. Once employers finished rating CVs, we asked them a) whether the can-
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didates they just evaluated were both female or both male, b) whether one of the candidates
had a kid and the other did not, and c) whether the vacancy they were required to fill was
permanent or temporary. While more than 70% of employers correctly recalled features a)
and b) of job candidates in both experiments, only 46-47% correctly recalled the type of
work contract being offered in the job ad. While many factors can bias recall, our estimates
should nonetheless be regarded as intention-to-treat.
Overall we find little evidence of a motherhood penalty in hiring in two sex-typical jobs in
the Netherlands, in line with what field experiments and vignette studies have shown in other
European countries (Petit, 2007; Bygren et al., 2017; Oesch et al., 2017). In our experiments,
this holds even if Dutch employers expect mothers to be less committed to their job and work
fewer hours a week than men and women without kids. This may speak to the relevance of
context for hiring decisions (e.g. Bills et al., 2017). In the Netherlands, women in part-time
jobs have similar chances to receive firm-sponsored training (Picchio and van Ours, 2016) and
experience comparatively small wage penalties (Fouarge and Muffels, 2009) vis-a`-vis their
full-time counterparts. The spread of part-time work arrangements (Bosch et al., 2010) and
the weakening of the ‘work obligation’ norm (Wielers and Raven, 2013), one giving work the
priority over all other spheres of life, may also explain why Dutch employers’ expectations
regarding a candidate’s commitment and working hours have small or nil spillover effects
on hiring decisions. Future research could shed light on whether employers hold similar
expectations, but to much greater detriment for the hiring of female job candidates, in
contexts where women (mothers) are expected to work par-time yet part-time jobs are of
much poorer quality career-wise.
On balance, results in this study fail to meet our predictions under both statistical and
status-based models of discrimination. Our study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first
to explicitly pit these theories against each other while examining gender-by-parental-status
hiring discrimination (cfr. Correll et al., 2007). We particularly focused on the screening of
CVs: most of our employers carried out real-world screenings in their jobs and such stage
of recruitment arguably presents a favourable opportunity structure for discrimination (e.g.
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Petersen and Saporta, 2004). Yet, we cannot assess here whether discrimination, either of
the statistical or of the status-based kind, may occur later in the hiring process or whether
and how it may affect career progression. The current debate could thus benefit from accu-
mulating tests of these two theories not only in other contexts, or for different job titles, but
also considering more fully the stages in which employers reward or penalise job candidates
and current employees.
Although not the main focus in our survey experiments, investigating gender discrimination
in hiring in sex-typical jobs may also highlight whether or not employers contribute to
occupational segregation in labour markets. In this respect, Dutch employers’ preference
for female candidates all else equal for a primary-school teacher vacancy is consistent with
previous experimental research on hiring discrimination in female-typical jobs (Booth and
Leigh, 2010; Carlsson, 2011; Rich, 2014). Yet, the presence of, if anything, very small effects
may rather strengthen the stance of those pointing to persistent gender segregation by field of
study (Barone, 2011; van de Werfhorst, 2017) as the main source of occupational segregation.
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Notes
1For example, Dutch employers particularly value a candidate’s field of study and occupation-specific
degrees (Di Stasio and van de Werfhorst, 2016). We felt that omitting such a commonplace information in
order to simulate a low-information setting would have further compromised the external validity of our
study.
2Both for the pre-test and test phase sample size was determined with reference to previous studies with a
similar design (Correll et al., 2007) and drawing from the total pool of 749 potential participants previously
identified in LISS through our filter questions. Prior to data collection, we defined clear stopping rules for
both the pre-test and the test keeping into account that the response rate in LISS usually exceeds 80%.
Employers involved in the pre-test phase were not re-contacted for the test.
3These numbers largely reflect persistent gender segregation in the correspondent fields of study (Barone,
2011; van de Werfhorst, 2017), yet we ask here if employers practice hiring discrimination even if confronted
with candidates with equal educational qualifications (work experience) in the relevant field (occupation).
4For Dutch teachers, salaries are set with reference to a national standard nonetheless (Salarisschaal)
5We made inquiries into online jobs postings of websites such as indeed.nl, nationalevacaturebank.nl,
and meesterbaan.nl.
6Throughout the test phase, employers give individual ratings to job applicants, meaning that there are
no instructions that would explicitly encourage any comparison or choice between the two candidates forming
a given pair. Previous research on gender discrimination in hiring has found no evidence of heterogeneous
effects depending on the type of rating (individual v. comparative) participants have been asked to give
(Koch et al., 2015).
7Such transformations do not alter the substantive or statistical significance of our results. Model estimates
deploying untransformed outcomes are available upon request.
8Multilevel models are chosen to account for the nested nature of our data (CVs nested within employ-
ers/subjects) and to allow for the estimation of both between- and within-subjects factors. Alternatively,
one can opt to include employer fixed effects in simple linear regression and thereby retain the possibility of
estimating coefficients for within-subjects factors and for the interaction(s) of within- and between-subjects
factors. Such fixed-effects estimates are available upon request. They are indistinguishable from their coun-
terparts in our multilevel models of choice.
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Tables & graphs
Table 1: Summary of sample features for each survey experiment.
Primary-school teacher Software engineer
Female 0.44 0.37
Age 46.57 47.08
Degree (HBO or WO) 0.60 0.62
Have a partner 0.81 0.78
Have children 0.49 0.49
Have the power to hire/fire 0.47 0.43
Screen candidates (CVs, interviews) 0.90 0.87
Set or influence pay 0.44 0.35
Influence or decide on promotions 0.48 0.45
Number of employers 239 237
Source: LISS 2016.
187
Female
Parent
Female X Parent
Female
Parent
Female X Parent
-.05 0 .05 .1 -.04 -.02 0 .02 .04 -.2 0 .2 .4
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 -3 -2 -1 0 1
Likelihood of Hire ln(Monthly Wage) Ability
Commitment Expected Hours
Figure 1: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals from multilevel linear models for hiring decisions
and ratings in the primary-school teacher experiment.
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Figure 2: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals from multilevel linear models for hiring decisions
and ratings in the software engineer experiment.
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Figure 3: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals from multilevel linear models for hiring decisions
and ratings in the primary-school teacher experiment, separate by work contract.
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Figure 4: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals from multilevel linear models for hiring decisions
and ratings in the software engineer experiment, separate by work contract.
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Appendix
Table 1A: Multilevel linear models for the likelihood of hire. Primary-school teacher
experiment (LISS 2017).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole sample Whole sample
Temporary
contract
Permanent
contract
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
Female 0.028 0.040** 0.031 0.050**
(0.017) (0.019) (0.028) (0.024)
Parent 0.006 0.001 0.010
(0.010) (0.016) (0.012)
Female × Parent −0.025* −0.023 −0.027
(0.014) (0.022) (0.017)
LR test (1,2) 4.55
(p = .103)
ICC 0.731 0.735 0.709 0.767
Number of employers 239 239 117 122
Number of observations 478 478 234 244
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
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Table 2A: Multilevel linear models for the monthly wage offer (logged). Primary-
school teacher experiment (LISS 2017).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole sample Whole sample
Temporary
contract
Permanent
contract
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
Female −0.002 −0.006 −0.033 0.022
(0.016) (0.017) (0.024) (0.024)
Parent −0.009 −0.015 −0.003
(0.009) (0.011) (0.013)
Female × Parent 0.007 0.012 0.002
(0.012) (0.015) (0.018)
LR test (1,2) 1.07
(p = 0.586)
ICC 0.755 0.756 0.801 0.710
Number of employers 239 239 117 122
Number of observations 478 478 234 244
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
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Table 3A: Multilevel linear models for ability ratings. Primary-school teacher ex-
periment (LISS 2017).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole sample Whole sample
Temporary
contract
Permanent
contract
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
Female 0.117 0.148 0.084 0.212*
(0.084) (0.091) (0.130) (0.127)
Parent 0.023 −0.029 0.068
(0.050) (0.071) (0.070)
Female × Parent −0.062 −0.007 −0.109
(0.070) (0.097) (0.100)
LR test (1,2) 0.84
(p = .656)
ICC 0.705 0.705 0.721 0.691
Number of employers 239 239 117 122
Number of observations 478 478 234 244
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
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Table 4A: Multilevel linear models for commitment ratings. Primary-school teacher
experiment (LISS 2017).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole sample Whole sample
Temporary
contract
Permanent
contract
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
Female 0.110 0.216* 0.159 0.267
(0.109) (0.120) (0.174) (0.166)
Parent −0.034 −0.105 0.026
(0.072) (0.108) (0.097)
Female × Parent −0.212** −0.112 −0.303**
(0.101) (0.148) (0.139)
LR test (1,2) 11.96
(p = .003)
ICC 0.629 0.644 0.640 0.650
Number of employers 239 239 117 122
Number of observations 478 478 234 244
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
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Table 5A: Multilevel linear models for expected working hours. Primary-school
teacher experiment (LISS 2017).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole sample Whole sample
Temporary
contract
Permanent
contract
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
Female −1.261*** −0.225 0.593 −0.969*
(0.366) (0.428) (0.631) (0.575)
Parent −0.641** −0.481 −0.778**
(0.317) (0.503) (0.396)
Female × Parent −2.072*** −2.487*** −1.663***
(0.444) (0.685) (0.570)
LR test (1,2) 69.28
(p < .001)
ICC 0.341 0.462 0.412 0.508
Number of employers 239 239 117 122
Number of observations 478 478 234 244
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
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Table 6A: Multilevel linear models for the likelihood of hire. Software engineer
experiment (LISS 2017).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole sample Whole sample
Temporary
contract
Permanent
contract
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
Female 0.022 0.028 0.005 0.054*
(0.020) (0.021) (0.030) (0.028)
Parent −0.004 0.004 −0.012
(0.010) (0.015) (0.014)
Female × Parent −0.012 −0.014 −0.011
(0.014) (0.020) (0.021)
LR test (1,2) 2.78
(p = 0.249)
ICC 0.763 0.766 0.788 0.736
Number of employers 237 237 120 117
Number of observations 474 474 240 234
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
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Table 7A: Multilevel linear models for the monthly wage offer (logged). Software
engineer experiment (LISS 2017).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole sample Whole sample
Temporary
contract
Permanent
contract
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
Female 0.002 −0.002 −0.013 0.010
(0.011) (0.012) (0.017) (0.016)
Parent 0.003 0.007 −0.001
(0.007) (0.010) (0.009)
Female × Parent 0.009 0.021 −0.006
(0.009) (0.014) (0.012)
LR test (1,2) 3.36
(p = 0.186)
ICC 0.684 0.688 0.683 0.710
Number of employers 237 237 120 117
Number of observations 474 474 240 234
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
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Table 8A: Multilevel linear models for ability ratings. Software engineer experiment
(LISS 2017).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole sample Whole sample
Temporary
contract
Permanent
contract
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
Female 0.130 0.133 0.100 0.166
(0.087) (0.095) (0.141) (0.128)
Parent −0.016 −0.107 0.069
(0.055) (0.077) (0.077)
Female × Parent −0.005 0.141 −0.152
(0.077) (0.106) (0.111)
LR test (1,2) 0.24
(p = .887)
ICC 0.673 0.673 0.718 0.626
Number of employers 237 237 120 117
Number of observations 474 474 240 234
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
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Table 9A: Multilevel linear models for commitment ratings. Software engineer ex-
periment (LISS 2017).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole sample Whole sample
Temporary
contract
Permanent
contract
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
Female −0.006 0.093 0.036 0.148
(0.103) (0.115) (0.165) (0.159)
Parent −0.118 −0.071 −0.161*
(0.073) (0.114) (0.093)
Female × Parent −0.199* −0.324** −0.067
(0.103) (0.155) (0.133)
LR test (1,2) 21.03
(p < .001)
ICC 0.570 0.599 0.557 0.649
Number of employers 237 237 120 117
Number of observations 474 474 240 234
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
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Table 10A: Multilevel linear models for expected working hours. Software engineer
experiment (LISS 2017).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole sample Whole sample
Temporary
contract
Permanent
contract
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
Female −1.468*** −1.122*** −1.225** −0.958
(0.344) (0.424) (0.609) (0.588)
Parent −1.655*** −1.643*** −1.667***
(0.354) (0.490) (0.509)
Female × Parent −0.692 −0.388 −1.035
(0.496) (0.671) (0.729)
LR test (1,2) 59.53
(p < .001)
ICC 0.201 0.318 0.393 0.229
Number of employers 237 237 120 117
Number of observations 474 474 240 234
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
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Summary
That ‘parenthood will change your life’ is common sense. Less self-evident is how women
and men grow unequal in labour markets as a consequence of parenthood. Once confined
to ‘home-making’, women have made strides in labour markets, increasingly so across
cohorts and continuously along their lifecycle. Gender gaps in pay have shrank and women
and men distribute more evenly across jobs, but only up to a point. Parenthood, in
particular, divides today the careers of women and men. A family gap has emerged in
labour markets: Women pay economic and career prices for motherhood, while the career
progression of men marches on come fatherhood.
Gender inequality in paid work persists despite institutional change aimed at mitigat-
ing it or curbing it altogether. Labour market and welfare institutions have variously
departed from the family wage model once supporting male breadwinning through se-
cure, well-paid employment, surrounded by social protections. In particular, the United
Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands moved away from this family wage model in
recent decades. This move has been marked by two main transformations, namely the
expansion of family leave rights and the flexibilisation of employment relationships. Yet,
beyond commonalities, policy trajectories have diverged in the three countries and so
have their consequences for the family gap and gender inequality more broadly.
Hence, I ask here how the family gap has shaped in the midst of akin and yet distinct
changes in the labour market and welfare institutions formerly devoted to the family
wage principle in the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands. By highlighting progress and
stall in the ways these three countries came to modify their male breadwinner order, my
main tenet is that policies aimed at women and families are not by default women- or
family-friendly. The family gap, I argue, is often the unintended or perverse by-product
of gradual and selective institutional change. Throughout, this overarching question is
addressed drawing on panel data analysis, quasi-experimental designs, and experimental
data.
In Chapter 1, I address whether fatherhood causally affects the wages of men in the
modified male breadwinner societies of Germany and the UK, relying on long-running
household panel data. Not unlike previous research for Nordic countries but differently
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from US-based studies, I cannot detect (substantial) wage responses to the transition to
fatherhood in both countries, on average as well as across cohorts. Positive selection into
fatherhood on the basis of prior wage levels and prior wage growth seemingly accounts
for much of the apparent premium. Overall, these results question whether fatherhood
“bonuses” contribute to family gaps and suggest to (re)cast the focus of policies to moth-
erhood “penalties” instead.
In Chapters 2 and 3, I turn to the effects of specific policies combining panel data and
a difference-in-differences design. Chapter 2 assesses how changes to parental leave man-
dates have shaped the motherhood wage penalty in Germany over recent decades. Overall
stability in the motherhood wage penalty is found comparing before and after the early
parental leave expansion, culminated in 1992. The new benefit installed in 2007, combin-
ing shortened and earnings-related benefit receipt and a “daddy bonus”, seems to have
ameliorated instead the average wage penalty for German mothers. Such patterns are
examined in the light of human capital, effort, and signalling mechanisms triggered by
each reform.
Chapter 3 turns from family leave rights to the flexibilisation of employment relationships,
with a focus on working-time flexibility and the labour market outcomes of parents in
the UK. I analyse a 2003 reform granting parents of young children the right to request
changes to their working-time arrangements with their current employer. Coherent with
a compensating differential story, eligible mothers of young children are the only group
that ends up trading off wage losses for shorter work schedules, while also feeling more
satisfied with working-time arrangements, in the aftermath of the reform.
A survey experiment involving Dutch employers is then the subject of Chapter 4. Hiring
decisions in a female-typical and a male-typical job are investigated. The experimen-
tal design allows to single out differential treatment of female and male job applicants
depending on their parental status, testing the implications of an economic and a socio-
psychological model of employer discrimination. Data in this study support neither, as
little differences in likelihood of hire or salary offers are found across candidates and job
types. Strikingly though, and in contrast with previous US-based research, such results
hold even if Dutch employers still expect mothers to be less committed to their job and
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to ask for the shortest working week available.
All in all, I attempt here to bridge some of the gaps in the extant literature. I highlight
links between institutional change and the well-established family gap in labour markets.
Motherhood penalties are key to persistent gender gaps in labour markets, but the effects
that new ‘family-friendly’ policies have on such gaps may vary over time and context.
Based on the findings of this dissertation, no “welfare model” or policy recipe (or laundry
list even) is identified and proposed as a panacea to counteract the family gap. Rather,
I more modestly provide an appraisal of how policy effects are subject to the logic of
trial and error, much like best practices in the science that aims at studying such policy
effects. In doing so, I lay down a – hopefully transparent – causal approach aimed at
shedding light on the assumptions needed to uncover whether and how parenthood and
policies contribute, to this day, to gendered economic inequality.
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